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A decade [after the signing of the Oslo Accords,] . . . . the image of [a Pales-
tinian] economy had taken form. The superheroes were not the negotia-
tors . . . and not even the Audi-happy Palestinian ministers, but rather the
donors and their agents who built an entire aid industry using the [Oslo]
agreements . . . as its foundation.
–  Sam Bahour1
Good governance is the highest form of resistance.
–  Senior Palestinian official2
Introduction: Stalemate, Internationalized3
On September 13, 1993, the New York Times announced, “In a triumph
of hope over history, Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yasir
Arafat, the chairman of the [Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)],
shook hands today on the White House lawn, sealing the first agreement
between Jews and Palestinians to end their conflict and share the holy
land . . . that they both call home.”4  Media the world over echoed the
themes of “hope over history,” peace over war, negotiation and compromise
over violence and conflict.5  Many expected that the Declaration of Princi-
ples on Palestinian Self-Government signed that day, along with several
agreements known collectively as the “Oslo Accords,”6 would usher in a
new and profoundly different era for Israelis and Palestinians.7
1. Sam Bahour, Palestine’s Economic Hallucination, 165 THIS WEEK IN PALESTINE, Jan.
2012.
2. Interview with senior Palestinian official in Ramallah, West Bank (Jan. 2009).
3. In addition to secondary literature, reference will be made to interviews
conducted by the author in Israel and the West Bank between 2007 and 2009.  Names
have been kept confidential.
4. Thomas L. Friedman, Rabin and Arafat Seal Their Accord as Clinton Applauds
‘Brave Gamble’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at lA1.
5. See id.
6. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.-PLO,
art. 1, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M 1525 (1993) [hereinafter DOP].  The litany of documents
and meetings that have emerged from various bilateral negotiations since Oslo is vast in
scope.  Following the Declaration of Principles, there was the Agreement on the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho Area (1994); Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(1995); Hebron Agreement (1997); Wye River Memorandum (1998); Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum (1999); Camp David II Summit (2000); Taba negotiations (2001); Quartet
on the Middle East, A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/
mideast/roadmap122002.pdf [hereinafter Roadmap]; and the Annapolis Conference
(2007).
7. This description is not to imply that there were no skeptics at the time.  The
most renowned was, perhaps, Edward Said, who authored a series of articles criticizing
the Accords. Several of these were later collected in Said’s PEACE AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
ESSAYS ON PALESTINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS (1996).
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By April 2014, the New York Times had a more skeptical assessment:
“The crisis that engulfed the ailing Middle East peace process this week
was much more about preserving the process than finding a path to
peace.”8  More than two decades after the historic handshake, the goals of
the Oslo Accords remain unfulfilled: violence continues, the parties have
failed to achieve a diplomatic agreement, and Israeli occupation persists.9
Yet the institutional forms, central players, and daily practices of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict have been transformed.  In this sense, the “Oslo
regime” is as significant for the system it produced as for the solution it
failed to provide.  The Accords produced a durable new reality in the West
Bank and Gaza10 in which international ideas, donor aid, and expert assis-
tance play a dominant role in the routine organization and management of
the Palestinian territories.
The Oslo Accords both anticipated and necessitated international
intervention.  International organizations and foreign states have played a
role in managing, governing, and shaping the territory between the Jordan
River and the Mediterranean Sea for over a century.11  Their direct role on
the ground diminished between 1948, with the establishment of the state
of Israel, and 1993.12  With the advent of the Oslo era, however, interna-
tional money, expertise, and ideas became central once again.  Israelis and
Palestinians negotiated the Accords in an era of increased international
involvement in conflict and post-conflict territories, and the Accords were
predicated on the availability of international resources and experts. Yet
international norms and ideas shaped the regime the Accords produced in
ways that its authors could not have foreseen.  International involvement
contributed to reframing the conflict from the occupation of territory by a
victorious power against the will and resistance of a local population, into
an indefinite “transition” in which two organized entities face one another
in negotiations as notional equals while the focal point of public life in the
occupied territories shifts from political resistance to institution-building,
economic development, and security.
The Oslo regime formally reallocated power and responsibility for the
8. Jodi Rudoren, A Peace Process in Which Process Has Come to Outweigh Peace, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 4, 2014, at A1.
9. Id.
10. Throughout this Article, “West Bank and Gaza,” “occupied territories,” and “Pal-
estinian territories” will be used interchangeably.
11. See generally MARK TESSLER, A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
(2009).
12. The notable exception is the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu-
gees (UNRWA), which was established in 1949 by the U.N. General Assembly and has
worked continuously in the West Bank and Gaza. UNGA A/ RES/302 (IV), 8 Dec. 1949.
In 2014, UNRWA served approximately 2 million registered refugees in the West Bank
and Gaza. UNRWA: Where We Work, UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY, availa-
ble at http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).  As an institu-
tion founded in a wholly different context and operating separately from the Oslo
regime, the study of UNRWA is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Palestinian population and territory between Israel13 and the Palestinian
Authority (“the Authority”), the nascent quasi-government created by the
Accords.  While the Oslo Accords assigned the Authority explicit responsi-
bility for Palestinian welfare and duties to control the population, they left
overall territorial control and an overriding responsibility for security with
the Government of Israel.14  The agreement was accompanied by a massive
ongoing aid package— envisioned as temporary— that inserted interna-
tional organizations and foreign donors into the inevitable gap that
emerged between the Palestinian Authority’s responsibilities and its capaci-
ties.15 As negotiations faltered, timeframes expanded, and violence ebbed
and flowed, international actors became increasingly indispensable play-
ers, enmeshed in governance on the ground no less than in the diplomatic
process.
The Authority’s limits were not the sole factor making international
actors central to the conflict.  The Oslo Accords reformulated the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict into a series of problems to be negotiated and resolved
in an international arena, mediated and managed by external actors.  In
1993, being “for” or “against” the Oslo Accords rested on interpreting them
as a victory for peace, a repackaging and re-legitimation of Israeli occupa-
tion, or a first step in a phased Palestinian plan to take over Israel. In the
years since, it has become increasingly clear that none of these notions
captured the essential nature of the Oslo regime, which has grown into a
multilateral governance project encompassing international organizations,
foreign donors, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel (as well as, after 2006,
the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas).  Under this regime, occupier
and occupied— excluding Hamas— were transformed into “partners for
peace” who shared an international vocabulary that shaped their practices
of conflict and cooperation.16
Making international players central to negotiation, conflict, and
reconstruction was hardly an exceptional program in the early 1990s.  The
Oslo Accords were negotiated in an era of renewed vigor for international
organizations and multilateral projects.  Conflict— including internal
wars— and its aftermath had become international concerns.  The “interna-
tional community”— represented by a host of international, regional, and
non-governmental organizations— routinely entered post-conflict states
and territories to reconstruct and rebuild.  The programs and policies pur-
sued in these areas followed the logic of the era as it evolved: peace— negoti-
ated in a multilateral arena— required development based on limited
government, high levels of foreign investment, and good governance prac-
13. Throughout this article, unless otherwise noted, “Israel” will be used to denote
the “Government of Israel.”
14. See id. at 1– 2.
15. See Oren Gross, Mending Walls: The Economic Aspects of Israeli-Palestinian Peace,
15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1540, 1563 (2000) [hereinafter, Gross, Mending Walls]; STATE
FORMATION IN PALESTINE: VIABILITY AND GOVERNANCE DURING A SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 2
(Mushtaq Husain Khan, George Giacaman, & Inge Amundsen, eds., 2004).
16. Mandy Turner, Creating ‘Partners for Peace’: The Palestinian Authority and the
International Statebuilding Agenda, 5 J. INTERVENTION & STATEBUILDING 1 (2011).
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tices; human rights, enforced through institutions and courts, were a neces-
sary component; and humanitarian objectives sometimes justified
displacing governmental power with international intervention.  In this
environment, an international role in brokering and securing a negotiated
peace between Israelis and Palestinians— and a continuing international
presence for a temporary period thereafter— seemed inevitable and
necessary.
The Oslo regime was thus comprised of two shifts: from power central-
ized in Israel to governance shared among multiple actors, and from a
regime characterized by explicit asymmetry, conflict, stasis, and legal
struggles, to one based on apparent equivalence between the parties, nego-
tiations, post-conflict transition, and policy disputes.  The multiplication of
actors evolved out of both the provisions of the initial Accords and the func-
tional needs of the regime.  The shift from an asymmetric occupation dis-
puted through law to ostensible equivalence and struggle over policy was
more subtle and as much a matter of interpretation as of institutional
change.  As a result of these shifts, thinking about the relationship between
Israel and Palestine solely as one of occupation now hides more than it
reveals.
Scholars and policymakers have debated whether or not there was an
occupation prior to 1993,17 whether occupation continued after the Israeli
withdrawals and redeployments in 1994 and 2005,18 or whether the occu-
pation is illegal.19  These questions can be phrased in political, legal, or
empirical terms; at times, they have been discussed in all three.  They are
critical to comprehending the conflict, but they represent only one piece of
the contemporary puzzle.  Thinking only in terms of occupation misses
significant aspects of governance in the West Bank and Gaza today.
17. See infra. notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
18. For an early discussion of the effects of Oslo on the applicability of the law of
occupation, see, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights
Under the Interim Israeli-Palestinian Agreements, 28 ISR. L. REV. 297 (1994) (arguing that
transferring “actual control” to a Palestinian government would end Israeli occupation
in those areas). See also EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2012)
(reflecting that the transfer of power to the Authority was limited as a result of events
taking place after his 1994 article).  For debates over the status of Gaza as occupied
territory after Israel’s 2005 disengagement, see, e.g., Elizabeth Samson, Is Gaza Occu-
pied? Redefining the Status of Gaza Under International Law, 25 AM. UNIV. INTL. L. REV.
915 (2010); Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets Complex Reality: The Occupation of Gaza
Debate, 41 ISR. L. REV. 69 (2008).
19. See, e.g., Yael Ronen, Illegal Occupation and Its Consequences, 41 ISR. L. REV. 201,
216– 21 (2008); Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross, & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation:
Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 553, 605– 6 (2005).
Scholars have also debated whether a more appropriate legal or political analysis of the
situation would involve the category of apartheid rather than occupation. See, e.g., John
Dugard & John Reynolds, Apartheid, International Law and the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 867 (2013); Yaffa Zilbershats, Apartheid, International Law, and
the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Reply to John Dugard and John Reynolds, 24 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 915 (2013); Raef Zreik, Palestine, Apartheid, and the Rights Discourse, 34 J. PALES-
TINE STUD. 68 (2004).
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The pre– 1993 occupation regime framed the parties as deeply une-
qual antagonists, spoke the language of legality and illegality, and created
institutions that tethered together Palestinian territory and population.  By
contrast, the Oslo regime interpreted the parties as relative equals, spoke
the language of policy and compromise, and sponsored institutions that
assigned territorial control to one party, population responsibility to
another, and divided security between the two.  While the new regime was
neither solely dependent on international actors nor comprehensively
formed according to international precepts, international resources, con-
cepts, and practices fundamentally affected the ideas, language, and insti-
tutional form of the new dispensation.  The first half of this article
examines the institutional transformation of governance in the Palestinian
territories from 1967 to 2014, focusing on changes in the institutional
actors, the allocation of power among them, and the practices of govern-
ance.  The second half of the article focuses on the way the conflict has
been and should now be interpreted.
The article begins by examining the roots of the Oslo paradigm and
the concomitant international involvement.  It describes the shift from an
occupation regime that was often articulated through international law and
based on Israeli control of both the Palestinian population and its territory,
to one expressed in the language of policy and premised on a formal divi-
sion of duties between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  Between 1967
and 1993, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territories
was structured around the law of occupation, despite ongoing debates
within Israel with regard to the law’s de jure applicability.20  The practices
of the military government and its arguments at the High Court of Justice
demonstrate that Israel viewed itself as at least partially responsible for the
Palestinian population, despite territorially expansionist activities and the
imposition of broad restrictions on Palestinian development.21  The Oslo
regime reallocated power by delinking control over territory (retained
largely by the Israeli government) from responsibility for the population
(transferred formally to the Palestinian Authority). Occupation as both a
legal regime and an interpretive framework did remain relevant.  Interna-
tional actors, the Palestinian population, and Israeli institutions responsi-
ble for shaping and defending Israeli activity in the territory all continued
to assert their claims, complaints, and defenses in the language of legal and
illegal, appropriate and inappropriate acts under “occupation.”
Despite the continuing relevance of occupation, however, the new
regime produced different actors with new responsibilities.  Limitations on
the Authority’s activity, through both spatial divisions and Israel’s contin-
ued control over territory, resources, and movement, necessitated interna-
tional support for the population formally under the care of the
20. See infra, notes 49-51, and accompanying text.
21. See generally SARA ROY, THE GAZA STRIP: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DE-DEVELOP-
MENT (1995).
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Authority.22  By focusing on economic issues of trade, revenue, and labor, I
analyze the conflict between the Authority’s formal role as the provider of
Palestinian services and welfare and the limitations it faced and continues
to confront as a creature of the Oslo regime.  Although certain aspects of
the pre-existing occupation regime continued after 1994, the tripartite
structure represented a dramatic departure from the prior scheme: the
Accords fostered a new system in which Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
and international organizations and donors shared responsibility for Pales-
tinian territory and population.23
The particular part played by international actors in the Oslo regime
was enabled not only by the language of the Accords but by the habits,
practices, expertise, and ideas they brought with them. Part II begins by
briefly describing the changed nature of the “international community”
after the Cold War, tracing its interventionist agenda, reduced emphasis on
national governments, and commitment to peace negotiations.  It considers
shifts in mainstream conceptions of peacebuilding, economic development,
human rights, and humanitarianism. Part II then analyzes the fluctuating
purposes and uses of aid to the Palestinian territories from 1993 to 2013,
tracing the tensions between aid intended to jumpstart the Palestinian
economy so as to make independence viable, and aid delivered as emer-
gency assistance to maintain an economy unable to escape dependence.
The prolonged nature of the regime eventually created further conundrums
for aid providers.  Part II concludes by examining three of these conflicts:
financial support for a system that many internationals saw as self-perpetu-
ating; the repair of infrastructural damage caused by Israeli military opera-
tions; and the mitigation of the effects of occupation on the local
population.
Part III suggests that an institutional description of the Oslo regime is
necessary but insufficient for understanding the conflict today.  Based on
published reports and field interviews, I argue that the regime has three
key characteristics that influence not only the way Palestinians are gov-
erned but also how they resist and how international actors perceive the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  I call these three characteristics “parity,”
“economism,” and “transition.”  “Parity” refers to the structuring of the
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians as if it were one of relative
equals, and to the designation of bilateral negotiations as the only appro-
priate avenue for achieving political change. “Economism” reflects the idea
that economic development is both the Palestinians’ primary problem
(rather than, for example, inequality of resource distribution) and their
sole solution (rather than other versions of resistance that defy donor
22. See infra Part I. See also Sara Roy, The Palestinian Economy: Beyond Decline, 14
PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2006).
23. For reasons of space and because the international community’s interlocutor is
the Palestinian Authority, the Article discusses Hamas’ position much less than that of
the Authority.  However, Hamas plays a critical organizational role in Palestinian govern-
ance today. See, e.g., NATHAN J. BROWN, GAZA FIVE YEARS ON: HAMAS SETTLES IN (CAR-
NEGIE PAPERS, 2012).
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norms).  Finally, “transition” connotes the redefinition of the situation
from one of conflict and occupation to one of post-conflict reconstruction
preoccupied with process and progress.
Viewing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a governance regime and
placing international actors at the center of analysis demonstrates that
while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is as sui generis as any other, it is no
more so.  The conflict cannot be meaningfully examined if it is portrayed
as the exception to every rule.  The international peace and post-conflict
enterprise, so integral to post– 1993 Palestinian governance, brings with it
language and practices learned and deployed around the world.  The insti-
tutionalization of parity, economism, and transition demonstrate both the
influence of international intervention on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and the manner in which local conditions in turn shape the contours of
intervention.  In particular, the context of violence and insecurity in which
international actors operated for much of the period after 1993, and which
belied the language of peace and post-conflict resolution, narrowed the
parameters of possibility for intervention. Throughout this period— espe-
cially but not only at times of heightened violence, such as Palestinian
attacks during the Second Intifada and Israeli incursions into the West
Bank, or ongoing conflicts between Israel and Hamas in Gaza— interna-
tional action was not only reactive to Palestinian needs but shaped by the
logic of Israeli security concerns.
Twenty years after Rabin and Arafat shook hands on the White House
lawn, the Israeli occupation continues.  This could be explained in myriad
ways. One could tell a story in which Oslo represented nothing more than
the continuation of an unequal regime premised on Israeli territorial
expansion and control of Palestinian life and in which occupation was sim-
ply repackaged and resold under other names and with other tools.  One
could also tell a story of Oslo as a dramatic break in a decades-long conflict
that would have found a peaceful resolution had one or both sides, or ele-
ments thereof, not stood in its way.  While each of these stories has ele-
ments of truth, neither accounts for the significant influence that
international actors and ideas have had.  Both suggest that the essence of
the story is occupation, whether continuing or ending.  Yet the interna-
tional role in governing Palestine suggests that while occupation remains
essential for understanding the situation, it has been displaced as the sole
interpretive framework and basis for governance.  Instead, a new regime
defined by a commitment to negotiations between ostensibly equal part-
ners, state-building based upon a specific version of economic develop-
ment, and gradualist change has taken hold.  Its greatest effect may have
been not ending or continuing the occupation but changing the terms of
the debate.  The Oslo regime intimated that occupation would end while
shifting attention from the political project of ending occupation.  Without
confronting and questioning the benefits and drawbacks of a regime that
both reaches beyond and sometimes obscures occupation, it will be impos-
sible to evaluate the consequences, legality, justice, or morality of the cur-
rent dispensation.
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I. Prelude: The Legal and Institutional Background for International
Governance
In June 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza.24  Legally and
institutionally, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territo-
ries was understood primarily as one of occupation, in which one party
controlled the territory and population of the other on a temporary basis,
balancing the occupier’s security against the occupied’s welfare.25  Institu-
tions formed in the wake of the 1967 War were designed around Israeli
security and management of Palestinian territory and population.  From
the first days after the war, the language of international law was central to
discussions about the status of the territories, and contestations over
Israeli action.26  Although Israel prioritized its own security and territorial
expansion over the welfare of the occupied population, the primacy of the
occupation as both the political and legal framework for rule ensured some
link between territory and population.  Understanding the situation as one
of occupation also suggested a transient period during which the occu-
pier’s activities in the occupied territory should be limited.27  Although the
prolonged nature of Israeli occupation challenged some of these assump-
tions, scholars, policymakers, and activists nonetheless argued over and
analyzed the situation on these grounds.  Whether evaluated in terms of
law, ethics, institutions, or strategy, the most appropriate vocabulary was
that of occupation.
In the twenty years since the Oslo Accords, that vocabulary— and a
series of related practices— has shifted.  Occupation remains central, but
new institutions and allocations of power have altered the form and con-
24. For more information on the 1967 War and the beginning of the occupation, see
generally THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR: ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES (Avi Shlaim &William
Roger Louis eds., 2012); MICHAEL B. OREN, SIX DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND THE MAKING
OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST (2002).
25. The terminology of “occupation” has been contested in Israeli discourse since
1967.  The West Bank and Gaza have often been labeled as “disputed” or “administered”
territories in Hebrew. See, e.g., NEIL CAPLAN, THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT: CONTESTED
HISTORIES (2010). See also Dore Gold, From “Occupied Territories” to “Disputed Territo-
ries”, 24 AM. FOREIGN POL. INT. 207 (2002).  Nonetheless, the governing regime operated
largely on the model of belligerent occupation and despite the questions over the appli-
cability of the law of occupation discussed below, the vocabulary and institutions of
occupation remained central.
26. Then-military advocate general Meir Shamgar issued a letter to the military com-
manders directly after the Israeli victory “reminding [them] of the principles of interna-
tional law . . . .” NEVE GORDON, ISRAEL’S OCCUPATION 26 (2008).  The Security Council
resolution issued shortly after the conclusion of the 1967 war called for the “withdrawal
of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.”  U.N. Sec. Coun-
cil S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967). See also Quincy Wright, The Middle East Problem, 64
AM. J. INT’L L. 270 (1970).  Kretzmer points out that the Supreme Court of Israel saw few
petitions by residents of the Territories in the first decade of occupation; after the 1977
election of a right-wing government in Israel, many more petitions were made to the
Court. DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 8 (2002).
27. BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 93 (The occupant must not seek to effect long-term
changes that would complicate the re-establishment of authority by the legitimate
government”).
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ceptualization of the regime.  Today, two ostensibly equal parties negotiate
common problems while focusing on the production of new Palestinian
institutions for security and development.  The status quo pressure of the
occupation regime has been replaced by a series of steps, conditions, and
benchmarks that emphasize process and suggest progress.  To analyze this
change, this Part examines certain institutional, legal, and policy shifts on
the ground, focusing on the move from a regime controlled by Israel to one
in which power is shared (albeit unequally) between Israel and the Pales-
tinian Authority.  Part II completes the institutional map with an analysis of
the role of international aid to the West Bank and Gaza.
The Oslo Accords largely delinked territorial control from population
responsibility and the occupier’s security from the occupied population’s
welfare.  Under the Accords, Israel withdrew from responsibility for the Pal-
estinian population, transferring duties such as welfare, health care, and
basic services to the newly-created Palestinian Authority.28  Israel main-
tained control of the majority of Palestinian territory, creating a formal sep-
aration between territory (controlled by Israel) and population (cared for
by the Authority).29  On the ground, however, the two could not be mean-
ingfully separated.  The occupying power’s continuing control of move-
ment, resources, and revenue— including actions taken according to the
logic of security— limited the autonomous capacity of the occupied to gov-
ern themselves.  Without another player, the Accords would have created a
governance gap between the Authority’s responsibilities and its capacity.
As a result, the Oslo regime depended from its inception upon interna-
tional mediation, funds, and management.
The initial arrangements of Oslo anticipated international involve-
ment, but only on a temporary basis. The incrementalist philosophy of the
Oslo Accords— which was based on confidence-building through smaller-
scale cooperation and compromise— portrayed shared governance as a
pathway to eventual resolution and, potentially, Palestinian indepen-
dence.30  Despite formal (and symbolic) gains in autonomy for the new
Palestinian leadership, however, a combination of the language of the
Accords and subsequent violence and discord between the parties drasti-
cally limited the potential for Palestinian self-rule.31  Instead, the Authority
became one member of a tripartite structure of governance, along with
28. See infra Part I.C.
29. See infra Part I.C.
30. Orde F. Kittrie, More Process than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo
Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661 (2003).
31. See e.g., David P. Fidler, Peace through Trade? Developments in Palestinian Trade
Law During the Peace Process, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 163– 64 (1998) (noting that Israel
has frequently closed its borders with the Palestinian Territories, wreaking havoc on the
Palestinian economy). The law of occupation does contemplate a degree of self-rule by
the occupied population for administrative purposes.  Dinstein views the Palestinian
Authority in this light, arguing that the autonomy of the local body is inherently limited
as long as the occupation continues. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 58 (2009).
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Israel and a host of international organizations (as well as Hamas, after
2007).
While undeniable continuities exist from the occupation schema to
the Oslo regime, the particular arrangement of responsibility and control,
as well as the large-scale insertion of international actors after 1993, belies
a tale of unchanging rule.32  To understand the transformations wrought
by Oslo requires revisiting Palestinian governance in the decades preceding
the Accords, focusing on the occupation regime.  This Part begins by
briefly examining the law of occupation.  From the outset of Israeli control
in the West Bank and Gaza, legal language provided a common vocabulary
used for describing the situation, evaluating the validity of Israeli rule,
determining the legitimacy of Israeli and Palestinian practices, analyzing
the allocation of power among the parties, and supporting or limiting eco-
nomic development.  As a result, considering the law of occupation is criti-
cal for understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Part I.A demonstrates
that the legal regime of occupation focuses attention on an unequal bilat-
eral relationship that temporarily and exceptionally separates territorial
control from title while maintaining the link between population and terri-
tory.  Because it is both temporary and exceptional, the regime envisions a
separation between occupier and occupied based on limiting the changes
made by the occupier to the public order of the occupied.  Part I.B argues
that between 1967 and 1993, these factors played out in an Israeli occupa-
tion comprised of a set of institutions that maintained some linkages
between the welfare of the Palestinian population and the security of Israel
as manifested through territorial control.  At the same time, the particulari-
ties of this occupation— including its prolonged nature, the expansion of
settlements, and the demographic interest of Israel in maintaining a Jewish
state— increased the level of integration between occupier and occupied.
Part I.C maps the reconfigured relationship between Israel and the West
Bank/Gaza Strip under Oslo through an analysis of the territorial division
initiated by the Accords, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority,
32. But see GORDON, supra note 26, at 180  (arguing that Oslo allowed Israel to pre-
serve the existing distinction between Palestinian inhabitants and their land); LISA HAJ-
JAR, COURTING CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
56 (2005) (suggesting that post– 1967 Israel sought to “separate the land from the peo-
ple residing there” by focusing on the land as unoccupied rather than the population as
a national collective).  While I agree that the Israeli government sought territorial expan-
sion at the expense of protecting or providing for the Palestinian population, I argue that
the system as designed nonetheless retained linkages between people and land that were
disrupted and replaced in the post– 1993 Oslo regime.  The 1978 Camp David Accords
negotiated between Israel and Egypt reinforce this position.  The agreement included a
section on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations which suggested a five year transitional period
with an interim Palestinian “self-governing authority” to replace the Israeli military
authority. See Camp David Accords, at A(1), Sept. 17, 1978, Egypt-Isr.-U.S., 17 I.L.M.
1466 (signing “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East”) at A(1)(a) (Sept. 17, 1978).
The Camp David regime anticipated the division of territory and population eventually
implemented by Oslo, but the fact that it was never implemented underlines the differ-
ence between the 1967– 1993 era (in which territory and population remained linked,
despite attempts to separate them) and the post– 1993 era.
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and the formal allocation of responsibility between Israel and the
Authority.
A. The View from the Law of Occupation
Occupation may be viewed as a way to organize governance, as a polit-
ical problem, as a military action, or as a legal regime.  Perhaps the most
central interpretive frame used in the Israeli case has been to examine occu-
pation as a legal regime.  The Israeli occupation has been consistently
debated and discussed in legal terms, whether with regard to settlements,
the Separation Barrier, or targeted assassinations.33  Even arguments over
whether it is an occupation involved citation to international law.  Thus,
understanding the perception and functions of the regime before 1993
requires focusing on the law of occupation. The International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) defines occupied territory, under both customary and treaty law,
as “territory [that is] actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such author-
ity has been established and can be exercised.”34  The law of occupation
comes into play at the moment the occupant establishes effective control.35
Yet title remains with the occupied, severing sovereignty from control.36
The occupation regime is an exceptional one, defined by a temporary break
with the normal international order.37  It rests upon an unequal relation-
ship between occupier and occupied, in which the former controls both
territory and population of the occupied.  The law institutes protections for
the population on the territory with a view toward the eventual return of
control of that territory to the sovereign, relinking sovereignty and control
and restoring international ‘normalcy’.38  In this sense, the law of occupa-
tion reinforces the connection between territory and population while bal-
ancing the security of the occupier against the welfare of the occupied.  The
occupier maintains its control of territory for its own security but respects
the rights of, and continuity of life for, the local population.
As a legal regime, occupation is characterized not only by the separa-
tion of sovereignty from control, but by the occupier’s management of pub-
lic order and civil life and by its inherently temporary quality.39 While the
33. See generally KRETZMER, supra note 26.
34. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 78 (July 9) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion]. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
35. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277
[hereinafter Hague Regulations 1907]; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 42.
36. DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 49.
37. Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross, & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 553, 605– 6 (2005).
38. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 31 at 140.
39. Although scholars agree that the occupation regime is intended to be temporary,
they argue over the precise implications of its time-bound nature. See Orna Ben-Naftali,
Aeyal M. Gross and Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 553, 599 (2005) (arguing that the legality of occupation
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security of the occupier is central to the regulatory architecture of occupa-
tion, the continuity of life for, and eventual return of the territory to, the
occupied population are critical considerations. The Hague Regulations
state that the occupier must “take all the measures in his power to restore,
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”40 The
Geneva regime focuses on protections for the occupied population and
responsibilities of the occupier.41  The international legal regime therefore
suggests a ‘balance’ between the security of the occupier on the one hand
and the continuity of the local system (Hague) and protection of the popu-
lation (Geneva) on the other, although “realistically, one cannot expect the
occupant, who is entrusted with the discretion to balance the conflicting
interests, to compromise its security interests in favor of the interests of the
population.”42
Although the occupier gains effective control of the territory and thus
of the population, the international legal regime regulates the degree to
which the occupier can fundamentally alter the local system or the life of
the population.43 The system is based upon a concept of temporary inter-
ruption in the life of both territory and population.44  The regime is set up
to maintain separation between the occupier and the occupied on the
grounds that the relationship will eventually end.  There are multiple pos-
relies in part on its temporary nature, as opposed to an indefinite duration). See also
BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 6 (“Because the occupation does not amount to sovereignty,
occupation is also limited in time and the occupant has only temporary managerial
powers”).  For further discussion of the temporary aspects of occupation, see infra Part
III.C.
40. Hague Regulations 1907, supra note 35, at art. 43.
41. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 34, at art. 55, 56, 59.
42. BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 105.  Some view the occupier as a ‘trustee’ of the
territory. See, e.g., Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again:
The Role of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of International Trusteeship and the
Framework of Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
85, 100– 02 (2009).  Given the largely inevitable conflict between the occupier’s interests
and its responsibilities, the law of occupation provides for “Protecting Powers” (either a
third state or other neutral such as an international organization) to “safeguard the inter-
ests of the Parties to the conflict.”  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 34, at art. 9, 11.  In
the event that ”persons protected by the present Convention do not benefit or cease to
benefit” from the actions of the protecting power, the occupier has a duty to appoint a
state or other neutral to perform the functions.  If protection cannot be arranged accord-
ing to these terms, humanitarian organizations may assume humanitarian functions per-
formed by the protecting power, although the activities included within this category “do
not include the power to supervise the management of the affairs of the occupied terri-
tory.” BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 205.  Benvenisti points out that the system of protect-
ing power has been used only twice in the context of Suez (1956) and Goa (1961).
BENVENISTI ,supra note 18, at 207.
43. See DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 286.  After the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional
Authority occupation of Iraq in 2003, a new set of scholarship began to explore the idea
of “transformative occupation.” See, e.g., Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupa-
tion: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 580 (2006);
Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 721
(2005); David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842 (2003).
44. See generally Wilde, supra note 42. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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sibilities for the end of occupation— the loss of effective control by the
occupant, the signing of a peace agreement with “genuine consent of the
[occupied] sovereign,” or the transfer of authority to an “indigenous gov-
ernment endorsed by the occupied population through referendum and
which has received international recognition”45— but there is no provision
for its permanence.46
B. Occupation on the Ground: 1967– 1993
In June 1967, Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan and
Egypt, respectively.47  Military administrations were immediately put in
place; a military order issued by the Israeli Military Commander declared
that existing law would remain in place insofar as it did not conflict with
military orders.48  The Israeli government initially argued that neither the
Hague Regulations nor the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to the West
Bank and Gaza,49 although Israel’s attorney general asserted that the
“humanitarian” provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention would be
applied de facto.50  The Israeli Supreme Court eventually applied the Hague
Regulations and has made “relating to provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Convention . . . part of [its] standard practice.”51
45. BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 56.  Formerly, occupation could also end in a situa-
tion of deballatio, in which the enemy state was utterly destroyed and no groups contin-
ued to fight on the defeated sovereign’s behalf.  However, the increased emphasis on self-
determination has largely overridden that option. Id. at 56. Dinstein adds that the Secur-
ity Council may be able to terminate occupation, as it did in Iraq, but that the fact that
this occurred only once and only in a strictly formal sense, makes this a contested possi-
bility. DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 272.
46. As Ben-Naftali et al. discuss, the prohibition on the acquisition of title to terri-
tory by force is a central tenet of international law. Ben-Naftali, supra note 19, at 2024.
47. See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories
Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 58– 60 (1990).
48. Proclamation Concerning Law and Administration (no. 2) (June 7, 1967).  A
separate order placed East Jerusalem under the municipality of West Jerusalem, which
was interpreted by many international observers as an illegal act of annexation of occu-
pied territory. See BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 204– 05.  The Israeli Supreme Court did
not formally recognize the act as annexation, but the state has exercised sovereignty over
“united Jerusalem” since 1967. Id. A 1980 Basic Law stated that “Jerusalem, complete
and united, is the capital of Israel.” Id.
49. Israeli Attorney General Shamgar claimed that recognizing the applicability of
the Fourth Geneva Convention would implicitly recognize the sovereignty of Jordan and
Egypt in the West Bank and Gaza respectively by according them the title of High Con-
tracting Party according to the Convention.  Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems
of the Israeli Military Government— The Initial Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TER-
RITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, 1967– 80 (Meir Shamgar, ed., 1992); see also Yehuda
Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L.
REV. 279 (1968).  Israel continues to deny the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva
Convention to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but neither the International Court of
Justice nor the vast majority of international lawyers has accepted this claim. See Advi-
sory Opinion, supra note 35, para. 101; BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 206; DINSTEIN,
supra note 31, at 2024 (2009); Roberts, supra note 47, at 63– 66.
50. BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 206.
51. David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel,
94 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 207, 213 (2012). See BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 207– 08. See
also Roberts, supra note 48, at 62– 63.  In the early years of the occupation, the Court
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Following the traditional understanding of occupation, control of, and
responsibility for, both territory and population fell to the Israeli state.52
Although the Israeli occupation schema arguably sought territorial expan-
sion at the expense of the population’s welfare,53 the legal regime of bellig-
erent occupation ensured some connection between the two.  Orders
issued by the Israeli military administration of the Territories54 immedi-
ately became law.55  These authorities managed (directly or indirectly)
most aspects of Palestinian life, ranging from social services to education,
trade, and security.56  A constant battle was waged between Israel’s interest
in its own security and its duties to protect the Palestinian population’s
welfare.57
The tension between an expansionist settlement project58 and the
state’s demographic preoccupations led to a regime that oscillated between
integration and separation of occupier and occupied.  The legal, political,
and economic rules and practices of the occupation swung between the
need to separate the Territories from Israel and an interest in maintaining a
close relationship between them.  This tension was present from the earli-
est era of the occupation, and it grew markedly as the decades wore on.
At the most explicit level of separation, the West Bank and Gaza were
placed under military rule, while East Jerusalem operated under Israeli
municipal law.59  Legally, the Territories were maintained as separate units
from the state of Israel, with military courts adjudicating security viola-
tions, other tribunals addressing administrative questions, and some
existing local courts continuing their operation.60  Israelis and Palestinians
could both move relatively freely across the former border, although the
“followed this path after government counsel had expressly stated that as the authorities
were convinced that they had acted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention,
they agreed to review of their acts according to its strictures.”  The authorities later
argued that the Convention was not customary law and thus not applicable, but the
Court continued to interpret the Convention in some of its rulings. Kretzmer, supra note
26, at 43.
52. See Roberts, supra note 47, at 58– 61.
53. See BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 206– 09.
54. The Israeli Civil Administration, operating under the Coordinator of Govern-
ment Operations in the Territories (COGAT) was created in 1981 to replace the military
government as the governing body of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. See Israel Military
Order Concerning the Establishment of a Civilian Administration (No. 947) (Nov. 8,
1981), translation available at http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israelmilitary-
orders/fulltext/mo0947.htm.
55. See Shamgar, supra note 49.
56. Uri Shoham, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military Government in the
Territories, 153 MIL. L. REV. 245, 250– 51 (1996); ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 112– 14 (1978).
57. For a detailed discussion of the dilemma and the approach of the Supreme
Court, see Kretzmer, supra note 26, at 64– 72.
58. See generally GERSHOM GORENBERG, THE ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE: ISRAEL AND THE BIRTH
OF THE SETTLEMENTS, 1967– 1977 (2007).
59. See BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 204– 05. See generally MENACHEM KLEIN, JERUSA-
LEM: THE CONTESTED CITY (2001).
60. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 117– 18 (2004); HAJJAR,
supra note 32, at 58– 69.
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latter were subject to a permit regime for both labor and non-work related
movement.61
Despite one set of practices that maintained separation between Israel
and the Palestinian territories, another set simultaneously fostered integra-
tion.  First and foremost, the establishment of Israeli settlements, which
were regulated under Israeli law, integrated parts of the West Bank terri-
tory into the Israeli system.62  Second, although the grounds differ, both
Israeli citizens and Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza had
(and continue to have) recourse to the Israeli High Court.63  Finally, in the
economic arena, “imposed, incomplete” integration stemmed from eco-
nomic interests and a tactical determination that improving Palestinian
daily life might mitigate opposition to Israeli rule.64
The Israeli government regulated the Palestinian economy directly and
created an economic union between the Palestinian and Israeli econo-
mies.65  In the years following 1967, the Territories became a source of
cheap labor (at first illegal and later regulated) for Israeli businesses, and
Israel became the primary market for Palestinian goods.66  A 1983 Israeli
High Court case allowing Israel to impose value added taxes (VAT) on the
territories both revealed and permitted further integration between the ter-
ritories and Israel;67 at the same time, however, the integration itself con-
tributed to further economic inequality between the two areas.68
According to the High Court, “the economy of the territories is umbilically
tied to the economy of Israel,”69 and the inevitable connection between the
two necessitated integration for the purposes of protecting the restoration
of public life and order required by the Hague Regulations.70  The Court’s
reasoning relies on three premises: first, the existing integration between
the economies is both beneficial and inevitable given the military occupa-
tion of the West Bank and Gaza;71 second, the imposition of the VAT on the
61. See LEILA FARSAKH, PALESTINIAN LABOUR MIGRATION TO ISRAEL: LABOUR, LAND AND
OCCUPATION (2005)
62. Settlement activity intensified exponentially after the election of the right-wing
Likud government of Menachem Begin in 1977. See, e.g., Ian Lustick, Israel and the West
Bank After Elon Moreh: The Mechanics of De Facto Annexation, 35 MID. EAST J. 557
(1981).
63. Kretzmer, supra note 26, at 19– 30; BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 218 (arguing
that the Court’s motivations included both “humanitarian considerations” and “the
wish to intensify ties between the local residents and the Israeli system”).
64. Arie Arnon & Jimmy Weinblatt, Sovereignty and Economic Development: The Case
of Israel and Palestine, 111 ECON. J. 291, 292 (2001).
65. BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 232.
66. Gross, Mending Walls, supra note 15, at 1549-52.
67. See HCJ 69/81 Bassil Abu Aita et al. v. The Regional Commander of Judea and
Samaria and Staff Officer in Charge of Matters of Customs and Excise 37(2) PD 197
[1983] (Isr.).
68. Gross, Mending Walls, supra note 15, at 1551 (2000) (arguing that Israel unilater-
ally shaped Israeli-Palestinian trade relations).
69. Bassil Abu Aita et al., HCJ 69/81 at 104.
70. Id. at 143.
71. Few would argue that Israeli policies did not benefit the Palestinian population
in the years between 1967 and the First Intifada, in the sense of increasing the standard
of living, levels of employment, and ownership of goods.  However, these improvements
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Territories is required in order to continue the beneficial integration
between the two economies (which are, for all intents and purposes, largely
one economy with unequal distribution); and third, maintaining the bene-
ficial level of integration is necessary not only for the benefit of the Pales-
tinian residents of the Territories but also for the security of Israel, since
“serious economic harm” in the Territories would constitute a “security
danger” for Israel.72  The decision exemplifies a particular line of argument
that finds actions by the occupier necessary for both populations.  While
the security of the occupying power remained central, both the military
government and the Court emphasized during the pre– 1993 era the
responsibility of the occupier to protect and assist the occupied
population.73
The longevity of the Israeli occupation exacerbated both the balance
between security and welfare and the tension between separation and inte-
gration.74  The longer an integrated system remains, the more the occu-
pier’s policies shape the local economy, and the harder it becomes to
institute economic (and thus political or legal) separation.75  As a result,
later agreements negotiated in an ostensibly neutral international space
were largely or entirely dependent on the Israeli economy, employment and consump-
tion. See, e.g., BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 241– 42 (suggesting that given the existing
inequalities, complete economic separation during occupation would have meant “stag-
nation, unemployment and social unrest in the territories,” whereas the notion of a sin-
gle market could considerably lift the standard of living in the territories); Gross,
Mending Walls, supra note 67, at 1551– 55 (arguing that while the system produced and
sustained extreme Palestinian dependence, “the forced economic integration with the
Israeli market greatly contributed to the rise in the individual Palestinian’s standard of
living as well as the growth of the economy”); Hisham Awartini, Israel’s Economic Policies
in the Occupied Territories: A Case for International Supervision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPA-
TION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP 399– 404, 416– 417 (Emma Playfair, ed., 1992)
(citing statistics that demonstrate Palestinians have experienced rising standard of liv-
ing, some economic growth, and decreasing unemployment in the Territories while also
becoming increasingly dependent, unable to develop economically, and subject to the
discretion of the occupier); MERON BENVENISTI WITH ZIAD ABU-ZAYED AND DANNY RUBIN-
STEIN, THE WEST BANK HANDBOOK: A POLITICAL LEXICON 67 (1986) (characterizing Israel’s
economic policy as one of “freezing the economic development of the Palestinian sector
along with encouragement of improvements in the standard of living” and encouraging
individual economic improvement offset by communal stagnation).
72. Bassil Abu Aita et al., HCJ 69/81 at 106– 07.
73. Emma Playfair, Playing on Principle? Israel’s Justification for Its Administrative
Acts in the Occupied West Bank, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
STRIP 215, (Emma Playfair, ed., 1992) (finding that Israeli case law reveals that the mili-
tary government “has cited the welfare or benefit of the local population as the rationale
for military orders affecting matters such as insurance, health, agricultural produce,
appliances, local courts, price fixing, etc”).
74. For a detailed discussion of the temporary nature of occupation, see, infra, Part
III.C “Transition.” Roberts defines “prolonged” as an occupation longer than five years
that “extends into a period when hostilities are sharply reduced” although he admits
that seeking a precise definition is “likely to be a pointless quest.”  Adam Roberts, Pro-
longed Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT’L L.
44, 47 (1990).
75. See, e.g., BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 242– 43 (discussing the difficulty of impos-
ing the VAT tax only in Israel and not in the occupied territories).
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relied upon the asymmetries and inequalities constituted by the uneven
integration of the pre– 1993 period.76
Between 1967 and 1993, Israeli military, legislative, and judicial prac-
tices operated between the poles of separation and integration. Although a
territorially expansionist agenda generally triumphed over concern for the
occupied population, the guiding framework of occupation supported
some level of administration or responsibility for the population.  As a
result, any attempt to integrate Palestinian territory into, while separating
its population from, Israel was subject to certain limitations.  With Oslo,
however, the link between territorial control and population responsibility
was severed, as Israel retained the former while the Palestinian Authority
took over the latter.  The tension between separation and integration was
eased as the signing of the Accords and the creation of the Palestinian
Authority arguably “further entrenched the dual mechanism that allowed
Israel to see the occupied territories as part of Israel when it came to
land. . .and separate from Israel when it came to responsibility for the Pal-
estinian population.”77  While the separation of territory from population
(and thus of security from welfare) appeared plausible— and even progres-
sive— to some, the situation on the ground suggested an inextricable rela-
tionship.78  As the next section argues, territory plays a key role in
restraining population— through building permits, movement regulations,
and resource limitations— and population remains tied to territory for both
material and symbolic reasons.  As a result, the Oslo regime maintained an
asymmetrical system that required multilateral intervention.79
C. Occupation Under Oslo/Oslo Under Occupation: 1993– 2013
Although the signing of the Oslo Accords did not override the applica-
tion of the law of occupation to the West Bank and Gaza,80 the system they
spawned altered the parameters of Palestinian governance. The Accords
established a new Authority to manage the Palestinian population and to
contribute to security in the Territories.  As a result of both structural limi-
76. See Arie Arnon, Israeli Policy Towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Eco-
nomic Dimension, 1967– 1970, 61 MIDDLE E.J. 573, 583– 84 (2007); COLIN SHINDLER, A
HISTORY OF MODERN ISRAEL 77 (2008).
77. Raef Zreik, Palestine, Apartheid, and the Rights Discourse, 34 J. PAL. STUD. 68, 73
(2004).
78. “Most Palestinians saw the signing of the Oslo agreements and the establishment
of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a step toward achieving their goal of an independent
state— complete separation from Israel.” Id.
79. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 16– 17.
80. Some scholars did suggest that the Accords affected Israel’s degree of effective
control and thus its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti,
Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights Under the Interim Israeli-Palestinian
Agreements, 28 ISR. L. REV. 297 (1994).  Others argue that “[t]he very existence of Israel’s
residual powers unmistakably indicates that the belligerent occupation was not over.”
By retaining certain governance powers, Israel retained effective control of the territories
and thus continued as the occupier. DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 274– 75. The ICJ con-
firmed that Israel continues as occupier in the Wall advisory opinion (“All these territo-
ries (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to
have the status of occupying power”).  Advisory Opinion, supra note 37, at para. 78.
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tations written into the Accords and the effects of subsequent events, the
Authority was significantly encumbered.  Two areas were particularly sig-
nificant: spatial division and allocation of power. First, Oslo divided the
territory into zones, leaving most of the land under Israeli control but for-
mally transferring major Arab population centers to Palestinian manage-
ment.81  This left the Authority with relatively little territory under its
exclusive control.  Second, while the Accords assigned a series of responsi-
bilities to the newly-created Palestinian Authority, they left a wide array of
issues under Israeli control.82  In addition, internal divisions and corrup-
tion weakened the Authority over time.  The limitations written into the
Accords, the longevity of the regime, the effects of internal Palestinian polit-
ics, and ongoing violence necessitated large-scale and long-term interna-
tional involvement, thus transforming the bilateral relationship between
occupier and occupied into a tripartite system of governance.
Both the spatial division and the allocation of responsibility were pro-
duced according to the gradualist, incrementalist logic of the Accords,
which assumed that a growing sense of Israeli security and decreasing Pal-
estinian violence would create confidence for tackling final peace negotia-
tions.83  By introducing formal territorial fragmentation, divided
governance,84 and an incrementalist philosophy of political change, the
new regime affected the factual evaluation of effective control (later exacer-
bated by the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza), the separation of pop-
ulation from territory and of (occupier’s) security from (occupied’s)
welfare, and the definitiveness of ending occupation.
1. Spatial Separation
The 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (DOP) established the parameters for negotiations between
the antagonists.85  A series of interim agreements followed the DOP;
although final status negotiations were formally attempted at Camp David
in 2000, no final agreements were ever concluded.86  The DOP provided for
a “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority . . . for a transitional
81. DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 245.
82. See Peter Malanczuk, Some Basic Aspects of Agreements Between Israel and the PLO
from the Perspective of International Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 485, 497 (1996) (“Israel has
retained jurisdiction over Israelis and the Israeli settlements in the respective areas, con-
trols security and external relations and has retained the ‘residual power’”).
83. See id. “Final status” issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders, set-
tlements, security, and “relations and cooperation with other neighbors” were left for
later negotiations. See DOP, supra note 6, art. V (5).
84. The law of occupation does contemplate a degree of self-government in the terri-
tory under occupation, although the occupation continues as long as the occupier main-
tains its overall authority. DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 58.
85. See DOP, supra note 6.
86. The DOP was followed by a series of interim agreements; final status negotia-
tions failed in 2000. See Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy of
Errors, N. Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 9, 2001), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2001/aug/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/.
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period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement . . . .”87
This body became known as the Palestinian National Authority, or simply
the Palestinian Authority.88  The DOP assigned the Authority responsibility
for education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism,
areas previously governed first by the Israeli military government and sub-
sequently by the Civil Administration.89  The Authority would also estab-
lish a “strong police force, while Israel [would] continue to carry the
responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the respon-
sibility for overall security of Israelis.”90
Spatial separation commenced when, as specified by the DOP, the
Israeli military withdrew from the Gaza Strip (excluding Israeli settle-
ments) and Jericho in the West Bank.91  The transfer of responsibility was
detailed in a May 1994 agreement, which formally established the Palestin-
ian Authority.92  The jurisdictional article of the DOP confirmed that “the
two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit,
whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.”93  However,
the division of territorial responsibility created by the subsequent agree-
ments reconfigured the West Bank and— to a certain extent— Gaza in a way
that in practice disrupted the area’s internal coherence.94
The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip (Oslo II) projected that the territory of the West Bank and
Gaza would come under Palestinian control within eighteen months of the
establishment of the Palestinian Council, except with respect to issues
reserved for permanent status negotiations.95  Oslo II divided the West
Bank and Gaza into Areas A, B, and C.96  Area A encompassed Palestinian
urban centers— amounting to about three percent of the West Bank at the
time, later increasing to about 17 per cent— and came under the Palestinian
Authority’s control.97  Area B was comprised of other populated Palestin-
ian areas and was subject to joint Palestinian-Israeli control based on Pales-
tinian control of civil life and Israeli control of security “for the purposes of
protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.”98  The remain-
der of the territory (about sixty percent of the total), designated as Area C,
87. DOP, supra note 6, art. I.
88. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip & the Jericho Area, Isr.-P.L.O., art. III, V, May 4,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 622.
89. See id; DOP, supra note 6, art. VI (2).
90. Id. art. VIII.
91. Id. art. XIV.
92. Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, Isr.-P.L.O., May
4, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622 (1994).
93. DOP, supra note 6, art. IV.
94. NATHAN J. BROWN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, THE PALESTINIAN REFORM AGENDA 13
(2009), available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/pwks48.pdf (not-
ing that the West Bank and Gaza ended up having different legal systems and different
political orientations).
95. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-
P.L.O., art. XI, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
96. Id. art. XI (3).
97. Id. art. XI.
98. Id. art. XIII (2)(a).
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stayed under Israeli control, although service provision for the population
fell under the Authority’s mandate.99
Unlike the balance or tension inherent in the law of occupation, in
which the protection of the population and the preservation of the existing
order weigh against the military interest and security of the occupier,100
the Oslo Accords divided these responsibilities, assigning population wel-
fare to the Palestinian Authority and security to Israel.101  Beyond the issue
of territorial control, the Authority’s governance capacity was constrained
by movement limitations on its own personnel; an economy weakened by
limitations on the movement of goods and services; rampant corruption,
mismanagement, and lawlessness among its own security forces; and its
inability to engage in independent development policy.102  These issues
forced the Authority to operate within limited parameters and to rely heav-
ily on external donors to finance its operation.103
Area C exemplifies both the governance gap created by Oslo and the
tension between Israeli security and Palestinian welfare that Oslo embod-
ied.  The Palestinian Authority remains responsible for service provision in
Area C, although Israel controls the development of infrastructure and the
movement of goods and people.104  Israel has argued since the inception of
the Accords that control of much of Area C, particularly in the Jordan Val-
ley, is necessary for maintaining the security of major Israeli population
centers and for preventing the import of weaponry to the West Bank.105  As
a result, “[t]he Authority’s ability to [provide services in Area C] is severely
impeded by Israel’s control over planning and construction: for example,
the Authority can provide a teacher but not build a school for the teacher to
teach in.”106  Israel has permitted some work to go forward,107 but it con-
tinues to deny permits for development projects and to demolish such
99. Id. art. XI (2)(c), Annex III. Jerusalem was placed within the ambit of final status
issues under the Oslo Accords and was therefore not included in this territorial division.
By default, it remained under full Israeli control.
100. See supra notes 39– 42 and accompanying text.
101. DOP, supra note 6, art. VI (2); Interim Agreement, supra note 95, art. XIII.
102. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE MEANINGS OF PALESTINIAN REFORM (Nov. 2,
2002) [hereinafter, MEANINGS].
103. Funding for development activities in the Palestinian Territories came from a
variety of sources. See, e.g., Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People, U.N. DEVEL-
OPMENT PROGRAMME, http://www.undp.ps/en/aboutundp/donors.html (last visited Feb.
1, 2014).
104. Interim Agreement, supra note 98, at annex III, art. IV; id. at annex III, appendix
1, art. 30.
105. David Newman, Shared Spaces - Separate Spaces: The Israel-Palestine Peace Process,
39 GEOJOURNAL 363, 365 (1996). See also Joseph Slater, Israel’s Security Concerns in the
Peace Process, 70 INT’L. AFF. 229 (1994).
106. WORLD BANK, STAGNATION OR REVIVAL? PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: ECO-
NOMIC MONITORING REPORT TO THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 19 (March 21, 2012).
107. GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL IN SUPPORT OF DEVELOPING THE
PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL TO THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 8 (Sept. 18, 2011) [hereinafter GOI, 2011
REPORT TO THE AHLC].
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projects when building occurs without permission.108  Israel argues that
development in Area C would prejudice final status negotiations, though in
the view of both the Palestinian leadership and most international organi-
zations, the limitations directly undermine the process of development that
is supposed to culminate in a state.109  Israeli security and Palestinian wel-
fare clash directly in this case, and international organizations often strug-
gle to operate in the middle.
The model of separating Israel from the Palestinian territories as well
as dividing the territories themselves should be understood within its polit-
ical context.  In 1987, a Palestinian uprising (the intifada, now known as
the First Intifada) broke out.  For the first time, Palestinians collectively
organized throughout the territories against Israeli occupation and control
through mass protests, economic boycotts, and limited violence.  The intro-
duction to an early scholarly collection published during the First Intifada
exemplifies a political shift that many Palestinians and their advocates
understood to occur at the time:
The intifada has demonstrated the futility of a military solution to the con-
flict between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews; it has similarly rendered the
military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza obsolete . . . The intifada and
its national leadership openly call for direct negotiation among the parties—
including Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization— in the context
of an international peace conference.110
The Israeli military was unable to quell the uprising; the political and
economic costs propelled the government to move toward separating Israel
from the Palestinian territories,111 as reflected in the Labor Party’s 1992
campaign slogan, “Us here, them there.”112  But Israeli settlements within
the Palestinian territories, and the necessity of securing Israeli communi-
ties on both sides of the Green Line, made a full separation of the West
Bank and Gaza implausible.  Given these priorities, negotiations with the
PLO became a more favorable option.  The Oslo Accords divided the terri-
tories into zones, decreasing direct Israeli rule and increasing Palestinian
autonomy, while leaving settlements and Israel more or less secure.
The spatial separation enacted by Oslo was echoed in a further effort
to separate the two populations from one another.  Arguing that security
concerns stemming from attacks during the First Intifada dictated separa-
108. UNSCO, PALESTINIAN STATE-BUILDING: AN ACHIEVEMENT AT INCREASED RISK—
UNSCO REPORT TO AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE ¶ 32 (2012) [hereinafter UNSCO, PALES-
TINIAN STATE-BUILDING].
109. According to the U.N., “Area C remains fundamental to the viability of a future
Palestinian state.” UNSCO, PALESTINIAN STATE-BUILDING, supra note 108.
110. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Introduction: On Achieving Independence, in INTIFADA: PAL-
ESTINE AT THE CROSSROADS 10– 11 (Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., 1990).
111. See Hemda Ben-Yehuda, Attitude Change and Policy Transformation: Yitzhak Rabin
and The Palestinian Question, 1967– 95, 3 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 201, 216– 20 (1997) (discussing
Rabin’s transformation into an advocate for negotiations based on his perception that
separation was necessary first through closure and later through the creation of a Pales-
tinian entity falling short of a state).
112. Robert Blecher, Living on the Edge: The Threat of ‘Transfer’ in Israel and Palestine,
32 MID. EAST REP. (Winter 2002).
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tion, Israel reduced Palestinian labor, and issued military orders prohibit-
ing Israeli Jews from traveling into Area A and discouraging their travel into
Area B.113  In the early 2000s, the Second Intifada and its accompanying
waves of suicide bombings led Israel to begin constructing the Separation
Barrier.114  The separation of the populations reinforced the spatial divi-
sion, reconceptualizing the actors as dual governments responsible for sep-
arate, conflicting populations.115  For example, the Oslo regime
institutionalized the dual legal system (Palestinian jurisdiction for Palestini-
ans, except in security matters handled by the Civil Administration and the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF); and Israeli jurisdiction for Israelis in all cases)
created under occupation.116  Although it was a continuation of the earlier
system, the Oslo regime separated the two legal systems as if they were
under two separate sovereigns, rather than two systems under centralized
rule.117  Separating the populations reinforced the sense that Israel was no
longer responsible for the wellbeing or development of the Palestinian pop-
ulation, while retaining the need to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian
violence.118  Israel’s 2005 “disengagement” from Gaza extended and
expanded this process in two ways: first, withdrawing completely from
Gaza’s territory permitted Israel to explicitly argue that it no longer had
effective control, and thus, no positive obligations with regard to the Gazan
population, despite Israel’s continuing control over movement and access
along Gaza’s borders.119  Second, the disengagement separated (Gazan)
population from (West Bank) territory; Israel ceded responsibility for the
former while consolidating control of the latter.
2. Palestinian Authority Governance
Despite having withdrawn (or redeployed) officially from Area A— and
to some degree from Area B— Israel remained present throughout most of
the Territories after 1993.120  The actors in the West Bank and Gaza— the
113. See Tobias Kelly, Laws of Suspicion: Legal Status, Space and the Impossibility of
Separation in the Israeli-Occupied West Bank, in RULES OF LAW AND LAWS OF RULING: ON
THE GOVERNANCE OF LAW 93, 95 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-
Bekmann, & Julia M. Eckert, eds., 2009); Cf. Blecher, supra note 112.
114. Kelly, supra note 113, at 94– 96.  Measures for separating the two populations R
have been consistently justified on the grounds of Israeli security.  Limitations on Pales-
tinian labor were part of an effort to restrict Palestinian movement across the Green Line;
the Separation Barrier was constructed as a bulwark against violent attacks; and the
Israeli military orders restricting Israeli (Jewish) travel to Area A are justified as neces-
sary to protect Israeli citizens from violence and kidnapping. See id.
115. See id. at 84.
116. See TOBIAS KELLY, LAW, VIOLENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AMONG WEST BANK PALESTINI-
ANS 169– 70 (2006).
117. See id. at 58– 60.
118. See id.
119. In the aftermath of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, the High Court found that
Israel no longer exercised effective control over the territory and thus “bears no obliga-
tion to concern itself with the welfare of the residents of the Strip.”  HCJ 9132/07 Jaber
al Bassiouni Ahmed et al. v. Prime Minister et al., Isr. LR 1 para. 12 [2008] (Isr.).
120. See id. at 56.  On March 29, 2002, Israel re-occupied the cities of the West Bank
during Operation Defensive Shield, The IDF officially departed again from Area A on
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Palestinian Authority, Israel, international organizations and donors—
quickly became enmeshed in a joint governance system that shared respon-
sibility and control for the Palestinian population.  Their codependence
relied upon continuing international support for both the peace process
that provided the backdrop to the Oslo regime and for the institutional
survival of the Authority.  As a result, international aid came to support
adaptation to the occupation rather than resistance to it, and the Authority
developed as an institution intertwined with Israel rather than, as the rhet-
oric often depicts, one fostering separation from it.
The Authority became a proto-government for a quasi-state, with many
of the symbolic trappings of sovereignty but few of the substantive powers
of statehood.  Despite limitations that ultimately undermined any claims
to sovereignty (for example, the Authority had no control over borders, air
space, external security, residency, or movement), the Authority “had
many of the symbols and trappings of a state (such as passports, stamps,
car number plates, an international airport, ministries, police and security
forces, and other public institutions).”121  In certain ways, the transforma-
tion was extremely significant for Palestinian daily life; rather than Israeli
control over schools, clinics, post offices, or policing, Palestinians took
charge of providing services for their own population.122  Israeli with-
drawal meant that everyday existence within the borders of the major cities
required little or no interaction with the IDF.123  Despite myriad restric-
tions, “if a Palestinian went to school, to court, or to apply for a business
license, the [Palestinian Authority] appeared to be a virtual state.”124  In
this sense, the Palestinian Authority was more a representation of state-
hood than a state itself: it was both an aspiration for what might come at a
later date (if sovereignty were earned) and a simulacrum of a state that
increasingly seemed to obscure the lack of a real one.
Oslo’s economic protocols provided the Authority with enough auton-
omy to be held responsible for failure but not enough to have a serious
possibility of success.  Limitations on trade, revenue, and labor exemplify
the tension between the expectations and capacities of the Authority.  The
April 21, but the situation on the ground had been fundamentally altered. See Brian
Whitaker, U.N. Report Details West Bank Wreckage, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 2, 2002.
121. Mushtaq Husain Khan, Introduction to STATE FORMATION IN PALESTINE: VIABILITY
AND GOVERNANCE DURING A SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 1– 2 (Mushtaq Husain Khan, George
Ciacaman, & Inge Amundsen eds., 2004).
122. See id. at 1– 3.
123. Outside the borders of major cities, Palestinians encountered a complex system
of permits, checkpoints, and other restrictions on movement.  Policies of partial or com-
plete closure pre-date the Oslo Accords, but the existence of areas formally controlled by
the Authority permitted the parallel notions of autonomy and constraint to co-exist, with
Area A considered under Authority control despite the inability of the Authority to con-
trol entry and exit.  Closures became increasingly widespread during and after the Sec-
ond Intifada, as Palestinian violence increased exponentially; Israeli military incursions
similarly grew more common. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 113, at 94– 96. See generally,
Access and Movements, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.ochaopt.org/reports.aspx?id=105 (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
124. NATHAN J. BROWN, PALESTINIAN POLITICS AFTER THE OSLO ACCORDS: RESUMING ARAB
PALESTINE 14 (2003).
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primary agreement delineating economic relations between the parties was
the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the
State of Israel and the P.L.O., representing the Palestinian people, generally
referred to as the “Paris Protocol.” Under the Protocol, the Authority
received a series of governance powers over economic policy.125  The Paris
Protocol formalized the quasi-customs union that existed between the Pal-
estinian territories and Israel, with certain alterations.126  However, with
regard to any powers not enumerated, goods not specified in the Protocol,
or amounts exceeding those agreed upon, Israel remained in control.127
The economic regime represented a compromise between the Palestinian
interest in transforming the existing structure, giving the Palestinians some
control, and Israeli reluctance to create any type of borders between Israel
and the West Bank and Gaza.128  However, given the existing power imbal-
ances and subsequent restrictions on movement and access, the end result
was to codify significant Israeli government control over Palestinian
imports and exports.129  In addition, Israel’s continued power over critical
resources like energy, communications, land, and water hampered the
Authority’s ability to do any strategic planning.130
In the area of revenue, the Authority has been largely dependent on
Israeli collection and transfer of taxes, a system that came to symbolize the
politicization of the economic agreement.131  Israel collects indirect and
direct taxes and transfers them to the Authority; these taxes amount to
approximately two-thirds of the Authority’s revenue.132  As a result, the
Israeli government can, and sometimes does, withhold funds as a means of
exerting political pressure.133  Like the trade system, the revenue provi-
sions of the Protocol initially suggested substantial Palestinian autonomy
125. See Interim Agreement, supra note 95, at annex V (referring to the Protocol on
Economic Relations).
126. See Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of
Israel and the P.L.O., representing the Palestinian people, Isr.-P.L.O., art. III, Apr. 29,
1994, 7 PAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 308 (1994) [hereinafter Paris Protocol]. See generally Nu’man
Kanafani, Trade - A Catalyst for Peace? 111 ECON. J. 276, 278 (2001). See also SARA ROY,
THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AND THE OSLO PROCESS: DECLINE AND FRAGMENTATION 9 (1998).
127. Paris Protocol, supra note 126, at art. III (5)(a). See also ARIE ARNON, ET AL., THE
PALESTINIAN ECONOMY: BETWEEN IMPOSED INTEGRATION AND VOLUNTARY SEPARATION 109
(1997).
128. See Kanafani, supra note 126, at 282.
129. See ROY, supra note 126, at 10.
130. See, e.g., Hiba I. Hussein, Challenges and Reforms in the Palestinian Authority, 26
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 500, 525 (2003).
131. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, RECENT EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS OF THE
ECONOMY OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA: STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE MEETING OF THE
AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 4 (2011) [hereinafter IMF REPORT].
132. For rules on tax transfers, see Paris Protocol, supra note 126, at art. III (15).  For
analysis of the role of clearance revenues in the Authority’s total revenue, see IMF
REPORT, supra note 131, at 12, box 2.
133. Israel first withheld the funds in 1997; more recently, Israel delayed transfer of
the funds after the Authority applied for U.N. membership.  For discussion of the influ-
ence of Israeli restrictions on Palestinian economic activity, see, e.g., WORLD BANK, COP-
ING WITH CONFLICT: POVERTY AND INCLUSION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP ch. 2
(2011).
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in the economic arena but in the end reinforced Palestinian dependence on
Israeli political decisions.134  At moments of heightened Palestinian vio-
lence and conflict, Israel’s security priorities combine with the gaps in
capacity left by the Accords to create restrictions on Palestinian economic
action.
Israeli limitations on Palestinian labor— largely the result of movement
restrictions— caused significant damage to the Palestinian economy and
eventually made the Palestinian Authority the largest employer in the West
Bank.135  As a result, the vast majority of the Palestinian economy depends
upon salary payments to the civil service; according to the IMF, the wage
bill for the Authority is more than half of total recurrent expenditures.136
Due to the Authority’s limited ability to generate revenue, much of the
financing for these salaries— and thus for the Palestinian economy as a
whole— derives from donor contributions.137
In the years following 1993, governance practices in the Palestinian
territories challenged several of the central assumptions of occupation: the
territory was deliberately fragmented, the occupier no longer took respon-
sibility for the occupied population, and the relationship between occupier
and occupied was no longer bilateral but instead relied upon a third cate-
gory of players— international organizations and national donors.  The
combination of fragmented territory and divided responsibility restricted
the Authority’s capacity to maintain its duties.  International forces were
summoned to fill what would otherwise have been an unmanageable gap
between need and capacity.
II. International Governance: Money and Expertise Under Oslo
The Oslo regime introduced new institutions and reallocated power,
resources, and responsibility for Palestinian governance.  The Palestinian
Authority was a critical actor, but its existence was from its inception
dependent upon external financial and political support.  As a result, while
the international community has long played a key role in historic Pales-
tine, Oslo’s inauguration of a multilateral governance regime dramatically
increased its centrality.138  This was largely due to changing norms and
institutions after the Cold War, which reframed the pursuit of peace and
the reconstruction of states and societies after conflict as sites for expert
interventions through statebuilding, economic development, human rights
134. See Kanafani, supra note 126, at 288.
135. Palestinian employment fell drastically throughout the 1990s and after the Sec-
ond Intifada. SECRETARIAT OF THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE, AID EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA: DRAFT REPORT (1999).  Israel stated that it planned to phase out
Palestinian labor completely by the end of 2008 by denying work permits to Palestini-
ans.  THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE WORLD BANK, STAGNATION OR REVIVAL? ISRAELI
DISENGAGEMENT AND PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, TECHNICAL PAPER III: TRADE AND
EXPORTS, para. 57 (December 2004).
136. See IMF REPORT, supra note 131, at 17– 18.
137. See id.
138. See Scott Lasenky, Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American
Foreign Aid, 58 MID. EAST J. 210, 211 (2004).
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reforms, and humanitarian assistance.  Peace had become a problem to be
identified, analyzed, and resolved by individuals trained to design and
implement peace agreements.139  Recovery and reconstruction were no
longer solely, or even primarily, the preserve of national governments: now
designated as “post-conflict,” these territories became the subject of inter-
national concern and intervention.  The Oslo Accords were in part a prod-
uct of these international shifts: they were negotiated in large part under
multilateral auspices and conceived with donor resources and interna-
tional support in mind.  Once the Accords were in place, the West Bank
and Gaza became a site for post-conflict assistance despite ongoing, and at
times escalating, violence.  To understand what it meant and means for
Palestine to apparently teeter on the edge of, and sometimes be character-
ized as, post-conflict territory requires examining how the international
community constructs and intervenes in those sites more generally.  The
institutional form that the Oslo regime took was partially a product of
international expertise and expectations, although it was also contingent
upon events and actors on the ground.
This Part introduces the evolving international pursuit of peace and
post-conflict reconstruction after the Cold War.  The new understanding in
the 1990s of peace and post-conflict reconstruction as subjects of technical
expertise and expert intervention was particularly evident in three areas:
economic development, human rights, and humanitarianism.  Each field
brought its own specific histories, biases, experiences, and habits, but
together they comprised a paradigm and program for post-conflict states:
limited state power, increased foreign investment, and good governance; a
human rights program focused on security, criminalization, and the rule of
law; and a forceful humanitarian agenda that sometimes displaced national
governments and progressively became more militarized.
The Part then turns to the role of international institutions in the Pal-
estinian territories from 1993 through 2013, focusing on the aid regime as
a pillar of the robust international presence.  External assistance became
vital to Palestinian life, as both a necessity for the system’s survival and a
symbol of the hope for peace.  Aid was also critical for Israel.  Admirable
work has been done on the politics, mechanics, and influence of interna-
tional aid in the Palestinian territories; I will not retread that ground
here.140  Rather, in outlining the centrality of aid to Palestinian and thereby
139. “Framework peace agreements reflect a common approach to settlement design
that links ceasefires to agreed new political and legal arrangements for the holding and
exercising of power. They reflect similar use of third parties to develop, enforce and
implement the agreement.  These hard-gained settlement terms are formally documented
in written, signed, and publicly available agreements, typically involving both domestic
and international actors.  This loose pattern describes a broad range of conflicts, and
cuts across different types of conflict.  The pattern holds across continents. . .  When it
comes to negotiating ends to conflict, at the level of basic settlement goals there is one
predominant way of doing business.” CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE 105 (2008).
140. See generally Nassar Ibrahim & Pierre Beaudet, Effective Aid in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territories?, 12 CONFLICT, SEC. & DEV. 481 (2012); SHIR HEVER, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ISRAEL’S OCCUPATION: REPRESSION BEYOND EXPLOITATION 21– 41 (2010); ANNE
LE MORE, INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIANS AFTER OSLO (2008); AID, DIPLO-
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Israeli life after 1993, this section lays the foundation for Part III, in which I
discuss three characteristics of the Oslo regime that have rendered the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict internationally cognizable as a transition.  The
contradiction between apparent transition and an ongoing reality of con-
flicts and crises has led experts and their organizations to question their
work even as they argue for their own indispensability.  The paradoxes of
aid work raise profound dilemmas for practitioners, three of which are dis-
cussed at the conclusion of this section.
A. Peace and Development After the Cold War
As international actors and organizations became integral to daily Pal-
estinian governance, they modeled their work on lessons that they had
learned elsewhere and on the normative consensus about peacebuilding,
development, human rights, and humanitarianism.
The post-Cold War era was hardly the first in which international
organizations, policy, and law grappled with issues of war and peace.
While many claim that the new era was marked by unprecedented and
progressive international intervention in areas traditionally preserved as
sovereign,141 others argue that the divide between sovereign governments
and international law or organizations had never been a stark one.142  The
early 1990s did lend a new gloss to the project of international interven-
tion in conflict areas: peace, like democracy or development,143 could now
be designed, implemented, and accomplished through expert intervention
in conjunction with local elites.  International consultation was necessary
for negotiating peace and managing the subsequent reconstruction,144
MACY, AND FACTS ON THE GROUND (Michael Keating, Anne Le More, & Robert Lowe eds.,
2005); Scott Lasensky, Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American For-
eign Aid, 58 MID. EAST J. 210, 211 (2004); REX BRYNEN, A VERY POLITICAL ECONOMY:
PEACEBUILDING AND FOREIGN AID IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (2000).
141. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Discovering the Limits and Potential of Peacekeeping in
PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW CENTURY 4 (Olara A. Atunnu, Michael W.
Doyle eds., 2000).
142. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that international law was formed in the crucible of coloni-
alism and consistently reproduces a “dynamic of difference” between “civilized” or
“universal” and “uncivilized” or “particular”). See also David Kennedy, When Renewal
Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POL. 335 (1999) (arguing that
the new consciousness of experimentation, revolution, and utopian internationalism
was in fact a repeating disciplinary phenomenon).
143. Rejecting the structural bent of modernization theory, the democratization liter-
ature of the 1970s and after argued that democracy would be “not the product of evolu-
tionary transformations but only of specific, transitory, and reversible configurations of
political forces.”  It was dependent on unpredictable political change, but democracy
could be provoked and encouraged.  NICOLAS GUILHOT, THE DEMOCRACY MAKERS: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER (2005).
144. “Through agreements ending civil strife, [international peace efforts] may
include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the cus-
tody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training
support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human
rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and
informal processes of political participation.” U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for
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although the results of external intervention were frequently far from the
initial intent.  The post-conflict territory or state was characterized not only
by the conclusion of a peace agreement or the end of war but by the fragil-
ity of the government, weakness of the state, and potential for violence.  In
this sense, the need for continued international assistance, in the form of
money and expertise, was self-perpetuating.145
1. The New Peace
The U.N. Secretary General, in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, emphasized
the U.N.’s role in “preventive diplomacy,”146 peacemaking,147 and post-
conflict peacebuilding.148  Peace negotiations, for the first time, took place
“in a context where an expanding international machinery has a clear man-
date in the areas that many peace agreements deal with, such as human
rights, refugees and displaced persons, independence of the judiciary,
policing, and economics.  Never before [had] international law and interna-
tional institutions had such an array of tools capable of application to
intrastate conflict.”149  While some interpreted them as functional
responses to global needs, the new tools also reinforced the sense that terri-
tories struggling through, or recovering from, conflict required interna-
tional intervention.
The Agenda for Peace foreshadowed the increasingly muscular nature
of the U.N.’s intervention in conflict zones, where it mediated peace negoti-
ations, enforced peace agreements, and coordinated post-conflict recon-
struction.  The Security Council, freed from its Cold War deadlock, vastly
Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. a/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992), at para. 55.
145. “There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations
has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transforma-
tion of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new
democratic institutions. . . . There is an obvious connection between democratic prac-
tices— such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making— and the achieve-
ment of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of
good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political
communities.” U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-
making and Peacekeeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. a/47/277-S/24111
(June 17, 1992).
146. Defined as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent
existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when
they occur.” Agenda for Peace para. 20
147. Defined as “action to bring  hostile parties to agreement, essentially through
such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United
Nations.” Id.
148. According to the Agenda for Peace, peacebuilding comprised “action to identify
and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid
a relapse into conflict.”  Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplo-
macy, Peacemaking, and Peace, para. 21. As a category, it included activities such as
disarmament, security sector reform, refugee repatriation, human rights, and rule of
law. Crucially, its conceptualization at the outset included the notion that “third parties
might contribute to preventing, resolving or managing violent conflict and the rebuilding
of communities thereafter.” ALEX J. BELLAMY & PAUL D. WILLIAMS, UNDERSTANDING
PEACEKEEPING 17 (2011)
149. BELL, supra note 139, at 104.
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increased both the quantity and scope of peace operations.150  Peace oper-
ations took several forms, from traditional enforcement of peace agree-
ments to complex operations coordinating humanitarian assistance,
ceasefires, and reconstruction.151  At the beginning of the 1990s, “U.N.
peace operations became international society’s conflict management tool
of choice.”152  At the same time, actors interested in conflict resolution and
post-conflict reconstruction multiplied rapidly, making the era one of
“ ‘international deregulation,’ one in which there were new players, new
capabilities, and new alignments.”153
Over the course of the 1990s and into the next decade, the Security
Council authorized international administrations and international crimi-
nal tribunals, creating an unprecedented level of U.N. governance in con-
flict and post-conflict zones.154  Despite ebbing confidence in, and
decreasing willingness to contribute troops to, peace enforcement after
events in Angola, Somalia, and Rwanda demonstrated the limitations of
peacekeeping, the growing conviction that peace, development, security,
humanitarian relief, and human rights were intimately interwoven led to a
continuing international presence in conflict areas.155
While it played a central role, the U.N. was only one member of a large
community of organizations working actively to (re)build states after con-
flict.  The post-conflict “regime” was governed not only by organizations
formed in the aftermath of the Cold War,156 but also by actors that were
less new than newly ascendant.  For example, the World Bank and IMF,
150. Introducing the Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali declared that “The Organiza-
tion must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed.” An Agenda
for Peace, para. 3. Between 1998 and 1993, the U.N. “conducted more peace operations
than it had undertaken in its previous forty years combined.” BELLAMY & WILLIAMS,
supra note 151, at 93.
151. BELLAMY & WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 93.
152. BELLAMY & WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 100.
153. Richard Haas, Paradigm Lost, 74 FOR. AFF. 43, 43 (1995).
154. Perhaps the most striking examples of U.N. involvement in governance were the
international administrations in East Timor and Kosovo. For a discussion of these and
other territorial administrations, see generally RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION: HOW TRUSTEESHIP AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT AWAY
(2008); CARSTEN STAHN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION: VERSAILLES TO IRAQ AND BEYOND (2008); SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE:
THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING (2005).  The
U.N. was also involved in the creation of a series of international and hybrid criminal
tribunals. For further discussion, see generally, ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW (2008); WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FOR-
MER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE (2006).
155. Duffield argues that Western intervention in the contemporary period has fre-
quently been justified through “examples of a claimed enlightened complementarity
linking development and security.” MARK DUFFIELD, DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, AND UNEND-
ING WAR: GOVERNING THE WORLD OF PEOPLES 2 (2007).
156. For discussion of the new role of non-governmental organizations in the after-
math of the Cold War, see e.g., Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global
Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOV-
ERNANCE (Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 1996).  On the growing influence of
transnational activists, see KATHERINE SIKKINK & MARGARET KECK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BOR-
DERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). On the new importance of
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among others, shifted focus and expanded their scope of influence as the
Cold War ended.157  By 1997, the World Bank had created a Post-Conflict
Unit to act as a “locus of expertise in post-conflict reconstruction.”158  As
the Bank’s phrasing suggested, the post-conflict arena had become the pre-
serve of international experts trained in the arts of humanitarian relief and
development, transition and democracy, peacemaking and peacebuild-
ing,159 and statebuilding.160
The expert community drew from a variety of international, regional,
and non-governmental organizations, as well as from donor country devel-
opment agencies.  International institutions in this period often treated the
post-conflict government either as a candidate for displacement (when
human rights were imperiled or humanitarian catastrophe loomed) or as a
site for regulatory intervention (when institution-building could secure pri-
vate investment and rule of law could ensure private property rights).  Con-
verting statebuilding and peacebuilding into expertise also licensed
continuing international support (and thus increased the demand for
experts) on the grounds that the projects were politically neutral, univer-
sally applicable, and inevitably necessary.161  As conflict resolution and
networks to global politics, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); see
also ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2001).
157. For example, the IMF was only minimally involved with the Third World in its
early decades. Initially, it monitored balance of payments issues in industrialized
nations; only in the 1980s did the IMF become a lender primarily to the Third World.
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements,
and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARV. INTL. L.J. 529, 570 (2000).
158. THE WORLD BANK, THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK IN CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT:
AN AGENDA 8 (2003).
159. As a category, it included activities such as disarmament, security sector reform,
refugee repatriation, human rights, and rule of law.  Crucially, its conceptualization at
the outset included the notion that “third parties might contribute to preventing, resolv-
ing or managing violent conflict and the rebuilding of communities thereafter.” BELLAMY
& WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 17. For a critical account of the practice of peacebuild-
ing, see SE´VERINE AUTESSERRE, THE TROUBLE WITH THE CONGO: LOCAL VIOLENCE AND THE
FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING (2010).
160. Chandler defines statebuilding as the “development of international mecha-
nisms aimed at addressing cases of state collapse or at shoring up failed states.” DAVID
CHANDLER, EMPIRE IN DENIAL: THE POLITICS OF STATEBUILDING 26 (2006). See also, SHAHAR
HAMEIRI, REGULATING STATEHOOD: STATE BUILDING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
GLOBAL ORDER (2010); Nehal Bhuta, Against State-Building, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 517
(2008).
161. For a discussion of these ideas with regard to peacebuilding, see, e.g., Richmond,
The Problem of Peace, infra note 376, at 304 (Liberal peace assumes its own “universality,
which legitimates intervention, and . . . the superiority of the epistemic peacebuilding
community over its recipients”). See also John Heathershaw, Unpacking the Liberal Peace:
The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses, 36 MILLENNIUM 597 (2008)
(“Experiments ‘on the ground’ are conceived in a particularly normalizing fashion,
where it is ‘the other’ of the conflict zone, rather than international political and eco-
nomic structures themselves, which must undergo change to correspond to mytho-
logised international standards”). With regard to development professionals, Kennedy
argues that while they have regularly considered themselves, “at least indirectly, to be
engaged in a ‘political’ project”, they have also “thought of their work in each period in
nonpolitical terms. . . .[In the contemporary era], development professionals tend not to
interpret their expert work in ideological terms –  far more, they are the purveyors of
something more like science”  As a symptom of expertise more than of development
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post-conflict reconstruction became technical fields, the experts that domi-
nated them transformed their ideas into a set of standardized practices
deployed across diverse sites— the Palestinian territories among them.  Not-
withstanding growing commitments to local participation and the rejection
of one-size-fits-all policies,162 peacebuilding— through institutions, open
markets, the rule of law, and elections— remained largely similar across dif-
ferent cases.
Three fields stood at the nexus of post-conflict reconstruction: eco-
nomic development, human rights, and humanitarianism.  In this era,
relief and development “tunnel[ed] toward each other: relief agencies were
increasingly contemplating how to tie relief to post-conflict reconstruction,
and development agencies were increasingly trying to use relief operations
as a springboard for development. Both relief and development agencies
were interacting more and more with human rights activists, and the three
sectors began discovering areas of common concern. . .”163  Each field or
sector had its own history and preoccupations, but they were increasingly
conjoined and reconfigured under the auspices of post-conflict
intervention.
2. Economic Development
Towards the end of the Cold War, a developmental consensus— often
termed as neoliberalism or the “Washington Consensus”— crystallized
around privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and private property
rights.164  Prior emphases on national developmental and trade policies
gave way to an era of open markets, conditional economic transition, and
decreased global regulation.165  These policies were implemented by inter-
governmental organizations that conditioned financial assistance on policy
professionals in particular, this description parallels the attitude of those in the ‘peace
professions’.  David Kennedy, Political Choices and Development Common Sense, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 97 (David Trubek and
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
162. “Operationally, the new thinking about participation has been reflected in
repeated [World] Bank expressions of commitment to ensuring, for example, greater
involvement of ‘key stakeholders’ in the preparation of country assistance strategies,
‘sharper client focus,’ and ‘responsiveness to clients’ . . . Within the IMF ‘ownership’ has
become a major element of adjustment programs.”  Ngaire Woods, The Challenge of Good
Governance for the IMF and the World Bank Themselves, 28 WORLD DEV. 823, 825 (2000).
Woods goes on to point out that “in both the Fund and the Bank, in spite of changes
aimed at improving ‘participation’ and ‘ownership,’ many staff suggest that much of the
basic modus operandi remains the same . . . attempting to reconcile ‘participation’ and
‘ownership’ with rigor and expertise poses a real challenge to both international finan-
cial institutions.” Id.
163. MICHAEL BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM (2013).
164. John Williamson, who coined the term “Washington Consensus” in 1990, sum-
marizes its main points and evaluates the (mis)uses of the term in John Williamson,
What Should the World Bank Think of the Washington Consensus?, 15 THE WORLD BANK
RESEARCH OBSERVER 251 (2000). See also John Williamson, What Washington Means by
Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? (John William-
son, 1990).
165. Charles Gore, The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for
Developing Countries, 28 WORLD DEV. 789, 792 (2000).
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change.166  Foreign aid was conceived as “either a necessary but temporary
crutch to facilitate the move from modest interventionism to neoliberal-
ism . . . or a humanitarian charity for addressing basic needs, rather than
generating development.”167  Private investment, not aid, was viewed as the
motor of development, particularly given the widespread faith in the effi-
ciency of markets and opposition to using economic policies to redistribute
wealth.168
By the early 1990s, the “Washington Consensus” had been chastened
by economic events and to some degree transformed by an increasing
emphasis on institutions and security reform, as well as on what became
known as “good governance” and on the rule of law.169  By 1991, the
World Bank had already concluded that competition and open markets
were necessary but insufficient for development and that the state had a
significant role to play: “In defining and protecting property rights, provid-
ing effective legal, judicial, and regulatory systems, [and] improving the
efficiency of the civil service . . . the state forms the very core of develop-
ment.”170  Repudiating both the import-substitution industrialization para-
digm’s celebration of a strong state and the Washington’s Consensus’s
attempt to consign it to irrelevance, the “post-Washington Consensus”
aimed at a “medium-sized state [which] is to be the economy’s ally, not its
engine or opponent. . . It should be a stable state, oriented toward main-
taining a social democratic market, integrated with the world economy.”171
Stability, statebuilding, and governance became key ideas, as did human
rights, which, experts posited, would prevent or save “failed” states and
create a necessary legal baseline for development.172
These changes tied economic development to questions of conflict and
peace.  In 1991, the World Bank declared that “[s]ustainable development
requires peace,” pointing out that the most important cause of famine in
developing countries in recent years had been not inadequate agricultural
166. Paul Collier, Patrick Guillaumont, Sylviane Guillaumont, & Jan Willem Gun-
ning, Conditionality Redesigned, 25 WORLD DEV. 1399 (1997).
167. Kennedy, supra note 161, at 130– 31.
168. Joseph Stiglitz, Is There A Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?, in THE WASH-
INGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 46 (Narcis Serra
& Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
169. “Good governance” may be understood as transparent governmental decision-
making, a “legitimate, effective, and efficient framework for the conduct of public pol-
icy,” public participation, rule of law, independent judiciary with judicial review, and
oversight agencies.  Carlos Santiso, Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World
Bank and Conditionality, 7 GEORGETOWN PUBLIC POLICY REV. 1, 5 (2001). See also Alvaro
Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 276– 78 (David Trubek
& Alvaro Santos eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
170. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOP-
MENT 4 (1991).
171. Kennedy, supra note 161, at 156.
172. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); PETER UVIN, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (2004).
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output or poverty, but military conflict.173  Over the course of the 1990s,
the World Bank became a leader in post-conflict reconstruction and
peacebuilding, joining with the UN to fill the “relief to development
gap”.174  Rather than focus solely on poverty reduction and development
assistance, as it had previously, the post-Cold War Bank researched links
between poverty and conflict, and between post-conflict reconstruction
and development;175 it also became invested in security and stability as a
necessary backdrop for development.176
3. Human Rights
The end of the Cold War coincided with the rapid rise of the human
rights movement, in terms of both its significance and the resources
devoted to it.  Two trends in particular distinguished the new era: institu-
tionalization and criminalization.  Institutionalization fully integrated
human rights concerns into the work of intergovernmental organizations,
states, and non-governmental organizations. In addition, it linked human
rights to democracy, peace and security, development, and humanitarian-
ism.  Criminalization re-oriented the human rights movement toward crim-
inal law and the fight against impunity, and away from “naming and
shaming” and opposition to state power.177  Both exemplified the ways in
173. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOP-
MENT 2 (1991).  The U.N. Secretary-General made a similar point the next year, linking
together democracy, peace, good governance, and security, stating that there is an “obvi-
ous connection between democratic practices— such as the rule of law and transparency
in decision-making— and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and
stable political order.” U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplo-
macy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. a/47/277-
S/24111 (June 17, 1992). Over time, support for peacebuilding based on a liberal peace
model expanded to include a strong emphasis on state-building, or “peace-as-govern-
ance.” OLIVER RICHMOND AND JASON FRANKS, LIBERAL TRANSITIONS: BETWEEN STATEBUILD-
ING AND PEACEBUILDING 6 (2009). Paris argues that the failures in Rwanda, Bosnia,
Cambodia, and Angola— which all faced violence after a transitional liberalization
phase— led the UN and others to focus on statebuilding as a part of peacebuilding.
Roland Paris, Saving Liberal Peacebuilding, 36 REV. INTL. STUD. 337, 342 (2010).
174. THE WORLD BANK, THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK IN CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 158, at 3.
175. The Bank summarizes its own changes: “Since its creation in 1944, the World
Bank’s role in reconstruction has moved from rebuilding infrastructure to a comprehen-
sive approach which includes the promotion of economic recovery, evaluation of social
sector needs, support for institutional capacity building, revitalization of local communi-
ties, and restoration of social capital, as well as specific efforts to support mine action,
demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants, and reintegrate displaced populations.  An
increased premium has, furthermore, been put on preventing the onset, exacerbation, or
resurgence of violent conflict.” THE WORLD BANK, THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK IN CON-
FLICT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 161, at 12.
176. See, e.g., OECD, DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (1997). See
also Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of
Peoples (2007); Bellamy & Williams, supra note 148, at 123.
177. Karen Engle, Self-Critique, (Anti) Politics and Criminalization: Reflections on the
History and Trajectory of the Human Rights Movement, in NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: THE EUROPEAN AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 57– 59 (Jose´ Mar´ıa Beneyto &
David Kennedy, eds., 2013).
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which “human rights. . .became a practice of governance.”178
The momentum that human rights gained in the last decades of the
twentieth century179 dovetailed with democratic transitions in southern
Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.180  Declaring victory in the
Cold War, liberal democracy promoters sought to export specific institu-
tions to transitional and post-conflict states.181  Open markets constituted
one focus; civil and political rights, manifested through elections and the
rule of law, comprised another.182 “Liberal peace” theory held that the
guarantee of these rights in post-conflict countries would lead to both
intrastate and international peace, based on the theory that liberal democ-
racies are least likely to devolve into internal violent conflict or to wage war
on each other.183  Advocates believed that institutions and agreements sup-
porting the formation of liberal democracies— particularly comprehensive
peace agreements, elections, and open markets— would in turn bring inter-
nal, regional, and global security.  Human rights quickly became part of
peacebuilding’s international vernacular, inseparable from development
projects emphasizing the rule of law.184  At the same time, the U.N. moved
178. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Regime: Still Part of the Prob-
lem?, in EXAMINING CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (Rob Dickinson, Elena
Katselli, Colin Murray & Ole W. Pedersen eds., 2012).
179. See SAM MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010) (arguing that
it was “in the middle of the 1970s that human rights came to define people’s hopes for
the future as the foundation of an international movement and a utopia of international
law”).
180. See, e.g., Jordan Gans-Morse, Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories
of Post-Communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm, 20 POST-SOVIET
AFFAIRS 320 (2004); Valerie Bunce, Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the
Postcommunist Experience, 55 WORLD POLITICS 167 (2003); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE
THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); JUAN LINZ &
ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION (1996); TRANSI-
TIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE (Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, & Lau-
rence Whitehead, eds. 1986).
181. Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEM. 5 (2002).
182. ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 21 (2004)
(“Whereas during the Cold War the meaning of democracy had itself been a lightning
rod for ideological conflict, there now seemed to be widespread agreement. . .that the
liberal definition of democracy (emphasizing elections and political liberties) was the
‘correct’ definition”).
183. BELLAMY & WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 23.  This is not to suggest that the lib-
eral peace was the only theory motivating international intervention in the 1990s.  How-
ever, as a crystallization of ideas about the need for open markets, democracy, and
individual rights— as well as a legitimating theory for broadscale international interven-
tion— it represents an important interpretive influence.  Debates over the meaning, effi-
cacy, ideology, and practices of the liberal peace abound. See, e.g., OLIVER P. RICHMOND,
A POST-LIBERAL PEACE (2011); Roland Paris, Saving Liberal Peacebuilding, 36 REV. INTL.
STUD. 337 (2010); John Heathershaw, Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and
Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses, 36 MILLENNIUM 597 (2008); MICHAEL DOYLE AND
NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE (2006); ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S
END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT (2004).  For an argument that focus on the
liberal peace is misplaced, see Jan Selby, The Myth of Liberal Peace-building, 13 CONFL.,
SEC., & DEV. 57 (2013).
184. “The relationship between the rule of law and liberal democracy is profound.
The rule of law makes possible individual rights, which are at the core of democracy.”
Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOR. AFF. 95, 97 (1998).
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increasingly toward enforcing human rights, including through institution-
alization, making them a concern not only of specialized bodies but
throughout the U.N.185
The turn toward criminalization was equally apparent. It was most evi-
dent in the rapid growth of international criminal tribunals and law from
1993, the prosecution of human rights violations, and the application of
universal jurisdiction.186  The creation of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugosla-
via and Rwanda, as well as renewed and successful efforts to establish the
International Criminal Court (ICC), marked a new era in which indictment
and prosecution of individual perpetrators took center stage.187  In addi-
tion to its institutional effects, the campaign against impunity sometimes
constrained peace negotiations by complicating or precluding amnesty.188
4. Humanitarianism
The late 1980s saw the rise of the “humanitarian international,” a cos-
mopolitan elite providing relief for victims of conflict and disaster.189  The
U.N. developed institutional initiatives to address “complex emergencies,”
including “cross-mandate” operations that combined multiple agencies to
deal with problems ranging from refugees and internally displaced people
to poverty.190  In the early 1990s, the U.N. created the post of Under-Secre-
tary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
185. JULIE MERTUS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE FOR A NEW ERA 1
(2009).
186. For a discussion of the various strands of the turn to accountability, see, e.g.,
FRANCESCA LESSA & LEIGH PAYNE, EDS., AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTA-
BILITY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (2012); ELLEN  L. LUTZ & KATHRYN
SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD
POLITICS (2011).
187. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 61
(2011) (“Without any doubt, [the] creation [of the Rome Statute] is the result of the
human rights agenda that has gradually taken center stage at the U.N. . . . From a hesi-
tant commitment in 1945, to an ambitious Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948, we have now reached a point where individual criminal liability is established for
those responsible for serious violations of human rights, and where an institution is
created to see that this is more than just some pious wish.”)
188. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991). See also Diane F. Oren-
tlicher, ‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency, 1 INTL. J.
TRANS. JUST. 10 (2007). For a discussion of the continuing use of amnesty laws, see
Louise Mallinder, Amnesties’ Challenge to the Global Accountability Norm? Interpreting
Regional and International Trends in Amnesty Enactment, in AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 69 (Fran-
cesca Lessa & Leigh Payne eds., 2012).
189. ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS & THE DISASTER RELIEF INDUSTRY IN
AFRICA 70 (2009) (Arguing that “internationalization is the key to the appropriation of
power by international institutions and the retreat from domestic accountability in fam-
ine-vulnerable countries”). See also BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY, supra note 163, at
214 (arguing that the emphasis of the aid agencies joining to write the Sphere Humanita-
rian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response presumed that
“because basic bodily needs vary little from place to place, the most important people to
have around the table are the experts and the professionals, not the end users”).
190. DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES, supra note 191, at 69. See also, U.N. Gen. Ass. A/RES/
46/18 (Dec. 19, 1991).
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to run the new Department of Humanitarian Affairs and coordinate all
U.N. humanitarian assistance and work among governmental, intergovern-
mental, and non-governmental organizations.191  What had been a “rela-
tively loose association of organizations that occasionally coordinated their
activities. . .yielded to a more centralized network of states, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and part-time members
such as foundations and corporations.”192  The simultaneous surge of
attention to “failed states”193 and the rapidly spreading notion of “earned
sovereignty”194 seemed to justify humanitarian interventions to protect
and provide for citizens when their governments could not.
At the same time, humanitarianism was drafted into military projects.
Greater attention to, and the increasing severity of, internal violence and
civil war— as well as, after the September 11 attacks, the ascendency of the
counter-terrorism agenda— made security a focal point for international
and regional organizations.  The Security Council authorized an increasing
number of peace operations under Chapter VII, authorizing the use of
force.195  The influential 2001 Responsibility to Protect Report wove
together the diverse strands of robust humanitarianism, failed states,
strengthened human rights, and peacebuilding.  Proclaiming that U.N.
membership entails the obligation to defend the safety and lives of one’s
citizens, it identified an emerging norm of “intervention for human protec-
tion purposes, including military intervention.”196  In arguing for the inter-
national responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild, it invoked the key
notions of the era— security, justice, and economic development.197
Post-conflict reconstruction combines the predilections and preoc-
cupations of multiple fields.  International organizations and experts have
become intimately involved in the (re)building of states in the aftermath of
191. OCHA: About Us, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITA-
RIAN AFFAIRS, available at http://www.unocha.org/about-us/headofOCHA.  This position
also involves overseeing the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which was created in
1992 for “coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key U.N.
and non-U.N. humanitarian partners.” U.N. Gen. Ass. A/RES/46/182 (June 1992).
192. BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY, supra note 163, at 168.
193. “In general, a failed state is characterised by: (a) breakdown of law and order
where state institutions lose their monopoly on the legitimate use of force and are una-
ble to protect their citizens, or those institutions are used to oppress and terrorise citi-
zens; (b) weak or disintegrated capacity to respond to citizens’ needs and desires,
provide basic public services, assure citizens’ welfare or support normal economic activ-
ity; (c) at the international level, lack of a credible entity that represents the state beyond
its borders.” Derek W. Brinkerhoff, Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Con-
flict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes, 25 PUBLIC ADMIN. DEV. 3, 4 (2005)
(citations omitted).
194. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373 (2003).
195. BELLAMY & WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 215. See also SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT,
SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT NO. 1: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII: MYTHS
AND REALITIES (2008), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-
research-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4202671.php.
196. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 16 (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT].
197. Id., at 39.
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violence, focusing on stability, security, rights, and relief.  While never
entirely uniform, a common agenda for reconstruction has gradually
evolved.  Interpreting a territory or state as “post-conflict” has wide-ranging
effects, particularly when the gap between the label and practice on the
ground grows precipitously.198
B. Peace and Development in the Palestinian Territories: International
Aid, 1993– 2013
The sense that international organizations and actors could and
should involve themselves in conflict resolution and post-conflict recon-
struction opened space for multilateral mediation as well as for direct inter-
national involvement in the structure and implementation of the Oslo
regime.  From the outset of the Accords, it was clear that only extraordinary
financial and institutional support from foreign donors and international
organizations could sustain the peace process: by October 1993, donors
had already pledged billions in aid.199  By 2003, the World Bank remarked
that “donor disbursement to the West Bank and Gaza remains the highest
sustained rate of per capita disbursements to an aid recipient in the world
since the Second World War.”200  At the beginning of the Oslo process,
funds were intended to bolster the peace process by building confidence
that it would improve Palestinians’ lives by providing a “peace dividend,”
supporting Palestinian economic development as a method for achieving
autonomy and, eventually, independence.201  Neither peace nor indepen-
dence materialized, however, and two decades later, international support
aimed simply to maintain the status quo and prevent the collapse of the
Authority rather than contribute to progressive change.
Events on the ground constantly affect the permutations of interna-
tional assistance.  Failed talks, concerns over corruption, Israeli settlement
building, and Palestinian violence have all affected the provision of aid and
the relationships between internationals and local elites.  International
contributions to the governance regime are partially contingent upon polit-
ics and immediate events, but they are simultaneously shaped by the exper-
iences and expertise of those delivering aid.  Over the decades of integral
international assistance, ideas about the necessity of institutions, the links
between development and peace, and the provision of international assis-
tance in humanitarian catastrophes influenced donors and aid organiza-
tions.  In addition, these ideas affect the relationship between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority— who today serve as co-governors of territory and
population— and the parameters of Palestinian resistance.
198. See AUTESSERRE, supra note 159, at 66– 70.
199. LE MORE, supra note 140, at 2.
200. THE WORLD BANK, FOUR YEARS— INTIFADA, CLOSURES AND PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC
CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT 64 (2004)[hereinafter FOUR YEARS].
201. Paris Protocol, supra note 126, at Preamble. See also Lasensky, supra note 140,
at 220.
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1. Building Peace: 1993– 2000
The first seven years of the Oslo period were characterized by initial
donor optimism and large investments in peacebuilding and development
assistance.202  The interim period was envisioned as a transition from
occupation to peace.203  The general understanding was that aid would
“deliver tangible benefits to the Palestinian population to reinforce the
momentum towards peace.”204  Early plans for aid focused largely on
development, institution-building, and good governance, along with infra-
structure, employment and administrative capacity— all in the service of
building Palestinian capacity for self-government and sustainable develop-
ment.205  Key in this regard was security. The Palestinian Authority estab-
lished security forces with dual, occasionally contradictory, duties:
protecting the personal security of Palestinians and ensuring public order
while stopping hostile acts against Israel.206
The World Bank estimated that donors disbursed approximately $4.4
billion between 1993 and 2001.207  Funds came primarily from the U.S.,
E.U., and the World Bank, along with several European and Arab donor
countries.208  The funds were intended mostly for investment projects,
with less than one-fifth planned for “start-up and current expenditures”
and the remainder devoted to infrastructure (including water, transport,
wastewater, power, and education).209  However, between 1994 and 1996,
almost 50% of assistance was used for short-term support to ensure the
“financial viability” of the Authority and to create a fertile environment for
private investment.210  Given concerns about the possible misuse of funds
and the unusual nature of a newly-established, donor-funded administra-
tion, the Bank administered a trust fund for the Authority’s budget sup-
port.211  Two years into the Oslo regime, “crisis management had become
an integral part of the strategy.”212  Despite the unexpected use of funds,
the Bank maintained that funding remained significant: “These resources
have been intended to enhance the capacities of the Palestinian Authority,
202. See Preface to WORLD BANK, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
VOL. 1: INVESTMENT PROGRAM (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter INVESTMENT PROGRAM].
203. See THE WORLD BANK, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, VOL.
2: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1 (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM].
204. Preface to INVESTMENT PROGRAM, supra note 202.
205. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 203, at 1.
206. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, SQUARING THE CIRCLE: PALESTINIAN SECURITY REFORM
UNDER OCCUPATION 4 (2010) [hereinafter SQUARING THE CIRCLE].
207. See WORLD BANK, FIFTEEN MONTHS– INTIFADA, CLOSURES AND PALESTINIAN ECO-
NOMIC CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT, at iv (Mar. 2002) [hereinafter FIFTEEN MONTHS].
208. The WORLD BANK OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, AID COORDINATION AND
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: THE WEST BANK AND GAZA EXPERIENCE 5 (Spring 1999).
209. THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, WEST BANK AND GAZA: AN
EVALUATION OF BANK ASSISTANCE, paras. 2.3, 3.7 (2002) [hereinafter EVALUATION].
210. Id., paras.  2.3, 3.8 (2002).
211. Id., paras.  3.13– 3.14 (2002).  This fund, the Holst Fund, was one of several set
up and administered by the Bank, including the Technical Assistance Fund and the Trust
Fund for Gaza and West Bank. Id. para. 3.11.
212. Id., para. 3.9.
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generate tangible improvements in the lives of ordinary Palestinians, and
lay the groundwork for future sustainable development.”213  Israeli and Pal-
estinian officials were explicit about the necessity of foreign funding for the
success of the peace process.214
In actual practice, however, relatively little aid was used for state- and
institution-building in the early years.215  Without meaningful controls,
enormous sums were diverted and lost through corruption and misman-
agement.216  Marking a recurrent pattern in the history of post-Oslo contri-
butions, some donors argued that certain priorities (e.g., stability or
security, understood as support for one Palestinian political faction over
another) trumped others (e.g., good governance and democratization).217
Palestinian security forces, with the support of their international patrons,
were focused more on repressing opponents of the peace process than on
building institutions.218  Over time, however, stability and security— mea-
sured by the absence of Palestinian violence— were linked to economic
reform, good governance, and democracy rather than to the exchange of
cash for quiescence.219  With the outbreak of the Second Intifada, interna-
tional rhetoric turned dramatically toward calls for anti-corruption, reform,
and castigation of then-Palestinian President Yasser Arafat.220
Over the course of the post– 1993 era, the institutional reality of the
Palestinian Authority became further entrenched even as the promise of
conflict resolution became more remote.  While a “substantial majority” of
Palestinians believed in 1994 that the peace process would award them a
better economic situation, less than a year later more than half reported a
decline in their standard of living.221  Already by 1994– 95, donors began
to shift towards relief assistance, a shift later solidified as closures contin-
ued, violence erupted with the Second Intifada, and the permit system
became increasingly complex.222  By 1997, over sixty-five percent of Pales-
tinians stated that the peace process had “negative or “very negative” eco-
213. THE SECRETARIAT OF THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE, AID EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA, at vii (World Bank Draft Report) (1999).
214. Lasensky, supra note 140, at 219, 228.
215. See id. at 231.
216. On Authority corruption during the 1990s, see MEANINGS, supra note 102, at 15. R
217. See Lasensky, supra note 140, at 223– 24. See also Sandra Pogodda, Inconsistent
Interventionism in Palestine: Objectives, Narratives, and Domestic Policy-Making, 19
DEMOCRATIZATION 535 (2012).
218. Roland Friedrich & Arnold Luethold, Introduction, in ENTRY-POINTS TO PALESTIN-
IAN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 19 (ROLAND FRIERICH & ARNOLD LUETHOLD EDS., 2007).
219. See Lasenky, supra note 140, at 228.
220. In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush said, “True reform will require entirely
new political and economic institutions, based on democracy, market economics and
action against terrorism . . . . A Palestinian state will require a vibrant economy, where
honest enterprise is encouraged by honest government.”  George W. Bush, Call by Presi-
dent Bush for New Palestinian Leadership (June 24, 2002) (transcript available at http://
1.usa.gov/jKNkZ8).  Many Palestinians were suspicious that U.S. attention to good gov-
ernance came about only when the United States sought to depose Yasser Arafat. C.f.
MEANINGS, supra note 102, at 2.
221. BRYNEN, supra note 140, at 63.
222. LE MORE, supra note 140, at 111.
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nomic effects.223
2. Managing Crisis: 2000– 2006
Despite the rhetorical and organizational emphasis on development
assistance, humanitarian aid was a central aspect of international interven-
tion in the West Bank and Gaza from the beginning of the Oslo process.
Donor rhetoric continued to focus on state-building and development, but
relief remained part of the international toolkit for managing the con-
flict.224  The eruption of the Second Intifada in 2000 significantly altered
international calculations. Over months of growing violence, Palestinian
armed groups led “increasingly accurate operations. . .and gruesome sui-
cide bombings in major Israeli population centres” while the Israeli mili-
tary reoccupied Palestinian cities, imposed curfews, and tightened the
closure regime (including constructing the Separation Barrier).225  In addi-
tion to the numerous victims of direct violence on both sides, the events
took a severe toll on Palestinian economy and society.226  Donors
responded by funneling increasing amounts of aid to emergency
assistance.227
From the beginning of the Second Intifada, the European Union and
other donors altered their assistance based on concerns regarding the
Authority’s viability.  They increased both the amount of aid generally and
the amount of direct financing to the Authority.228  By 2002, the ratio of
emergency and development aid in commitment terms had changed from
7:1 in favor of development assistance in 2000, to 5:1 in favor of emergency
223. BRYNEN, supra note 140, at 63 (citing Jerusalem Media and Communications
Centre public opinion surveys, printed in Palestine Report, Apr. 11, 1997 and Apr. 25,
1997).
224. Anne Le More, Killing with Kindness: Funding the Demise of a Palestinian State, 81
INTL. AFFAIRS 981, 992 (2005) (“The aid community . . . responded to the degrading
socio-economic conditions by shifting to emergency assistance while attempting to
maintain a veneer of medium-term development focus and continuing rhetorically to
frame its assistance programme within a broader state-building objective”).
225. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, A TIME TO LEAD: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
AND THE ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 2, 7 (2002).
226. The World Bank’s initial post-Second Intifada report cited Israel’s closure of the
territories as the “proximate cause of the Palestinian economic crisis.” FIFTEEN MONTHS,
supra note 209, at iv. The Bank reported a year later that the closures increased unem-
ployment from ten to thirty percent between 2000 to 2003 and that the share of the
population living in poverty “tripled during the intifada, to about sixty percent of the
population.” WORLD BANK, THE TRUST FUND FOR GAZA AND THE WEST BANK: STATUS,
STRATEGY AND REQUEST FOR REPLENISHMENT 7 (2003).
227. See Le More, supra note 224, at 982.
228. See MIFTAH, FACT SHEET: THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY’S SOURCES OF
FUNDING 1– 2 (2006) (“[S]ources suggest that the bulk of donor assistance . . . has been
recent, with almost 90% of the total amount disbursed over ten years appearing to have
been received by the PNA in the last five years only”); Programme of Assistance to the
Palestinian People, supra note 106 (showing a jump in aid in the early 2000s); EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, PALESTINE: ECHO FACTSHEET (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/
files/aid/countries/factsheets/palestine_en.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-2\CIN203.txt unknown Seq: 42  9-OCT-14 13:33
372 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
assistance.229  The long-term vision of development and state-building had
been fettered by the short-term requirements of relief.  The Authority was
kept from disintegration by regular emergency budget support throughout
2002, averaging $39 million per month, comprising about “half of total
Authority budget outlays over the period.”230  The World Bank itself stated
in 2002 that “long-term investment has been sacrificed to short-term sur-
vival.”231  As violence decreased, medium-term spending increased for
infrastructural and other projects.232  However, direct budget support and
emergency assistance remained central; in 2003, donors disbursed $264
million in emergency and humanitarian aid, of which $119 million was
dedicated to food aid, job creation programs, and cash assistance.233
The tension between relief/humanitarian assistance and development
aid demonstrates how donors and service providers endeavored to deter-
mine the structure, process, and organization of Palestinian governance but
found themselves subject to political contingencies.  Donors and providers
maintained the rhetoric of long-term planning for peace and development
while deploying the methods of immediate relief.234
3. Confronting Statehood: 2006– 2013
While the worst of the humanitarian emergency waned in parallel to
the intensity of violence, the Authority— in both the West Bank and Gaza—
grew more dependent on international aid after 2006.  In January 2006,
the Islamist movement Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elec-
tions.235  When Hamas formed a government in March 2006, Israel cut off
the transfer of customs revenues236 and donors rerouted their aid from the
Authority to a new entity called the Temporary International Mechanism
(TIM).237  The TIM was administered through the office of President Mah-
moud Abbas, who is affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Movement and
229. WORLD BANK, TWENTY-SEVEN MONTHS– INTIFADA, CLOSURES AND PALESTINIAN ECO-
NOMIC CRISIS, at xvii n.13 (2003), available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/14614 [hereinafter, TWENTY-SEVEN MONTHS].
230. TWENTY-SEVEN MONTHS, supra note 229, at 6.
231. FIFTEEN MONTHS, supra note 207, at v– vi.
232. FOUR YEARS, supra note 200, at 67.
233. FOUR YEARS, supra note 200, at xvii.
234. See Le More, supra note 224, at 992.
235. Scott Wilson, Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in
the Middle East, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html.
236. Steven Erlanger, Israel Suspends Tax Money Flow to Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 2006, at A1.
237. Isabel Kershner, Abbas and Olmert Delay Meeting; Withheld Funds at Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2007, at A12. The Middle East Quartet, an international mediating body
for the peace process made up of the EU, Russia, the UN, and the US, set conditions for
their recognition of a Hamas-led government.  These conditions included recognizing
Israel, renouncing violence, and abiding by past PLO agreements.  Statement by Middle
East Quartet (Jan. 30, 2006) (available at http://www.unsco.org/Documents/
Statements/Quartet/2008/Quartet%20Statement%2030%20Jan%202006.pdf).  Hamas
refused. See Greg Myre, Hamas Criticizes Aid Cuts as It Assumes Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
30, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/international/middleeast/30cnd-
mideast.html.
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therefore was not subject to the international boycott of Hamas.238  After a
short-lived attempt at a unity government between Hamas and Fatah fell
apart,239 the Islamic movement took over Gaza in June 2007.240  This had
two major consequences for the aid regime in the Occupied Territories.
First, the Israeli government declared Gaza a “hostile entity” and imposed
severe additional restrictions with devastating economic effects.241  Sec-
ond, in response to Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, President Abbas dissolved the
government and appointed Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister.242  As a result,
the territories were divided into “the internationally recognized and sup-
ported Fatah-led Authority in the West Bank, and the boycotted de facto
Hamas-run Authority in the Gaza Strip.”243  Employees of the Authority in
both territories continued to receive salaries, supported by international
aid, but Palestinian employees in the West Bank were essentially paid not to
go to work under Hamas.244
With Hamas’ ascendance to government, the emergency relief para-
digm established during the Second Intifada became the norm in Gaza.  In
2008, due to the prohibition on working with Hamas-connected bodies and
the Israeli refusal to let construction material into Gaza, U.N. agencies cut
foreign aid projects totaling $230 million.245  Despite both rhetoric and
practice, however, aid continued; in fact, the total value of international
assistance flowing to the Strip increased.246  Given the impact of Israeli
restrictions, emergency assistance became increasingly critical, particu-
larly in Gaza.247  The Gazan economy improved markedly after May 2010
238. See David Shearer & Francine Pickup, Dilemmas for Aid Policy in Lebanon and the
Occupied Territories, 37 HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE 6 (2007), available at http://www.
odihpn.org/download/humanitarianexchange037pdf. See also Temporary International
Mechanism, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/
neighbourhood/country-cooperation/occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/index_en.htm
(last updated Feb. 17, 2012). Israel occasionally released tranches of clearance revenues
to the TIM, though only a small portion of what it collected.  Greg Myre, Israel Releases
Withheld Tax Funds to Abbas’ Office, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/01/19/world/africa/19iht-israel.4269261.html.
239. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AFTER GAZA 1 (2007).
240. Steven Erlanger, Hamas Seizes Broad Control in Gaza Strip, N.Y. TIMES (June 14,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/world/middleeast/14mideast.html.
241. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, RULING PALESTINE I: GAZA UNDER HAMAS
1– 2 (2008).
242. Isabel Kershner & Taghreed El-Khodary, Abbas Swears in Emergency Govern-
ment, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/world/mid-
dleeast/18mideast.html.
243. Tamer Qarmout & Daniel Be´land, The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza
Strip, 41 J. PALESTINE STUD. 32, 37 (2012).
244. EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS, EUROPEAN DIRECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE PAL-
ESTINIAN AUTHORITY 26 (2013)[hereinafter, AUDITORS].
245. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 225, at 4.
246. Steven Erlanger, Aid to Palestinians Rose Despite an Embargo, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/world/middleeast/21palestinians.html.
247. “[I]nternational donors . . . have infused massive amounts of money, substituting
humanitarian aid for development assistance, in effect turning most Gazans into wards
of the international community.” INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 225, at 1– 2.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-2\CIN203.txt unknown Seq: 44  9-OCT-14 13:33
374 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
when Israel relaxed its blockade,248 growing faster than the West
Bank’s.249  However, the damage had been so great that by 2012, “seventy-
five percent of the population in Gaza [still] relied on some form of human-
itarian assistance, and given their low incomes, people in Gaza [were] espe-
cially vulnerable to fluctuations in prices of food and fuel.”250
The aid regime in the West Bank was very different.  With former IMF
official Salam Fayyad as prime minister and Abbas as president, the Ramal-
lah-based Authority did not reject the Quartet conditions, emphasizing
good governance, non-violence, institution building, and security— for
Palestinians and Israelis alike.251  Under Fayyad, and with assistance from
the U.S. (in the form of the U.S. Security Coordinator, who trained the
Authority’s paramilitary force) and the E.U. (which focused on the civil
police and judiciary), the Authority prioritized security reform, which rep-
resented “the triumph . . . of a particular political outlook: the notion that
by building institutions of a modern state, enhancing personal security
and vigorously establishing a monopoly over the use of force, Palestinians
can regain the international community’s and Israel’s confidence, neutral-
ise a key Israeli argument against statehood and thus pave the way for
independence.”252
With Abbas and Fayyad focused on different aspects of this vision, the
two West Bank Palestinian leaders undertook separate, but linked, paths of
resistance between 2009 and 2012: Prime Minister Fayyad’s “bottom-up”
statebuilding strategy and President Mahmoud Abbas’s “top-down” diplo-
matic strategy, in which a bid for U.N. membership played a central role.
Frustrated with both aid dependency and arguments that occupation pro-
scribed any progress, Fayyad announced a two-year plan in 2009 to build
the institutions of a Palestinian state from the ground up, arguing that
good governance and institution-building would constitute resistance to an
occupation that damaged Palestinian development.253  Two years later,
President Abbas applied for membership at the U.N., arguing that member-
ship would constitute recognition of Palestinian statehood, thus placing
Palestinians in a more powerful position for negotiations.254  While the
248. Ethan Bronner, Reports See Fiscal Woes Undermining Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/12/world/middleeast/12palestini-
ans.html.  Although Israel had partially relaxed the blockade already, it was forced to
speed up the process in the aftermath of an international incident involving the forcible
boarding of an activist-led flotilla and the death of several Turks and one American.
Isabel Kershner, Deadly Israeli Raid Draws Condemnation, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/middleeast/01flotilla.html.
249. Hamas and the Peace Talks, Contradictory Noises, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2010,
available at www.economist.com/node/17103827.
250. UNSCO, PALESTINIAN STATE-BUILDING, supra note 108, at para. 48.
251. PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, PALESTINE: ENDING THE OCCUPATION, ESTABLISH-
ING THE STATE PROGRAM OF THE THIRTEENTH GOVERNMENT 31– 33 (2009) [hereinafter
ESTABLISHING THE STATE].
252. SQUARING THE CIRCLE, supra note 206, at 4– 5.
253. See infra, notes 389– 402 and accompanying text. See generally, ESTABLISHING THE
STATE, supra note 251.
254. See infra, notes 351– 355 and accompanying text. See generally, INTERNATIONAL
CRISIS GROUP, CURB YOUR ENTHUSIASM: ISRAEL AND PALESTINE AFTER THE UN (2011).
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two plans shared an international focus, they were both deployed and
received in the international arena in drastically different ways.  Both strat-
egies significantly affected international assistance to the Palestinians, but
whereas the former won praise and convinced Western donors to increase
aid, the U.S. condemned the latter as a “unilateral” step that was harmful to
negotiations and antagonistic to the U.S. and Israel; it was subsequently
punished by both.255
After 2007, the West Bank and Gaza were divided not only due to the
conflict between Fatah and Hamas but by international condemnation of
Gaza and approbation of the West Bank.  The most dramatic division
between the two territories from an aid perspective was the treatment of
Gaza as a humanitarian disaster and the West Bank as a developing econ-
omy.256  With the resumption of regular aid due to donor confidence in
Fayyad’s technocratic approach to Palestinian governance, the West Bank’s
economy stabilized, although it remained heavily dependent on interna-
tional aid; in 2010, Authority expenditures were approximately $2.9 bil-
lion, a little under $1.2 billion of which was financed by external
support.257  Donors and international organizations praised the Author-
ity’s success in building institutions as well as its commitments to trans-
parency, anti-corruption efforts, human rights compliance, and rule of law
advances.258  They emphasized the need for “expenditure restraint, institu-
tion- and capacity-building, and structural reforms” for growth.259  In the
succeeding years, however, aid shortfalls created an enormous deficit that
the Authority struggled to cover.260  So long as the Authority could rely on
coping mechanisms— chiefly borrowing from Palestinian banks and
accumulating arrears to the private sector— it could continue to pay sala-
ries.261  As those alternatives were gradually curtailed, however, the
Authority was forced to delay salary payments, with significant conse-
quences for the West Bank’s economic and political stability.262
255. See infra, Part III.
256. The bulk of donor assistance has been funneled through the U.N.’s Consolidated
Appeals Process which some have criticized for “turning a blind eye to some major eco-
nomic needs (namely recovery and development-based interventions) while focusing
almost exclusively on funding humanitarian interventions.”  Qarmout & Be´land, supra
note 243, at 43.
257. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, MACROECONOMIC AND FISCAL FRAMEWORK FOR
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA: SEVENTH REVIEW OF PROGRESS, STAFF REPORT FOR THE MEETING
OF THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 17 (2011).  The E.U. contributed over $600,000 that
same year in direct financing to the P.A. to cover, among other things, civil servant sala-
ries, pensions, public services, and cash assistance. AUDITORS, supra note 244, at 11– 13.
258. UNSCO, PALESTINIAN STATE-BUILDING, supra note 108, at 11.
259. THE WORLD BANK, A PALESTINIAN STATE IN TWO YEARS: INSTITUTIONS FOR ECONOMIC
REVIVAL, ECONOMIC MONITORING REPORT TO THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 14 (2011).
260. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, BUYING TIME? MONEY, GUNS AND POLITICS IN THE
WEST BANK 8 (2013) [hereinafter BUYING TIME?]
261. WORLD BANK, FISCAL CRISIS, ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: THE IMPERATIVE FOR ECONOMIC
COHESION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES— ECONOMIC MONITORING REPORT TO THE AD
HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 7– 10 (2012).
262. The financial crisis prompted street protests fueled by Fayyad’s political foes in
September and December of 2012, culminating in his resignation on April 13, 2013.
Isabel Kershner & Jodi Rudoren, Palestinian Prime Minister Resigns, Despite U.S. Efforts,
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C. Costs and Consequences
Delivering aid to a post-conflict territory still wracked by conflict and
crisis inevitably raises questions with regard not only to efficacy but also to
ethics.  With aid having become an irreplaceable part of a political process
and governing arrangement that have not reached their ostensible goals in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many question the role aid plays in the local
legal and political context.263  Particularly after the uses of refugee camps
and aid by genocidaires after the Rwandan genocide,264 workers within the
humanitarian field, and scholars studying it, came to question the political
and ethical consequences of humanitarian work.  Claims of the enterprise’s
neutrality and impartiality were undermined by its entrenchment in ongo-
ing conflicts, by transparent political and economic motives on the part of
donors, and by the project’s paternalism.265 These critiques— and parallel
ones in the development field266— implicated the very machinery of aid
itself, particularly the ways in which it often deepens conflict and inequal-
ity rather than alleviate their effects.
Three issues have been particularly salient in the last decade in the
Palestinian territories: the role of the Authority and international aid in
reducing the cost of Israel’s occupation; the implicit license for destruction
potentially created by donor willingness to rebuild demolished infrastruc-
ture; and the “mitigation effect” of aid projects that alleviate the harsh con-
ditions of life under occupation.267  Self-critique has arguably become part
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, at A8.  For a detailed analysis of the events of 2012– 2013, see
BUYING TIME?, supra note 260. R
263. I do not address here the effects of international intervention on Palestinian civil
society, the creation of a new “NGO culture,” or the production of a new set of elites,
much of which contributed to transforming class structures. See, e.g., Sibille Merz, ‘Mis-
sionaries of the New Era’: Neoliberalism and NGOs in Palestine, 54 RACE & CLASS 50
(2012); Nasser Abourahme, The Bantustan Sublime: Reframing the Colonial in Ramallah,
13 CITY 500 (2009); Islah Jad, NGOs: Between Buzzwords and Social Movements, 17 DEV.
IN PRACTICE 622 (2007); SARI HANAFI & LINDA TABAR, THE EMERGENCE OF A PALESTINIAN
GLOBALIZED ELITE: DONORS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL NGOS (2005);
Karma Nabulsi, The State Building Project: What Went Wrong?, in AID, DIPLOMACY, AND
FACTS ON THE GROUND, supra note 145, at 117.
264. SARAH KENYON LISCHER, DANGEROUS SANCTUARIES: REFUGEE CAMPS, CIVIL WAR, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF HUMANITARIAN AID 1 (2005)
265. See, e.g., Rony Brauman, Medecins sans Frontieres and the ICRC: Matters of Princi-
ple, 94 INTL. REV. RED CROSS 1 (2012); THE GOLDEN FLEECE: MANIPULATION AND INDEPEN-
DENCE IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION (Antonio Donini, ed., 2012); HUMANITARIAN
NEGOTIATIONS REVEALED: THE MSF EXPERIENCE (Claire Magone, Michael Neuman, & Fab-
rice Weissman, eds., 2011); MICHAEL BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF
HUMANITARIANISM (2012); DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: RE-ASSESSING INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2004); ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS AND THE DIS-
ASTER RELIEF INDUSTRY IN AFRICA (1997); Liisa Malkki, Speechless Emissaries: Refugees,
Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization, 11 CULT. ANTHRO. 377 (1996).
266. See, e.g., EMPIRE, DEVELOPMENT AND COLONIALISM: THE PAST IN THE PRESENT (MARK
DUFFIELD & VERNON HEWITT, eds., 2009); PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOP-
MENT ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA (1998); JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: DEVEL-
OPMENT, DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO (1994).
267. Mary Anderson states that there is a “widespread [view] that donor assistance to
the [occupied Palestinian territories] plays into and reinforces the Israeli occupation of
Palestine –  that aid ‘relieves Israel of its obligations as an occupier,’ that it ‘rebuilds
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of aid provision itself, an expected acknowledgement of personal or organi-
zational complicity linked with skepticism about the possibility for chang-
ing the broader system.
1. Subsidy
Some scholars and aid workers have described the Authority as a “sub-
contractor” of an “outsourced” occupation.268  The subcontractor argu-
ment rests on the idea that the Authority lowers the cost and logistical
complications for Israel to continue occupying the Palestinian territories;
as the major financial support for the Authority infrastructure, interna-
tional aid provides a subsidy for occupation.269  Under this line of reason-
ing, helping to pay salaries and supporting the Palestinian economy means
assuming responsibilities that should fall to Israel under international law.
Preserving the health and welfare of the occupied population, a responsi-
bility the Fourth Geneva Convention assigns to the occupier,270 became
the responsibility of the population itself in cooperation with its interna-
tional backers.  An Israeli former official affirmed the importance of this
arrangement for his country:
Israel started letting in the internationals with the idea that they would
replace us.  The Palestinians need help because they need money, infrastruc-
ture, buildings, to create wells, to do sewage— everything. . . . And incre-
mentally the international organizations became more active, with the
informal blessing of Israel— and now with the formal blessing.  And it all
becomes more internationalized, and it’s clear that this is necessary . . . .271
Reflecting this view, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu urged the U.S. Con-
gress in 2011 to release $50 million in new assistance to the Authority.272
2. Infrastructure
Donors routinely rebuild infrastructure that is damaged as a conse-
quence of what Israel calls counter-terrorism operations, or demolished
whatever Israel destroys’ and ‘enables’ the continuation of such actions and that cur-
rently it simply ‘maintains’ levels of poverty resulting from a strict closure regime and
other aspects of Israeli control by providing major financial resources for food, employ-
ment, and other essentials.” See Mary Anderson, ‘Do No Harm’: The Impact of Interna-
tional Assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in AID, DIPLOMACY, AND FACTS ON
THE GROUND, supra note 145, at 144.
268. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 26, at 169– 70.
269. See Amira Hass, Palestinians’ Low Salaries Also Linked to Israeli Social Struggle,
HAARETZ (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/palestinians-
low-salaries-also-linked-to-israeli-social-struggle-1.376283?trailingPath=2.169%2C2.225
%2C2.239%2C (“Israel is in control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip– and Palestin-
ian society and the donor countries finance the cost of this domination”). Some scholars
argue that the Israeli economy benefits directly from donor funds, given Palestinian con-
sumption and limits on imports. See, e.g., LE MORE, INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, supra
note 140, at 128; HEVER, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 140, 38– 40.
270. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 34, art. 55, 56, 59.
271. Interview with former Israeli government advisor in Tel Aviv (May 4, 2008).
272. Jennifer Steinhauer & Steven Lee Meyers, House G.O.P. Finds Growing Bond With
Netanyahu, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A1.
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after being built without permits.273  Donors evince concerns for the cost
and ethics of reconstructing buildings targeted by the IDF.274  The damage
done to infrastructure has decreased since the worst violence of the Second
Intifada abated, and the Israeli government has been increasingly solicitous
of donors’ goodwill,275 but the problem still remains— as does the willing-
ness of donors to rebuild rather than lodge substantial protests against the
destruction.276  Critics argue that such funding encourages a build-
destroy-build cycle, with no real cost, either political or economic, to
Israel.277  It also potentially weakens high-level condemnation of Israeli
government actions by the Security Council or elsewhere in the interna-
tional system.278  As a result, the division between politics and econom-
ics— or law and economics— is made manifest.  Declarations of illegality or
expressions of condemnation occur at the headquarters level while aid is
meted out on the ground as if operating in an unconnected universe.
273. See ANNIKA HAMPSON & JANINE ABOU AZZAM, WALL MITIGATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
DONORS AND IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES OPERATING IN AREAS AFFECTED BY THE SEPARATION
BARRIER— REPORT TO THE LOCAL AID COORDINATING COMMITTEE 7 (2005).
274. A 2005 report on issues around wall mitigation noted that Japan was “hesitant to
fund projects either near the Barrier or within the Seam Zone due to the possibility of
Israeli Defense Force-inflicted damage to such projects.” Id. at 7– 8.
275. A former military official said donors increasingly “want guarantees that their
buildings aren’t going to be destroyed.  Even the U.S., our ally, says it’s our taxpayers’
money paying for these buildings and we want commitments that they won’t be
destroyed.  It does change things.  After [Operation] Defensive Shield, [the IDF] mapped
every plant, sewage purification plant, hospital, and put it on the map as a restricted
area to try to avoid bombing there.  Officers have orders to be careful not to hit those
areas.  But it’s unavoidable sometimes.” Interview with former Israeli government advi-
sor in Tel Aviv, supra note 271. R
276. Far less infrastructural destruction has occurred in recent years, though the
problem remains. An umbrella organization of national and international NGOs—
chaired by the U.N.’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs— reported that
“Israel razed 62 European-funded structures [in 2011], and another 110 such projects
were at risk.” EU Palestinian Aid Projects Destroyed by Israel: NGOs, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 13, 2012, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AL
eqM5hzG0fTr6sqqDxnuMtDcsBLisiI2Q.
277. Pointing out that donors have not asked Israel to pay the bill for rebuilding
demolished houses or repairing the massive infrastructural damage in the Gaza town of
Rafah in 2004, Shearer and Meyer query, “If Israel were presented with the $15 million
bill for Rafah’s reconstruction, as international law stipulates, would it prompt a rethink-
ing of military strategy and encourage other methods of surveillance that cause less
harm to civilians and property?” David Shearer & Anuschka Meyer, The Dilemma of Aid
Under Occupation, in AID, DIPLOMACY, AND FACTS ON THE GROUND, supra note 277, at 175.
See also TAGHDISI-RAD, POLITICAL ECONOMY 159 (arguing that donors “rushed to set up
‘reconstruction’ and rehabilitation’ programmes and donor pledging conferences follow-
ing each wave of Israeli military destructions in the occupied Palestinian territories” and
that they therefore “indirectly assist[ed] Israeli policies of destroying Palestinian infra-
structure, undermining Palestinian independence and livelihood and fragmenting the
Palestinian territory”).
278. As former European Commission for External Affairs Lord Patten writes, “[W]e
should be clear that this cannot be an open-ended commitment to pay the costs of
Israel’s occupation of Palestine. At present, international donors meet most of the bill for
the consequences of occupation that should be met under the Geneva Convention by
Israel.” Chris Patten, Europe’s Route to a New Jerusalem, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 16, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08e64ec2-e918-11de-a756-00144feab49a.html#
axzz2sfVXacIt.
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3. Mitigation
As in any aid situation, donors and workers on the ground are
required to work within the parameters of the existing system.  For humani-
tarian actors, the question of how and whether to politicize aid— in the
sense of condemning the harm done by powerful actors or refusing to pro-
vide assistance that could facilitate further harm— is a function of the bene-
fits and risks that confrontation would have for the needy population they
serve as well as for their own high-level politics.279  In the West Bank and
Gaza, calculating harm is often framed in terms of the mitigation effects of
aid on the daily harms of occupation and the unwillingness or incapacity
of international organizations to directly confront or resist the actions of
the occupying power.280  Aid workers as individuals and organizations
more broadly find it difficult to balance the short-term benefits of aiding
needy groups and the long-term consequences of contributing to
occupation.
The calculations differ in the West Bank and Gaza.  Once Israel car-
ried out its 2005 Disengagement Plan in Gaza in 2005, Israeli movement
restrictions and international prohibitions on dealing with Hamas ham-
pered the aid community’s activities.  Donors were more confrontational
regarding access to Gaza in the wake of new restrictions imposed on the
aid community in 2007.281  In the West Bank, by contrast, aid dilemmas
focus more on individual projects, since in an environment where the
Authority and Israel— and therefore the donor community and Israel— work
in conjunction, donors and aid workers must weigh the consequences of
individual projects.282
Donors and aid workers generally avoid projects they view as support-
ing the occupation directly, although countries’ standards differ.  For
example, USAID funded upgrades to two checkpoints for both goods and
people— Jalameh and Shaar Ephraim (near the West Bank cities of Jenin
and Tulkarem, respectively).283  However, it refused to fund improvements
at the Kalandiya checkpoint, located within the West Bank and which
divides Ramallah from East Jerusalem, which Israel claims as its own.284
Funding improvements to the checkpoint would essentially endorse the
Israeli claim to East Jerusalem, which the U.S. has not done.
Yet drawing these distinctions is not as obvious as it might seem.  The
Shaar Ephraim checkpoint is one of six back-to-back crossings through
279. See Shearer & Meyer, supra note 144. See also MARY ANDERSON, DO NO HARM:
HOW AID CAN SUPPORT PEACE –  OR WAR (1999); Donini, supra note 265.
280. See id. at 133.
281. See UN Humanitarian Official Urges Israel to Lift Crippling Restrictions on Gaza,
U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Jul. 3, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
45332#.UtS0GfRDvIc.
282. See, e.g., USAID Funds Israeli Military Checkpoint Upgrade, MA’AN NEWS AGENCY
(Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=239516.
283. See GOI, 2011 REPORT TO THE AHLC, supra note 107, at 11.
284. Interview with embassy official in the region (Dec. 3, 2009). See also USAID
Funds Israeli Military Checkpoint Upgrade, supra note 282.
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which Palestinian goods must travel to enter Israel.285  While U.S. aid does
not directly contribute to the functioning of occupation infrastructure in
the West Bank, it does help mitigate the substantial complications of trans-
porting goods that arise from the occupation regime.286  USAID has
funded roads in the West Bank— including one adjacent to the Kalandiya
checkpoint that facilitates travel to and from it.287  Roads built with donor
funding ease Palestinian movement, yet because they facilitate the aims of
the occupation, some are opposed by the Authority and many Palestini-
ans— the ostensible client of the donors.288
Decisions with regard to aid came to the fore with the construction of
the Separation Barrier.289  On the one hand, the Barrier cut off West Bank
villages from each other and from the rest of the West Bank, generating
broad humanitarian need; on the other, funding those needs posed a quan-
dary for organizations since mitigating the effects of the Barrier could vio-
late the International Court of Justice’s decision.  In finding the Barrier
illegal, the ICJ reasoned that “all States are under an obligation not to rec-
ognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem.
They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in main-
taining the situation created by such construction.”290  Scholars and prac-
titioners continue to grapple with the practical implications of the Court’s
finding.291
An international aid official in the region cited the example of a West
Bank town surrounded by the Separation Barrier that has no hospital.292
Prior to the construction of the Barrier, the inhabitants went to a nearby
285. WORLD BANK, WEST BANK AND GAZA— PALESTINIAN TRADE: WEST BANK ROUTES 7– 8
(2008).
286. See USAID Funds Israeli Military Checkpoint Upgrade, supra note 282 (noting that
“Israel is not on the list of countries supported by USAID funding”).
287. See id.
288. See, e.g., Jonathan Cook, US Funds ‘Apartheid’ Road Network in Israel, NATIONAL
(May 15, 2010), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/us-funds-
apartheid-road-network-in-israel; Nadia Hijab & Jesse Rosenfeld, Palestinian Roads:
Cementing Statehood, or Israeli Annexation?, NATION (April 30, 2010), http://www.thena-
tion.com/article/palestinian-roads-cementing-statehood-or-israeli-annexation#.
289. The Economic Impact of Israel’s Separation Barrier, 10 PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. POL.,
ECON., & CULTURE (2003), http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=67#.
290. Id. para. 159.
291. The Authority suggested a “traffic light” paradigm for advising international
organizations about projects they should support.  “Green light” projects would be con-
sidered consistent with the ICJ’s opinion, based on their direct humanitarian contribu-
tion.  Unacceptable “red light” projects, would involve direct assistance to Israel in
building or funding the Barrier, assisting in border arrangements, or any project offering
“recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Seam Zone areas [i.e., territory between the Bar-
rier and the Green Line].”  Finally, an intermediate category of “orange light” projects
would require case-by-case assessment based on the degree to which donor assistance
would contribute to making the Barrier regime permanent. HAMPSON & AZZAM, supra
note 273, at 13– 14. See also LARISSA FAST, AID IN A PRESSURE COOKER: HUMANITARIAN
ACTION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, FEINSTEIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, 21– 22
(2006).
292. Interview with international aid official in East Jerusalem (April 18, 2008).
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maternity center for medical attention.  Once it was completed, residents
had to drive for over an hour to reach the center.  Thus, when donors and
international organizations asked residents what they needed, they
requested a clinic. As the aid worker pointed out, however, “now every little
community enclave that’s cut off by the [Barrier] needs a school and a
clinic.  From a service delivery viewpoint, it doesn’t make any sense.  And
it makes each enclave self-sufficient and autonomous.  But if you don’t do
it, people will die.”293  International reluctance to mitigate the effects of the
Separation Barrier poses a conundrum, but refusing aid based on its miti-
gation effects creates equal complexity.  The mayor of Qalqilya, a city sur-
rounded entirely by the Barrier, pleaded for the aid community to focus on
immediate needs: “It is philosophical to talk about aid in political terms.
The farmer who can’t reach his olive grove doesn’t think about politics, nor
does the unemployed father.  People need jobs, education, and hope for the
future.”294
The contention about mitigating the effects of the Barrier has been
extended to the entirety of the aid enterprise in the West Bank.  Some aid
workers and Palestinians promote a full withdrawal of humanitarian aid as
the only viable alternative for resisting or altering the current situation;295
others go so far as to support the shuttering of the Authority, which they
argue would force Israel to resume full operational control of and financial
responsibility for the Palestinian governance.296
Others counter that a return to Israeli rule would hardly be prefera-
ble297 and that there is no guarantee that, after two decades of interna-
tional sponsorship, the Israeli government would dedicate the same
amount of resources to the West Bank.298  At the height of Israel’s pressure
on Gaza, aid workers reported hearing from Peter Lerner, then the IDF
liaison for humanitarian aid in Gaza: “No development, no prosperity, no
293. Id.
294. HAMPSON & AZZAM, supra note 273, at 10 (quoting an interview with Maa’rouf
Zahran, Mayor of Qalqilya).
295. One aid worker at a donor organization suggested that while she would advocate
the end of humanitarian aid, a referendum should be required for such a move since the
majority of West Bank and Gaza residents would suffer direct and dramatic conse-
quences were aid to be withdrawn.  Interview with a national program officer of an
international agency operating in the occupied territories in East Jerusalem (Feb. 29,
2008).
296. See, e.g., Yossi Beilin, Dear Abu Mazen: End This Farce, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 4,
2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/04/dear_abu_mazen_end_this_
farce.
297. Interview with Palestinian professor in the West Bank (Jan. 15, 2009) (“Do we
want to go back to the situation where military officers of Israel are running health and
education?  Do we want to go back to a period without passports, back to having a
laissez-passer instead?”).
298. See SCOTT LASENSKY & ROBERT GRACE, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, DOLLARS AND DIPLO-
MACY: FOREIGN AID AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION 1 (2006); Noah Browning, Israeli
Forces Manhandle EU Diplomats, Seize West Bank Aid, REUTERS, (Sept. 20, 2013) http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/us-palestinians-israel-eu-hamlet-idUSBRE98J0G
K20130920.
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humanitarian crisis.”299  The statement revealed Israel’s interest in “sus-
pending” Gaza between humanitarian crisis and development.300  While
Gaza’s situation differs and Israel has shown that it is willing to facilitate
development in the West Bank, aid workers and Palestinians do not believe
that Israel necessarily would rush to fill a void left by the international
community.301
The public performance of ambivalence regarding aid and the role it
plays in governing the West Bank and Gaza has become standard— even
obligatory— within the aid community.  If not na¨ıve believers in neutral
humanitarianism, international aid workers tend to position themselves
wryly as either well-intentioned collaborators or self-conscious contribu-
tors genuflecting at the altar of self-knowledge and acknowledging their
role in supporting a broken system.302
Internationals enmeshed with the occupying power are not unaware of
their influence.  Their ambivalence stems from questions about whether
the immediate benefits they bring aid recipients outweigh the detrimental
effects of reinforcing a system that they oppose.  The issue is not that they
see no “dark side” to their virtuous work, but rather that they internalize
their ambivalence as a condition of its continuation.  But while ambiva-
lence over international financial or material contributions to occupation
may have become a standard feature of the aid community, these conversa-
tions are situated within a broader governance regime in the Palestinian
territories.
III. Reframing the Conflict: The Significance of Oslo
The post-Oslo arrangements fundamentally changed the ways Pales-
tinians are governed.  The new regime, built on the foundation of the Oslo
Accords, both depended upon and was shaped by continuous interactions
among Israel, the Palestinian Authority (and Hamas), and a wide range of
international actors.  It transformed an occupation into a “transition,” in
which two equivalent parties negotiate core issues while Palestinians pur-
sue institution-building, economic development, and security reform with
299. Interview with U.N. humanitarian official in East Jerusalem (Mar. 14, 2008);
Interview with humanitarian aid worker of the European Commission in East Jerusalem
(Dec. 18, 2007).
300. Ariella Azoulay & Adi Ophir, The Order of Violence, in THE POWER OF INCLUSIVE
EXCLUSION: ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (2005).
301. Interview with humanitarian aid worker of the European Commission in East
Jerusalem (Dec. 18, 2007); Interview with U.N. humanitarian official in East Jerusalem
(Mar. 14, 2008). See LASENSKY & GRACE, supra note 298, at 4– 5 (“[Some members of
Israel’s national security establishment] believe that the economy can be used puni-
tively, as an instrument of coercion.  International aid is necessary, according to this
view, so that Israel itself will not have to shoulder the financial burden, but can still
exercise exclusive control over access and movement”); See Browning, supra note 298. R
302. Ariella Azoulay & Adi Ophir, Address at the Van Leer Institute, The Politics of
Humanitarianism: The Ruling Apparatus of Control in the Occupied Territories (Apr.
20– 21, 2004).
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international assistance.  Although occupation remains the backdrop, new
projects of negotiated peace and state-building have reframed the conflict.
The new regime has three key characteristics which I term: “parity,”
“economism,” and “transition.”  I use the term “parity” to describe the new
structure of relations between Israel and the Palestinians, arranged on
the— often illusory— basis of relative bilateral equality between antagonists
(rather than asymmetrical parties, as in occupation).  I refer to the new
regime as “economistic” to reflect the new focus on the need for economic
development and a preoccupation with the cost of continuing occupation,
which have largely crowded out discussions of the distribution of resources
and power between Israelis and Palestinians or of forms of resistance that
challenge donor norms.  Finally, I argue that conflict and occupation have
been replaced by what I term “transition.”  Prior to Oslo, Palestinians were
governed by an occupation regime that was both stable (if prolonged) and
associated with an ongoing conflict.  Palestinian-Israeli relations are now
structured as if they have entered (or will imminently be in) a “post-con-
flict” transition oriented toward an ultimate resolution based on the asym-
metrical fulfillment of economic, legal, and political conditions.  The large-
scale political objectives of a prior era have been transformed into a series
of discrete issues to be discussed, compromised on, and resolved under
international auspices.  Working within this new regime of transition,
elites, aid workers, and donors become focused on process, on achieving
benchmarks as signs of progress, rather than on accomplishing particular
substantive objectives.  Negotiations sometimes appear to be an end in
themselves rather than a road towards resolution.  Economic development
seems like an autonomous goal rather than a process hamstrung by occu-
pation and dependent on donors.  Change seems progressive by definition
rather than indeterminate ex ante.
These three characteristics have had wide-ranging effects on the pos-
sibilities for peace, the achievement of Palestinian statehood, and the con-
tinuation of conflict.  The Oslo regime as a whole, and these aspects in
particular, represents both hope for peace and obstruction of peaceful reso-
lution.  The contradictions inherent in putative equality between asymmet-
rical parties or treating a conflict as a transition have become increasingly
manifest.  As the gap between the regime on the ground and its ostensible
objectives has grown, so has the cost of deviating from accepted practices.
A. Parity
The Oslo Accords, like the institutions they spawned, portrayed the
relationship between Israel and Palestine as that of two relatively
equivalent parties struggling to make their narratives heard and to satisfy
their historical, material, and political needs.  The Oslo regime constructed
the parties as if they were two entities without fixed borders, with overlap-
ping populations, entrapped in an historical (and possibly primordial)
struggle, attempting to make peace through negotiation over such shared
concerns as borders, refugees, and Jerusalem.  Other vocabularies, particu-
larly that of occupier and occupied, were increasingly marginalized in the
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international sphere and even in the rhetoric of the Palestinian govern-
ment.  The conceptualization of the parties as relative equals negotiating
common problems began when Arafat and Rabin shook hands and signed
the Letters of Mutual Recognition and Declaration of Principles.  Political
considerations (such as Arafat’s weakened position after the first Gulf War)
and recent events (most notably the First Intifada) brought the highly
antagonistic parties to the point of mutual recognition and negotiation.303
Yet international ideas and practices were present from the outset: the new
era of “preventive diplomacy” created a fertile environment for Israeli-Pales-
tinian negotiations.
The Oslo regime’s turn to parity manifests itself in multiple ways,
including in the bilateral structure of negotiations, which suggests that
each party can fend for itself at the same table, in the presence only of an
impartial mediator; in the design of the Oslo Accords, which were signed
between two parties with ostensibly reconcilable if competing claims; and
in the construction of a quasi-state apparatus in Palestine, which reinforced
the status of two equal negotiating partners rather than that of a powerful
state and an insurgent liberation movement.  At an unofficial level, the
structure was echoed and reinforced in the “people-to-people” dialogue
groups that sprang up in the 1990s, which tended to operate under the
notion of competing and incompatible, but potentially equally valid,
narratives.304
1. Imagining Equality
The character of the Oslo process was shaped by two factors: the direct
participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the will-
ingness of the parties to negotiate peace.  The Oslo Accords broke many
taboos.  Unlike other talks, the PLO participated directly. At the Madrid
Conference— a different set of Arab-Israeli negotiations, which overlapped
with the Oslo talks— Palestinians were present only as members of the
303. See infra Part I.C.
304. These initiatives ranged from projects to write reconciled histories to those
focused on shared grief and loss or any number of others focused on humanizing each
enemy to the other in various ways. See, e.g., The Parents Circle Families Forum— Intro-
duction, PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI BEREAVED FAMILIES FOR PEACE, http://www.theparentscircle.
org/Content.aspx?ID=2 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN THE MID-
DLE EAST, 2 LEARNING EACH OTHER’S HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS
(2006), available at http://vispo.com/PRIME/narrative.pdf; About Seeds of Peace, SEEDS
OF PEACE, http://www.seedsofpeace.org/about (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). See also Ifat
Maoz, Peace Building in Violence Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Post-Oslo People-to-People
Activities, 17 INT’L J. POL., CUL., & SOC. 563, 565– 67, 569 (2004).  Hanafi and Tabar
point out that “Palestinians have been increasingly critical of ‘people-to-people’ initia-
tives that promote dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian civil society groups, arguing
that they often result in . . . each side sharing their own narrative, and ignoring the
structural roots of the conflict and the broader power relations that perpetuate it.” See
HANAFI & TABAR, supra note 269, at 54. See also Tami Amanda Jacoby, Canadian
Peacebuilding in the Middle East: Case Study of the Canada Fund in Israel/Palestine and
Jordan, 8 CANADIAN FOREIGN POL’Y J. 83 (2000).
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Jordanian delegation.305  At Oslo, however, Israel explicitly recognized the
PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people; by implication, Israel
thus recognized the Palestinians as a people for the first time.306  This was
celebrated as a major achievement, one that both was tantamount to peace
and would catalyze agreement on outstanding issues.307  Lost in the cele-
bration, however, were three elements of the Accords that would under-
mine the pursuit of peace and contradict the apparently equal partnership
set up by the initial Letters of Mutual Recognition exchanged by the PLO
and Israel.  First, although the PLO recognized “the right of the State of
Israel to exist in peace and security,”308 Israel recognized the PLO only as
the representative of the Palestinian people and decided “to commence
negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.”309  Israel
recognized neither the existence nor the corresponding rights of a state of
Palestine.310  Thus, even in the course of agreeing to negotiate, the parties’
positions were structured asymmetrically.  Second, while the language of
the PLO letter declared the recognition of Israel in light of the “new era” it
invoked in Middle East history, Israel recognized the PLO “in light of the
PLO commitments included in [the PLO] letter.”311  As a result, PLO recog-
nition was framed as conditional on its commitments, while the recogni-
tion of the state of Israel was inherent to the “new era.”  Finally, as one
Palestinian negotiator discussed, early events suggested that the PLO
would be limited in its ability to represent itself and its territory as it
desired:
[With] others from my delegation . . . we ran into the Israeli delegation . . . .
[Former Israeli Minister Binyamin] Ben-Eliezer asked where I was from.  And
I said Nablus.  And he said, “[Y]ou mean you’re from Shechem [the biblical
and modern Hebrew name for Nablus].”  And I said no, I’m from Nablus.
And he said Shechem.  And we went back and forth for two or three minutes
on Nablus and Shechem . . . . [L]ater, . . . I told [PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat] this story, and I said, “This isn’t going to get anywhere.”312
305. Institute for Palestine Studies, The Madrid Peace Conference, 21 J. PALESTINE STUD.
117, 121– 22 (1992).
306. Letter from Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, to Yasser Arafat, Chairman,
Palestine Liberation Organization (Sept. 9, 1993) (available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/
ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook9/Pages/107%20Israel-PLO%20Mutual%20
Recognition-%20Letters%20and%20Spe.aspx) [hereinafter Letter from Rabin]. See also
Avi Shlaim, The Oslo Accord, 23 J. PALESTINE STUD. 24, 28– 30.
307. See id. at 24– 25.
308. Letter from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization, to
Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel (Sept. 9, 1993) available at http://mfa.gov.il/
MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook9/Pages/107%20Israel-PLO%20Mutual
%20Recognition-%20Letters%20and%20Spe.aspx) [hereinafter Letter from Arafat].
309. Letter from Rabin, supra note 313. The letters may also be contrasted in terms of
length; Arafat’s letter stretches several paragraphs, while Rabin’s contains one (long)
sentence.
310. See id.
311. Letter from Arafat, supra note 308; Letter from Rabin, supra note 306.
312. Interview with former Palestinian negotiator in Ramallah, West Bank (Jan. 13,
2009).
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The story suggests an asymmetry in representation that was produced by
and with the Oslo Accords.  Although Israel recognized the PLO as the rep-
resentative of the Palestinian people, recognition of Palestinian ties to West
Bank territory— symbolized by the linguistic battle over naming— remained
ambivalent.
The practice of the negotiations further evidenced the regime’s foun-
dation in parity.  The bilateral negotiation structure, which has remained
largely unchanged since 1993, represents the situation between the Jordan
River and the Mediterranean Sea as a conflict between two parties who
must decide for and by themselves how to share territory while maintain-
ing their core national identities.313  The parties’ achievement or failure
rests on their own will to participate in good faith and on limiting the
actions of ‘spoilers’ in their midst.314  According to this model, outside
powers such as the U.S. or the Quartet play the important role of
mediators, arbitrators, and guides, but they have little contribution to make
to the bargaining power of either party or their will to participate.315  In
this sense, the bilateral negotiations model produces Israel and the PLO as
notionally equal parties with a similar stake in achieving what is assumed
to be a singular goal: peace.  Historically, however, the Palestinians’
national struggle has focused on ending the occupation, not achieving
peace per se.316
The formal equality of the two parties assumed by the Oslo Accords is
undermined within the documents themselves.  The early agreements— the
founding documents of the process— are largely devoted to the internal Pal-
estinian governance structure.317  The 1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip
and the Jericho Area has twenty-three articles, of which six deal mostly or
entirely with the design of the Palestinian Authority, its jurisdiction, and its
responsibilities.318  Oslo II, signed the next year, contains articles address-
ing plans for “direct, free and general political elections” to the new Pales-
tinian Council and for Ra’is319 (characterized as a “significant interim
preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Pales-
tinian people,”320 a phrase which suggests conditions for Palestinian sover-
313. See Peter Malanczuk, Some Basic Aspects of Agreements Between Israel and the PLO
from the Perspective of International Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 485, 492– 94 (1996).
314. See, e.g., BRUCE D. JONES, THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: WHERE DO WE
STAND? 9– 10 (Carter Center, ed., 2002).  The U.S. government has repeatedly declared
that the U.S. cannot “want peace more than the parties themselves,” meaning mediators
cannot replace the goodwill and good faith of the negotiating parties. See, e.g., Tony
Karon, Palestinians Hold to Peace-Talk Preconditions, TIME (July 30, 2010), http://content.
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2007604,00.html.
315. JONES, supra note 314, at 910.
316. For a comprehensive examination of the Palestinian national struggle prior to
1993, see YEZID SAYIGH, ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE SEARCH FOR STATE: THE PALESTINIAN
NATIONAL MOVEMENT, 1949– 1993 (1997).
317. See e.g., DOP, supra note 6, art. 1; Interim Agreement, supra note 100, art. III. .
318. Gaza Strip and Jericho Agreement art. 4– 9, Isr.-Palestine, May 4, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
622.
319. The term “ra’is” means both chairman and president in Arabic.
320. Interim Agreement, supra note 95, art. II (2).
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eignty or self-determination); the size, powers, and “structure of the
Palestinian Council” (including legislative and executive responsibilities,
the role of the Speaker, the Ra’is, and Council);321 the committee to be
appointed as its executive body;322 the requirement for Council meetings
to be open to the public;323 and the system of judicial review of the execu-
tive and legislative branches.324  The Oslo documents contain no discus-
sion of the internal policies, politics, or structure of the Israeli state or
government. In this sense, the ostensible equivalency created by the pro-
cess is limited by the agreements’ contents: one party to the process, Israel,
played a significant role in determining the nature of the other, Palestinian,
side.  The agreements reinforce Israel’s sovereignty (and, by implication,
the inability of external actors to dictate its domestic policies) while under-
lining the nascent and conditional character of Palestinian self-rule (thus a
primary subject of bilateral agreements).  Israel’s sovereignty is given; Pal-
estinian sovereignty must be earned.
The initial, imbalanced structure of the Accords, which premised Pal-
estinian autonomy and eventual sovereignty on international and Israeli
conditions, remained largely constant throughout the next two decades.  In
his 2011 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Palestinian President Abbas
acknowledged that the implementation of Palestinian rights had been con-
ditional: “Despite the unquestionable right of our people to self-determina-
tion and to the independence of our State as stipulated in international
resolutions, we have accepted in the past few years to engage in what
appeared to be a test of our worthiness, entitlement and eligibility.”325
According to the bilateral negotiation structure, the two parties relate as
relative equals at the negotiating table.  Yet their ostensible parity masks
asymmetry.  By defining ‘peace’ as the goal of both parties, Palestinian sov-
ereignty was reduced to a subsidiary issue, a bargaining chip in a different
game.
The 2003 Roadmap, a document published by the Quartet as a “per-
formance-based and goal-driven” path to “a final and comprehensive settle-
ment of the Israel-Palestinian conflict,”326 reinforced the notions of parity
in negotiation, inequality in practice, and asymmetry of conditionality.
The Roadmap required parallel obligations of Israel and the PLO: in the
first phase, the most dramatic were the removal of unauthorized settle-
ments and freezing of settlement activity (Israel) and the dismantling of
“terrorist infrastructure” (PLO).327  The second phase of the Roadmap
focused, much like the Interim Accords, on the internal structure and gov-
ernance of the West Bank and Gaza and on the “option of creating an inde-
321. Interim Agreement, supra note 95, art. III– IV, IX.
322. Interim Agreement, supra note 95, art. V.
323. Interim Agreement, supra note 95, art. VII (1).
324. Interim Agreement, supra note 95, art. VIII.
325. Mahmoud Abbas, President, Palestine, Speech at the U.N. General Assembly
(Sept. 23, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/full-transcript-of-abbas-speech-at-un-general-assembly-1.386385).
326. Roadmap, supra note 6.
327. Id.
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pendent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of
sovereignty.”328  In addition to the partial nature of the goal itself, Phase II
of the Roadmap states that “this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian
people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to
build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.”329  Phase II
requires no specific actions by Israel and entailed no parallel commitment
to tolerance and liberty from the Israeli leadership.330  Beyond the asym-
metry of the requirements, former U.N. Envoy to the Quartet Alvaro de
Soto, in his end-of-mission report (an internal evaluation that was leaked to
the press), pointed out that Israel accepted the Road Map subject to four-
teen reservations,331 “one of which rejected the premise of parallel-
ism . . . .[As a result,] Israel’s commitment to the Road Map was never
complete, and the international community allowed it a major loop-hole to
shirk its obligations.”332  The parity reinforced by internationally endorsed
documents laying out a path for negotiating partners to move forward via
parallel actions was belied by the reproduction of inequality through
Israel’s reservations,333 which the international community implicitly per-
mitted.  Framing the two parties as equivalent may enhance Palestinian
negotiating capacity, but it can also obscure inequality between the
players.334
The formation of the Authority as a quasi-government for the arguably
state-like territory also reinforced the logic of parity.  One influential Pales-
tinian economist suggested in 1994 that the path laid by Oslo focused on
“all the trappings of statehood at the expense of political and social and
economic development.”335  He queried, “What is the point of a state that
is sovereign with all trappings of independence— a central bank, a cur-
rency, borders, armies, a police force, and so on— but which is totally desti-
tute, dependent on aid, heavily in debt, and unable to manage its own
affairs?”336  Ironically, the proto-state nature of the Authority encompassed
328. Id. (emphasis added).
329. Id.
330. See id.
331. Hillel Fendel, PM Sharon’s 14 Road-map ‘Red Lines’, ARUTZ SHEVA (May 26, 2003),
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/44014#.UgkJ32T71Wt.
332. ALVARO DE SOTO, END OF MISSION REPORT 13– 14 (2007).  It should be noted that
these reservations were not explicitly accepted by the U.S., but they were also not explic-
itly rejected.
333. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, A MIDDLE EAST ROADMAP TO WHERE? 4– 5
(2003); Israel’s Roadmap Reservations, HAARETZ (May 27, 2003), http://www.haaretz.
com/print-edition/news/israel-s-road-map-reservations-1.8935.
334. As Avi Shlaim depicts the 1994 negotiation, “[t]he Cairo document was billed by
both sides as an agreement to divorce after twenty-seven years of unhappy coexistence in
which the stronger partner forced the weaker to live under its yoke. This was true in the
sense that Israel secured a separate legal system and separate water, electricity and roads
for the Jewish settlements. It was not true in the sense that the document gave the
stronger party firm control over the new relationship.” Avi Shlaim, The Rise And Fall Of
The Oslo Peace Process, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST 276– 77 (Louise
Fawcett, ed., 2d edition).
335. Developing the Palestinian Economy: An Interview with George T. Abed, 23 J. PALES-
TINE STUD. 41, 51 (1994).
336. Id.
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both the “earned sovereignty”337 offered to the Palestinians and their sta-
tus as partners or equal players to Israel.  At times, the limitations of the
Accords and the requirements of negotiations reinforced the conditional
nature of Palestinian statehood.  At others, the emphasis on the state-like
Authority made it the center not only of international efforts (as the institu-
tion on which hopes for peace rested, particularly in contrast to the Hamas
government in Gaza) but also of the “common-sense” of Palestinian self-
governance.338
Both international reports and Authority rhetoric have affirmed the
state-like nature of the West Bank and Gaza, and since 2007, the West
Bank itself.  Numerous commentators have noted the transformation of the
Authority from a proto- or quasi-government to a kind of ‘almost-state’ in
international rhetoric, despite the reality of shared governance.339  Interna-
tional reports have contributed heavily to the narrative of successful Pales-
tinian state-building and governance capacity.340  In 2012, the U.N.
reported to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee that “governmental functions of
the Palestinian Authority were sufficient for a functioning government of a
state.”341  A 2012 IMF report stated that “the Authority is able to conduct
the sound economic policies expected of a future Palestinian state,” thus
muddying the line between the capacity of the current regime and its sta-
tus as a proto-state.342  Authority rhetoric, following the state-building plan
announced by Prime Minister Fayyad, utilized similar language of prepara-
tion for statehood.  The 2011 Palestinian Authority report to the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee declared, “[W]e have created an environment, recog-
nized by the international community, in which we, Palestinians, are now
prepared for such statehood.”343
The statehood narrative emphasizes the capacity of the Authority to
serve as its people’s government and for its parent organization, the PLO,
to negotiate with Israel from a position of increasing power and interna-
tionally recognized competence.  It also, however, underlines the Author-
ity’s significance to the international community, Israel, and ostensibly the
Palestinian people.  As a result, international actors and Israel, as well as
the PLO leadership, have treated the temporary institution authored by the
337. See James R. Hooper & Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimen-
sion, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 355 (2003).
338. Margaret Coker & Peter Spiegel, Israel Offers Two-State Plan, WALL ST. J. (June
15, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124500039331213063#printMode.
339. See LE MORE, INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 140, at 64. See also GORDON,
supra note 27, at 171 (“[The Authority] was frequently depicted, and at times even acted,
as Israel’s rival and opponent”).
340. See, e.g., UNSCO, PALESTINIAN STATE-BUILDING, supra note 108, at para. 2.
341. Id. The U.N. specifically cited six areas: “(1) Governance, human rights, and rule
of law; (2) Education and culture; (3) Health; (4) Social protection; (5) Livelihoods, food
security and employment; and (6) Infrastructure/water and sanitation.” Id.
342. See IMF REPORT, supra note 131.
343. PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, BUILDING THE STATE OF PALESTINE: A SUCCESS
STORY— TO THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 7 (2011) [hereinafter BUILDING THE STATE].
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Oslo Accords as the only possibility for Palestinian progress.344  One Pales-
tinian lawyer pointed out the narrowing effects of the regime: “[t]he genius
of Oslo is that institutions don’t self-destruct.  There’s a certain logic [to]
institutional self-perpetuation.  So the idea of creating the Authority makes
it difficult now to come up with options that might generate a different
political configuration.”345  Governance capacity, in this argument, rein-
forces the Authority’s significance and seemingly increases its bargaining
power.  Yet the ongoing division of authority with Israel, the unequal con-
trol of territory, and the conditional nature of negotiations all contribute to
limiting the deployment of that bargaining power.  As a result, interna-
tional and national strategies for equality through statebuilding yield
impoverished results for Palestinian interests.
2. Limits of Peacemaking
Conceptualizing the two parties as relative equals in terms of
demands, rights, and suffering reinforces the hegemony of bilateral negoti-
ations as the definitive mechanism for peace.  Backed by powerful interna-
tional actors and largely supported by both Israel and the Authority,
negotiations remain the only legitimate approach to the conflict, despite
both ongoing violence and dispossession and the adamant opposition of
some groups of Palestinians and Israeli Jews to resolution through compro-
mise.346  The negotiations narrative suggests that a peace-loving core of
each side will prevail, leading to resolution through conversation rather
than violence.  In turn, the metric of legitimate activity by either party is
defined in terms of the contribution to bilateral negotiations (understood
as support for peace) or the tendency toward unilateralism (interpreted as
opposition to peace)— rather than, for example, their international legality.
For example, Israel argued that the PLO’s bid for U.N. membership was a
unilateral move; similarly, the Authority accused Israel of unilateralism for
its continued building of settlements.347  Each party used the allegation of
unilateralism to delegitimize the activities of its opponent.  Their shared
vocabulary suggests that their two activities are parallel. Evaluating them
344. OLIVER RICHMOND AND JASON FRANKS, LIBERAL PEACE TRANSITIONS: BETWEEN
STATEBUILDING AND PEACEBUILDING 173 (2009)(“It is the state-centric nature of the liberal
peace model –  an autobias toward building the state and existing state entities –  that has
created the most difficulty . . . The result [in the Israeli-Palestinian case] is a very con-
servative form of liberal peace at best, representing a virtual peace in the form of an
emancipated, virtual state as the endpoint of the peace process, rather than as a transi-
tionary point.”)
345. Interview with Palestinian lawyer in East Jerusalem (Mar. 20, 2008).
346. See, e.g., Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Israel and Palestine: Can They Start
Over? N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2009/dec/03/israel-palestine-can-they-start-over/?pagination=false; INTERNATIONAL CRI-
SIS GROUP, THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOHES: PALESTINIANS AND THE END OF THE PEACE PRO-
CESS (2012).
347. See Richard Roth & Kevin Flower, Israel Calls for Peace Talks Amid Palestinian
Statehood Push, CNN (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/09/19/un.pales-
tinian.statehood.bid; Press Release, Palestine Liberation Org., Dr. Erakat: Israeli Uni-
lateralism is a Call for Immediate International Recognition of the Palestinian State
(Nov. 9, 2010) (available at http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=243).
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based on grounds of international legality, however, would yield a different
result.  While few international lawyers argue that Israeli civilian settle-
ments are legal under the law of occupation, even fewer would make the
case that applying for U.N. membership was illegal.348  Such distinctions
are erased, however, according to the logic of parity and the vocabulary of
bilateralism.
Any move to withdraw from or contest the negotiations paradigm
brings official condemnation by major international actors.349  Despite the
shared vocabulary valorizing coordination, negotiation, partnership, and
compromise, power inequities between the parties lead to unequal conse-
quences for each side if it deviates from the paradigm.  Palestinian reliance
on international aid drastically raises the price for acting against positions
taken by the U.S., E.U., and Quartet.  By contrast, despite international
condemnation of Israeli settlement construction in East Jerusalem in 2010,
material effects have been relatively rare, given the structural obstacles.350
At the same time, the vocabulary of legitimate bilateral action and ille-
gitimate unilateralism has crept into both Palestinian and Israeli official
rhetoric.  Debates over Palestinian President Abbas’ “U.N. strategy” exem-
plify the new rhetoric.  Frustrated with the Israeli refusal to freeze settle-
ment activity and use the 1967 lines as the basis for negotiations, Abbas
submitted Palestine’s application for U.N. membership on September 23,
2011.351  Abbas reasoned that since only states may be members of the
U.N., attaining membership would convince the world to treat Palestine as
such.352  Membership would provide tools to pressure Israel, eventually
leading back to negotiations, which would in turn be premised on better
terms.353  The application was submitted to the Security Council Member-
ship Committee;354 after it stalled in committee, a General Assembly reso-
348. See Roberts, supra note 43, at 85– 86; U.N. Charter art. 4.
349. See, e.g., Neve Gordon & Yinon Cohen, Western Interests, Israeli Unilateralism
and the Two-State Solution, 41 J. PALESTINE STUD. 6, 10 (2012) (arguing that Western
rejection of the Palestinian bid for U.N. membership in the name of bilateralism is “dis-
ingenuous” when it ignores power inequalities and long-standing unilateralism in the
conflict).
350. Rory McCarthy, Binyamin Netenyahu Tells US: We Won’t Stop East Jerusalem Set-
tlement Building, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/
apr/22/binyamin-netanyahu-jerusalem-settlements-building/print; Daniel Nasaw,
Obama Aide Calls Israeli Settlement Announcement an ‘Insult’ to the US, GUARDIAN (Mar.
14, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/14/israel-palestinian-territo-
ries/print.
351. Natasha Mozgovaya & Barak Ravid, Abbas Officially Submits Palestinian Applica-
tion for Full UN Membership, HAARETZ (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/
diplomacy-defense/abbas-officially-submits-palestinian-application-for-full-un-member-
ship-1.386351. Palestine was previously classified as an observer at the U.N., a status
awarded in 1974 and upgraded in 1998. G.A. Res. 1002, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/52/1002 (Aug. 4, 1998).
352. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, CURB YOUR ENTHUSIASM: ISRAEL AND PALESTINE AFTER
THE UN (2011).
353. Id., at 3– 5 (2011).
354. For a detailed analysis of the requirements and procedures for gaining U.N.
membership, see SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, UPDATE REPORT NO. 2: PALESTINE’S APPLICA-
TION FOR ADMISSION TO THE UN (2011), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.
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lution on November 29, 2012 granted Palestine status as a non-member
observer state.355
Both the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships used the concept of uni-
lateralism to condemn the other’s actions during the debate over U.N.
membership.356  In a speech at the General Assembly the day he submitted
Palestine’s application for U.N. membership, Abbas implied that the contin-
uing occupation represented unilateral Israeli action to obstruct the negoti-
ations process.357  In parallel, Israel argued that the U.N. strategy
represented a unilateral effort to disrupt the existing process— which freed
them from any obligation to cooperate.358  After the General Assembly
upgraded Palestine’s status to that of “non-member observer state,” Israel
withheld 460 million shekels in Authority tax revenues.359  The Israeli
Finance Minister warned the Authority: “If the Palestinians continue to
advance their unilateral move they should not expect bilateral tax coopera-
tion.”360  Both the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships argued that their
opponent’s actions prejudiced an ongoing process, and both premised
their arguments on the advantages of a bilateral negotiations process.
International actors echoed and reinforced these themes by condemning
particular actions described as unilateral or threatening to negotiations
while supporting others labeled as productive of peace.361
org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-7743619.php. See also U.N. Charter art.
4(1).
355. G.A. Res. 19, U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/67/19 (Dec. 29,
2012).
356. See Roth & Flower, supra note 347; Abbas, supra note 325.
357. Id.  Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat stated that Israeli settlement construction
is a “unilateral Israeli act” that “necessitates dramatic international attention for imme-
diate recognition of the Palestinian State.” Press Release, Palestine Liberation Org., supra
note 354.  In 2011, the PLO published a fact sheet on “Israeli Unilateralism” listing a
series of violations of Oslo by unilateral Israeli actions, including some in relation to
redeployment in the West Bank, settlements, water resources, prisoner release, and eco-
nomic relations. PLO NEGOTIATIONS OFFICE, FACT SHEET: ISRAELI UNILATERALISM— UNDER-
MINING PEACE (2011), available at http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/fact%20sheet/
Israeli%20Unilateralism%20FINAL.pdf.
358. See Herb Keinon, Israel Dubbing Palestinian Moves ‘Diplomatic Terror’, JERUSALEM
POST (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Israel-dubbing-Pales-
tinian-moves-diplomatic-terror.
359. Barak Ravid, Israel Confiscates NIS 460 Million in Palestinian Authority Tax Funds,
HAARETZ (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-con-
fiscates-nis-460-million-in-palestinian-authority-tax-funds.premium-1.481888.
360. Id. Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman called Palestinian activities (including
those at the U.N.) “diplomatic terrorism.”  Keinon, supra note 362.  In addition, Israel
announced the expansion of the E-1 settlement bloc east of Jerusalem.  The former
Israeli ambassador to the U.N. stated on NPR: “Certainly if the Palestinians go forward
with their unilateralism, . . . then Israel will have to protect its interests.  And that’s what
the E-1 struggle is all about.” Larry Abramson, Israelis, Palestinians Spar Over Controver-
sial Settlement, NPR NEWS, Mar. 19, 2013.
361. After the Palestinian application to the Security Council was submitted, the
Quartet issued a statement “taking note” of the U.N. application, explicitly supporting
Fayyad’s “state-building actions” (interpreted as supporting a bilateral process) and call-
ing upon “all parties” to “refrain from provocative actions” (implicitly including the U.N.
strategy) in order to make negotiations possible. Statement, Quartet on the Middle East
(Sept. 23, 2011) (available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/quar-
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The use of a conflict and negotiations paradigm also affects the vocab-
ulary and conceptualization of the situation itself.  Rather than under-
standing the situation in terms of occupation— a framework that seeks to
protect a vulnerable people from a militarily strong sovereign— the Oslo
regime suggests two warring parties.362  In the process, Israeli, interna-
tional, and even Palestinian discourse has gradually reduced or eliminated
the use of the term ‘occupation’ while focusing on the achievement of
‘peace.’363
The Oslo regime has also affected Palestinian resistance.  While the
PLO in the past sought to end the occupation, current iterations have
focused on the achievement of statehood.364  In the process, the goal of
equality (as two states, in terms of global power, under the law, or with
regard to resources such as water) may at times be undermined by a pro-
cess predicated on parity (participating in negotiations, deploying interna-
tional law, or utilizing international fora).  Relations of parity resulted in
part from the Palestinian belief that mutual recognition or formal status
would alter the terms of the conflict; in the end, however, the conception—
and perception— of equivalence largely overtook the reality of asymmetry,
making it harder rather than easier to address the structural inequality
between the players.  The focus of the international community (and the
PLO) on establishing a state has oriented the Palestinian national move-
ment away from earlier approaches rooted in rhetoric of emancipation and
liberation.
At an institutional level, parity both produces and is reproduced by
emphases on statehood and governance.  International aid represents both
the central ingredient for Palestinian semi-autonomy through Authority
governance and the ‘stick’ used to limit deviance from the negotiations par-
adigm.  The efficacy of aid may be compromised by the contradiction
between the context of ongoing occupation and the dominant narrative of
tet-23sep2011.htm).  In a speech at the General Assembly given as the Abbas submitted
the application for U.N. membership, U.S. President Obama both declared that the “Pal-
estinian people deserve a state of their own” and rejected the Palestinian intervention,
implying that it was a “short cut” and holding that “[p]eace will not come through state-
ments and resolutions at the United Nations” but only through negotiations.  President
Barack Obama, Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, (Sept. 21,
2011) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/21/remarks-
president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly).
362. Sara Roy, Reconceptualizing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Key Paradigm Shifts, 41
J. PALESTINE STUD. 71, 77 (2012) (arguing that “occupation has been transformed from a
political and legal issue with international legitimacy into a simple border dispute where
the rules of war, not of occupation, apply”).
363. See, e.g., LE MORE, supra note 140, at 29.  Roy suggests that “the word ‘occupa-
tion’ has been removed from the political lexicon, as would an insult or obscenity.” Sara
Roy, Praying with Their Eyes Closed: Reflections on the Disengagement from Gaza, 34 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 64, 70 (2005).
364. Compare Yasser Arafat, Editorial, The Palestinian Vision of Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
3, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/03/opinion/the-palestinian-vision-of-
peace.html, with BUILDING THE STATE, supra note 343.
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conflicted parties negotiating for peace under difficult conditions.365  At
the same time, once international organizations conceptualize the Author-
ity as a state-like entity, governance capacity becomes the metric for evalu-
ating Palestinian success or failure.  International organizations sometimes
compare the West Bank and Gaza to other countries in the process of evalu-
ating Authority progress,366 or they use the Authority’s state-like status to
evaluate its responsibilities, duties, and shortcomings.367  While moves to
gain statehood or recognition have met an ambivalent response in interna-
tional arenas, the World Bank and others use comparisons with “other
states.”  As a result, expectations based on statehood are employed even as
statehood itself is denied.
B. Economism
The Oslo process conceptualized Palestinian economic development
as a mode of peacebuilding.368  From the outset, the function of interna-
tional aid was not only to nurture economic growth or mitigate suffering
but also to make peace and negotiations more attractive to Palestinians
than the alternatives, principally violence.369  In this sense, economic pro-
gress was explicitly interwoven with political objectives and discussed
instrumentally.  In the first decade of negotiations, advocates of the Oslo
process argued that Palestinians would embrace peace and reject violence if
they experienced early tangible rewards.  International organizations and
donors premised their involvement initially on producing a Palestinian
“peace dividend.”370
Over the course of the Oslo process, however, economic arguments
and rhetoric became increasingly technocratic, with economic progress a
goal in itself.  Later arguments frequently subsumed questions of occupa-
tion, inequality, and sovereignty under process-oriented development.  In
365. Jeremy Wildeman, Why Aid Projects in Palestine Are Doomed to Fail, ELECTRONIC
INTIFADA (Sept. 6, 2012), http://electronicintifada.net/content/why-aid-projects-pales-
tine-are-doomed-fail/11642
366. See, e.g., SECRETARIAT OF THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE, supra note 213.
367. When Israel withheld Authority tax revenues, de Soto questioned whether it is
“credible to judge the ability of a government to deliver when it is being deprived of its
largest source of income, to which it is indubitably entitled by virtue of an agreement
endorsed by the Security Council, by the State which largely controls the capacity of
that government and its people to generate income. In fact, the Authority government is
being expected to deliver without having make-or-break attributes of sovereignty such as
control of its borders, the monopoly over the use of force, or access to natural resources,
let alone regular tax receipts.”  DE SOTO, supra note 339, at para. 53. See also Yezid
Sayigh, Inducing a Failed State in Palestine, 49 SURVIVAL 7, 23– 24 (2007) (arguing that
the international community “underestimated the extent to which presenting the
Authority with demands and expectations it could not meet eroded its credibility and
standing domestically and internationally . . . . Even at the best of times, in 1994-2000,
it was not a government capable of reaching decisions and enforcing them over most of
its territory –  key criteria for a functioning, viable state”).
368. See Jonathan Rynhold, The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed
Implementation?, 76 MIDEAST SEC. & POL’Y STUD. 1, 4 (2008).
369. See id.
370. Lasensky, supra note 140, at 220.
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most cases, however, economic language and development practices have
had a depoliticizing effect in the Palestinian case.  In one version, develop-
ment would produce peace in the long-term, either by pacifying Palestinian
resistance or by cementing international support for the Authority. In
another, more critical version, particular limitations— chiefly those around
movement and access for people and goods— can be improved, but the
structure of occupation as a whole remains largely unshakeable.  Perhaps
most strikingly, some Palestinian rhetoric has reformulated economic
development as resistance.  Israeli governmental invocations of “economic
peace,”371 Prime Minister Fayyad’s vocabulary of statebuilding,372 and
international reporting on Palestinian development together reflect the
economistic nature of the Oslo regime.
1. A Question of Development?
As discussed above, the Oslo Accords envisioned economic develop-
ment as a key aspect of peacebuilding.373  In this sense, the Accords were
typical of the era of “liberal peace” and democratic peace theory, when
scholarship and practice converged around the idea that encouraging the
development of free markets, the rule of law, and electoral democracies in
post-conflict states would produce sustainable peace.374  In the case of
Oslo, supporters paid special attention to the “urgent need to deliver tangi-
ble benefits to the Palestinian population to reinforce the momentum
towards peace,”375 benefits they called a “peace dividend.”376  Shimon
Peres and Yossi Beilin, key Israeli negotiators of the Oslo Accords, consid-
ered economic discussions and Palestinian development necessary to the
success of the peace plan; Peres was one of the main figures seeking finan-
cial support for the Palestinians.377
There was broad agreement at the outset— including among the Pales-
tinian leadership— around the notion of economic development: interna-
tional aid would support the Palestinian transition to autonomy by
371. See, e.g., infra notes 383– 385 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., infra notes 389– 402 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part II.B.1.
374. A plethora of literature has addressed democratic peace theory and liberal
peacebuilding particularly as practiced in the 1990s. See, e.g., Roland Paris, Saving Lib-
eral Peacebuilding, 36 INT’L STUD. 337 (2010); Oliver Richmond, The Problem of Peace:
Understanding the Liberal Peace, 6 CONFLICT, SECURITY, & DEV. 291 (2006); ROLAND
PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT (2004); Bruce Russett et al.,
Correspondence: The Democratic Peace, 19 INT’L SECURITY 164 (1995); U.N. Secretary-
General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Rep.
of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. a/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992).
375. Preface to INVESTMENT PROGRAM, supra note 202.
376. See Lasensky, supra note 140, at 218– 19.
377. Id.  The “peace dividend” was also intended to incentivize Israeli involvement in
the peace talks by promoting trade in the region, greater foreign investment, and other
benefits for the Israeli economy. See generally YOSSI BEILIN, TOUCHING PEACE: FROM THE
OSLO ACCORD TO A FINAL AGREEMENT (1999); SHIMON PERES, THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
(1993).  Questions of integration or separation between the Israeli and Palestinian econ-
omies far predate the Oslo negotiations. See generally Gross, Mending Walls, supra note
69.
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building up infrastructure, supporting new institutions, lending expertise
in the financial and other sectors, and altering the distribution of resources
such as power and water.378  Palestinian economic security would under-
pin Israel’s overall security while creating potential for growth, economic
and political, on both sides.
Contestation quickly arose, however, first with regard to the details of
economic arrangements and later to the effects of Israeli policies on Pales-
tinian development.  As they negotiated what became known as the Paris
Protocol, the Palestinian negotiating team advocated a free trade agreement
between the Authority and Israel, while Israeli negotiators called for contin-
uing the customs union.379  The ensuing agreement largely followed Israeli
preferences, albeit with certain allowances for Palestinian freedom of trade
with Arab states.380  Analyses of the final result oscillated between those
suggesting it merely continued a previously unequal system and those
arguing that it produced new opportunities for Palestinian economic
growth.381  As described above, while aspects of the Paris Protocol contrib-
uted to continuing asymmetry between the parties, other events gradually
obstructed possibilities for growth in the West Bank and Gaza.382
In the 2008 Israeli elections, prime ministerial candidate Benjamin
Netanyahu advocated “economic peace”.383  Netanyahu suggested that
negotiations should first address economic issues— one of the few possible
areas of agreement— and only later progress to controversial political top-
ics, once the groundwork for cooperation had been laid.384  After his elec-
tion, Netanyahu announced the creation of a governmental body to address
378. See Lasensky, supra note 140, at 220.
379. Gross, Mending Walls, supra note 15, at 1601.  A customs union creates a single
‘envelope’ for the parties, between which there are no duties on goods and services; they
share a common external tariff.  A free trade agreement, by contrast, lowers barriers to
trade between the parties but allows for separate external tariff rates.
380. See Paris Protocol, supra note 126, art. III.
381. See Sharif Elmusa & Mahmud El-Jaafari, Power and Trade: The Israeli-Palestinian
Economic Protocol, 24 J. PALESTINE STUD. 14, 30 (1995) (arguing that the terms created by
the Paris Protocol are unsurprising given the inequality between Israeli and Palestinian
negotiators and their economic positions and suggesting that any progress will come
from the “breaches it introduces in the wall of the one-sided customs union and the
possibilities for immediate financial gain”). See also Gross, Mending Walls, supra note 15.
382. See supra Part I.C.
383. Barack Ravid, Palestinians Reject Netanyahu’s ‘Economic Peace’ Plan, HAARETZ
(July 9, 2009), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/palestinians-reject-netany-
ahu-s-economic-peace-plan-1.279616. I do not assess here the empirical plausibility of
claims that economic improvements will bolster peace; rather, I look at the ways in
which discourse around economic issues has gradually become a substitute for deeper
political debates.  For a closer examination of the claim that economic growth reduces
potential for war, see Nizan Feldman, Economic Peace: Theory Versus Reality, 12 STRATE-
GIC ASSESSMENT 19 (2009) (arguing that even taking the most sympathetic assessment of
the economic peace argument, “it is still difficult to argue persuasively that increased
economic cooperation between Israel and the Authority and the creation of conditions
conducive to economic growth on the West Bank can pave the road to political peace”).
384. Raphael Ahren, Netanyahu: Economics, Not Politics, Is the Key to Peace, HAARETZ
(Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/netanyahu-economics-
not-politics-is-the-key-to-peace-1.257617.
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“economic peace” with the Palestinians.385  During his campaign and after
his election, Netanyahu portrayed the situation as a struggle between two
parties with conflicting considerations who were persistently unable to
agree (parity) while advocating economic development, taking place under
the auspices of occupation, which would replace, or at least defer, political
considerations (economism).
Emphasizing the intractable stalemate between the parties implied
that expanding settlements and continuing occupation were at most secon-
dary factors in the conflict.  Israel’s official submission to the Ad Hoc Liai-
son Committee (AHLC) in 2011 reflected this paradigm.386  In
summarizing the causes for the downturn of the Palestinian economy, the
AHLC report lists aid dependency, inability to receive bank loans, lack of
revenue generation, and a large public sector.  Israel is mentioned only as a
facilitator of the Palestinian economy: “Israel’s policy in the West Bank has
contributed significantly to growth in the past year.”387  The report calls
for “ongoing international support for the Authority budget and develop-
ment projects that will contribute to the growth of a vibrant private sector,”
condemns Palestinian terror, and lauds Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on
security and economy.388  As in international reports, the Palestinian econ-
omy becomes the primary concern, with the structure of occupation as a
whole left increasingly implicit rather than central.
Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad’s statebuilding initiative— which
focused on constructing the institutions and economy of a state as a way of
establishing that state— in many ways resembled Netanyahu’s notion of
economic peace and represented to international organizations and donors
a direct contrast to the Hamas regime in Gaza.  In 2009, in an effort to
circumvent the short-term trap of aid and to defy those who suggested no
progress could be made while the occupation continued, Prime Minister
Fayyad announced a two-year state-building plan to “create an entity that
looks and behaves like a state before the occupation ends.”389  By creating
the institutions of the state, he reasoned, the state itself would become
inevitable.390  The Palestinian Authority’s 2009 Program of the Thirteenth
Government, Palestine: Ending Occupation, Establishing the State, stated
unequivocally the belief that “full commitment to this state-building
endeavor will advance our highest national priority of ending the occupa-
385. Amos Harel & Barak Ravid, Netanyahu’s Opening Gambit: A Special Body on ‘Eco-
nomic Peace’, Haaretz (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-s-
opening-gambit-a-special-body-on-economic-peace-1.272935.
386. See generally GOI, 2011 REPORT TO THE AHLC, supra note 107. The Ad Hoc Liai-
son Committee (AHLC), a multilateral, fifteen-member donors’ group (including Israel
and the Authority) set up in October 1993, “serves as the principal policy-level coordina-
tion mechanism for development assistance to the Palestinian people.” Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee, LOCAL DEV. FORUM, http://www.lacs.ps/article.aspx?id=6 (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
387. GOI, 2011 REPORT TO THE AHLC, supra note 107, at 3.
388. GOI, 2011 REPORT TO THE AHLC, supra note 107, at 4.
389. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, TIPPING POINT? PALESTINIANS AND THE SEARCH FOR A
NEW STRATEGY 24 (2010) [hereinafter, TIPPING POINT?].
390. See id.
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tion, thereby enabling us to live in freedom and dignity in a country of our
own.”391  Rather than focusing on negotiations, Fayyad planned to build
the state from the ground up, creating a set of facts that would influence
the political process.
Netenyahu’s and Fayyad’s plans shared a common vocabulary—
statebuilding, development, and institutional formation— and both sug-
gested that economic growth was the only possible area for progress given
the political stalemate.392  There was, of course, a crucial difference: while
Netanyahu’s plan emphasized economic development as an intermediate
tactic to sustain the status quo (and Israeli security) without negotiated
agreement, Fayyad’s plan suggested that statebuilding should be consid-
ered a non-violent method of resistance to Israeli occupation.  Yet their
shared vocabulary and emphases led some Palestinians to express concern
that Fayyad’s plan— like Netanyahu’s— would end up truncating the sover-
eignty that was his objective.393
Fayyad’s plan depended on infusions of international aid (although it
also aimed to wean the nascent Palestinian economy from aid dependence),
reducing corruption and violence, and constructing efficient and indepen-
dent Palestinian national institutions on a broad scale.394  Using language
familiar to the international community, Ending Occupation, Establishing
the State argued that the “establishment and promotion of good governance
in the occupied territory is elevated to the status of a national goal in and
of itself,” given the effects of occupation in “hamper[ing] the efficiency and
effectiveness of [Palestinian] national institutions.”395
Western donors and international organizations largely embraced
Fayyad’s efforts, praising his achievement of statebuilding benchmarks and
contributing funds to his projects.396  Gaza in turn became a foil for the
West Bank, representing the economic consequences of non-participation
in the peace process in contrast to the benefits reaped by the Ramallah-
based Authority.  Fayyad’s administration launched upon over one thou-
391. ESTABLISHING THE STATE, supra note 251, at 3.
392. In a 2010 interview, Abbas’s economic advisor Mohammad Mustafa rejected
wholly any links between Fayyad’s plan and Netanyahu’s economic peace stating, “We
absolutely and categorically reject Netanyahu’s project.  There can be no economic peace
without political peace and without the establishment of an independent and sovereign
Palestinian state.”  Nasr Abdul Karim, Salim Tamari, & Khalid Farraj, The Palestinian
Economy and Future Prospects: Interview with Mohammad Mustafa, Head of the Palestine
Investment Fund, 39 J. PALESTINE STUD. 40, 43 (2010).
393. International Crisis Group found that some Palestinians expressed criticism of
Fayyad’s plan based on his “becoming a Palestinian partner for Netanyahu’s ‘economic
peace’ that would result in something far short of an independent state.” TIPPING POINT?,
supra note 389, at 23. See also Raja Khalidi & Sobhi Samour, Neoliberalism as Libera-
tion: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement, 40 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 6, 8– 12 (2011); Ahmad Salih Khalidi, The Palestinian Authority’s State-
First Mistake, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2009/oct/28/palestinian-authority-israel-state-first [hereinafter State-First Mistake].
394. See id. at 14.
395. See id. at 11.
396. See TIPPING POINT?, supra note 389, at 22.
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sand development projects.397  His plan included efforts to develop Area C,
which remained wholly under Israeli control.398  Donors that previously
had avoided “running afoul of Israeli concerns”399 by supporting projects
in Area C assisted his efforts by helping negotiate approvals from the Israeli
government, among other actions.400  Criticism was plentiful; some
accused Fayyad of replacing politics with technocracy while others sug-
gested that his plan had no purpose other than self-aggrandizement.401
Overall, however, international donors and organizations treated the strat-
egy and its execution as successes, praising Fayyad for his focus on eco-
nomic development and statebuilding.402
In September 2011, at the end of the self-imposed two-year deadline
for statebuilding, the Authority issued a report to the AHLC, reviewing the
Authority’s achievements.  Fayyad’s introduction to the report affirmed that
the “strategy of self-reliance and self-empowerment, focused on providing
good government, economic opportunity and the rule of law, has removed
all pretexts that were exploited to justify our continued occupation.  Our
effort has been to make statehood inevitable.”403  The body of the report
went on to show that the effort had not, and indeed under current political
conditions could not, come to fruition.404  Although the original plan
aimed to advance the end of occupation through statebuilding, the report
to the AHLC demonstrated the ways in which Palestinian statebuilding had
made progress in spite of, and without much effect on, the occupation
itself.405  After fifty pages outlining Palestinian achievements, the report
concluded, “Realistically, genuine and sustainable development cannot
occur without ending the occupation and establishing an independent,
sovereign, and viable State of Palestine.”406  Occupation had stymied the
goal of moving “from a welfare-oriented to a development approach.”407  As
Fayyad himself admitted two years later, “[While] the Authority is a key
building block in the effort to resolve the conflict, . . . . somebody needs to
explain . . . how something viewed as central to building peace is left on the
ropes for three years, reeling under bankruptcy, and every action is taken
to erode its political viability . . . . We have not delivered.  I represent the
address for failure.”408
397. Nathan Thrall, Our Man in Palestine, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/our-man-palestine/
?pagination=false.
398. ESTABLISHING THE STATE, supra note 251, at 35.
399. TIPPING POINT?, supra note 389, at 22.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 23.
402. See NEW YORK UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, STATE-BUILD-
ING AND POLITICAL CHANGE: OPTIONS FOR PALESTINE 2011, at 5 (2011).
403. BUILDING THE STATE, supra note 343, at 7.
404. See generally id.
405. See, e.g., id. at 7, 38, 51– 53.
406. Id. at 57.
407. Id.
408. Roger Cohen, The Success That Failed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/02/15/opinion/global/roger-cohen-The-Story-of-Palestinian-Prime-
Minister-Salam-Fayyad-.html?pagewanted=all.
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International reports during and after Fayyad’s two-year plan endorsed
his approach while downplaying the role of occupation per se.409  Instead,
they addressed specific— albeit pervasive— Israeli constraints on the Pales-
tinian economy.410  The World Bank’s 2009 and 2010 reports to the AHLC
announced that the Authority was “well-positioned for the establishment of
a Palestinian state at any point in the near future,”411 while the Office of
the Quartet Representative remarked in 2011 that “[t]here is strong inter-
national recognition of the Palestinian Authority’s readiness for state-
hood.”412  The reports mention occupation rarely, if at all, focusing instead
on Palestinian fiscal and institutional progress since the inception of the
statebuilding plan; economic improvement appears as a support to negotia-
tions, which are assumed to be the only pathway to peace.413  U.S. Secre-
tary of State John Kerry revisited the economic argument for peace in 2013
when he announced a $4 billion development plan for the West Bank.414
Kerry’s rhetoric and strategy reflected the evolution of the economistic
agenda: he advocated economic development, claimed explicitly that it
would not distract from, but rather advance, political considerations, sug-
gested that negotiations were both the only strategy for peace and conceiva-
bly near extinction, and embraced an initiative among Israeli and
Palestinian businessmen advocating private sector investment, renewed
negotiations, and cooperation between the parties.415
Whereas in earlier eras, Israeli officials discussing the economy por-
trayed development as a strategy for pacifying Palestinian resistance, the
later Fayyad-led version argued for development was resistance.416  Early
international discussions also linked development to politics by arguing
409. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE QUARTET REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT FOR THE MEETING OF THE
AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE ON OQR ACTION IN SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY STATE-
BUILDING (2011) at 5, 17 [hereinafter QUARTET REP. REPORT]; WORLD BANK, THE UNDER-
PINNINGS OF THE FUTURE PALESTINIAN STATE: SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND INSTITUTIONS— ECO-
NOMIC MONITORING REPORT TO THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 6 (2010) [hereinafter
UNDERPINNINGS].
410. See Politics and Economics, infra.
411. See UNDERPINNINGS supra note 409, at para. 37; WORLD BANK, A PALESTINIAN
STATE IN TWO YEARS: INSTITUTIONS FOR ECONOMIC REVIVAL, at para. 3 (2009).
412. QUARTET REP. REPORT, supra note 409, at 5.  That same year, the IMF confirmed
that it “considers that the Authority is now able to conduct the sound economic policies
expected of a future well-functioning Palestinian state, given its solid track record in
reforms and institution-building in the public finance and financial areas.” See IMF
REPORT, supra note 131, at 5.
413. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE QUARTET REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF OQR DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA TO SUPPORT PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING—
REPORT FOR THE MEETING OF THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE 3 (2012) (“[T]he goal of this
development agenda . . . is to catalyse significant economic change on the ground to give
greater oxygen to the political negotiation process”).
414. Michael Gordon & Jodi Rudoren, Trying to Revive Mideast Talks, Kerry Pushes
Investment Plan for West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2013, at A6.
415. See id. Kerry’s plan also focused entirely on the West Bank, leaving the Hamas-
run Gaza Strip as an unspoken foil to the donor-supported Authority. See id. In the end,
however, neither the $4 billion nor peace materialized.
416. See BUILDING THE STATE, supra note 343, at 7; ALAA TARTIR, SAM BAHOUR, & SAMER
ABDELNOUR, DEFEATING DEPENDENCY, CREATING A RESISTANCE ECONOMY 4 (2012).
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that economic growth would reduce Palestinian frustration and promote
peace.  Later international rhetoric and practice, however, treated develop-
ment as a process to be conducted regardless of the larger constraints of
occupation.  As a result, what was in its earlier form a device for explicitly
linking economics and politics (development would build peace) became a
wedge between them (development should take place regardless of ongoing
occupation).  Despite Fayyad’s rhetoric of resistance through statebuilding,
the practice and vocabulary of development came to serve the status quo,
rather than challenge it.
2. Politics and Depoliticization
Notwithstanding the different styles of economistic argument— the
proximate improvement of individual Palestinian lives, mutual Palestinian
and Israeli economic benefits, collective Palestinian resistance to occupa-
tion, or peace support— its cumulative effect was to dampen political rheto-
ric and practice under the weight of economic development and
statebuilding.  From the end of the Second Intifada, the combination of
ongoing occupation, failed negotiations, and fluctuating aid priorities
encouraged a depoliticizing agenda that focused on the economy and
statebuilding as the only viable arenas for change.  Gaza’s growing humani-
tarian crisis after 2007 had a parallel depoliticizing effect, albeit through a
different route: rather than deflecting politics through development, Gaza
diverted attention from politics to humanitarian catastrophe.417  The West
Bank’s economistic regime was reinforced by the contrast of Gaza’s human-
itarian crisis after 2007.  While in the West Bank the focus was primarily
on the need for growth and development, in Gaza, the story was one of
humanitarian necessity.
Proliferating reports from international organizations, in replacing
politics with technocratic economics, suggest that a— if not the— central
problem of the occupation is its cost to the Palestinian economy.418  Fram-
ing the issue as one of economic cost reconfigures the problem of creating
a self-sufficient Palestinian economy as one of improving it.  By focusing
on current damage to Palestinian fiscal growth or institutional capacity,
international reports reinforce a narrative of potential Palestinian progress
toward independence persistently slowed by a combination of external and
417. See, e.g., Ariella Azoulay & Adi Ophir, Abandoning Gaza, in AGAMBEN AND
COLONIALISM (Marcello Svirsky and Simone Bignall, 2012) (arguing that the Israeli High
Court in recent cases has ignored Israeli responsibility for Palestinian humanitarian
suffering).
418. The February 2012 U.N. Seminar on Assistance to the Palestinian People (con-
vened by the U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People) focused on the economic cost of the occupation, in particular the “impact of
Israeli policies and practices on the socio-economic situation in the West Bank and
Gaza[;] . . . . the cost of the Israeli occupation incurred by the Palestinians in various
sectors of the economy[;] . . . the ways of sustaining the recent economic achievements
following the implementation of the Palestinian State-building programme.” United
Nations Seminar on Assistance to Palestinian People Considers Economic Cost of Continued
Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Territory, in Cairo, 6– 7 February, UNITED NATIONS (Feb.
2, 2012), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gapal1216.doc.htm.
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internal factors.  The narrative takes political inequality for granted, which
in effect marginalizes it as an area of active concern. As Palestinian critics
have noted, the result reinforces the status quo by encouraging the Author-
ity to develop its institutions within the context of occupation rather than
in resistance to it.419
A focus on the economic cost of occupation obscures the politics that
underpin a technocratic analysis of a limited economy.420  In addition to
marginalizing questions of politics, the economic prescriptions encouraged
by the international community and embraced by Fayyad and the Author-
ity rely on neoliberal conceptions of a market economy.421  As such, they
are freighted with the limitations and critiques of “post-Washington Con-
sensus” policies throughout the world.422  In the context of neoliberal plan-
ning, those economic tools deemed confrontational or unilateral, or
economic plans emphasizing other theories of development, are marginal-
ized, ignored, or condemned in international reports.423
Despite— or perhaps because of— the overall depoliticization, interna-
tional organization reports use economic discussions as a proxy for politi-
cal criticism.  As a result, reports concerned with economic development
often demonstrate a type of schizophrenia in relation to the occupation,
the Authority, and Palestinian statehood.  International reports both smug-
gle politics in under the auspices of economics and obscure politics
through technocratic preoccupations.  For example, in a 2004 report
reviewing Israel’s proposed Disengagement Plan (the withdrawal from
Gaza), the World Bank chastised the Israeli government for maintaining
major closures, for delaying humanitarian aid, and for destroying donor-
financed infrastructure— all in the name of the economic cost they impose
on Palestinian development.424  Yet in thirty-six pages, the report never
used the term ‘occupation,’ preferring to refer only to closure (one piece in
419. See, e.g., State-First Mistake, supra note 393 (arguing that the Authority approach
is “apolitical: improving Palestinian living standards and fomenting state-like behavior
but without any of the advantages of a real state . . . . [I]t appears as a pragmatic ambi-
tion, to supplement the peace process and path to a viable two-state solution.  In reality
it is destined to circumvent it altogether or, at best, to ensure that the outcome is deter-
mined by Israeli national interests alone”).
420. Palestinians must “move beyond the technocratic and apolitical understanding
of the development process toward recognizing the asymmetry of power.” TARTIR,
BAHOUR, & ABDELNOUR, supra note 416, at 4.  They add, “All international NGOs should
agree to work on Palestinian development priorities and timeframes (not three-year
donor agendas) and tackle the root causes of Palestinian poverty: the Israeli occupation
and resulting restrictions.” Id. at 5.
421. Khalidi & Samour, supra note 393, at 6.
422. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 168; David Trubek, The ‘Rule of Law in Development
Assistance, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 89– 91
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
423. For example, tactics such as boycotts of Israeli or settler products are often con-
demned as unilateral and obstructionist.  Alternative economic approaches are generally
marginalized. See generally TARTIR, BAHOUR, & ABDELNOUR, supra note 416.
424. Foreword to WORLD BANK, DISENGAGEMENT, THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AND THE
SETTLEMENTS (2004) (“Above all, Israel’s restrictions on the movement of people and
goods needs a major overhaul. These closures stifle any home of Palestinian economic
revival”).
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the complex apparatus of control) or to Israel’s “responsibility” for the pop-
ulation of Gaza prior to Disengagement.425  This dual voice— criticism in
the name of development paired with avoidance of engagement with, or
even naming of, the system as a whole— features prominently in many inter-
national reports.  A 2007 IMF donors report is representative of the Fund’s
combination of (softer) criticism with a focus on working within the
existing system.  The report notes in a number of places the negative effects
of Israeli restrictions on movement and access on the Palestinian econ-
omy.426  However, it calls for “close cooperation” among the Authority,
Israel, and donors— a difficult proposition in the midst of ongoing conflict
and occupation.427
Political considerations do, however, reappear in unexpected ways.
Neoliberal policies in Palestine (such as fiscal austerity measures, shrink-
ing the public sector, opening markets, focusing on the private sector, and
improving institutional efficiency and the rule of law) have often been
aborted due to the fear that they will provoke instability.428  Indeed the
Authority has implemented policies in direct contradiction to these objec-
tives in order to forestall a complete collapse.429  The IMF avers that “politi-
cal uncertainty and the restrictions on movement and access are a key
barrier to private investment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” but sug-
gests that the Authority can nonetheless “still support a business-friendly
environment by enhancing macroeconomic stability, ensuring sound fiscal
management, and taking measures supportive of the private sector.”430
The institution acknowledges the conditions that may limit economic
achievements but ambiguously apportions responsibility between the
Authority and Israel.  This obscures the reality that many crucial resources
for statebuilding— such as “land, water, roads, borders, electromagnetic
spectrum, airspace, movement, access, electricity, and . . . human
resources”431— remain under Israeli control by virtue of the Oslo Accords,
425. See generally id.
426. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, MEDIUM-TERM MACROECONOMIC AND FISCAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA: REPORT FOR THE DONORS’ CONFERENCE 2, 5, 7
(2007).
427. Id. at 15.
428. See, e.g., Le More, supra note 140, at 64– 84. C.f. Khalidi & Samour, supra note
401, at 14 (describing the obstacles to the Authority adopting neoliberal economic
policies).
429. See, e.g., Diaa Hadid & Nasser Shiyoukhi, Palestinian Protests Turn Violent in West
Bank, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/
sep/10/palestinian-protests-turn-violent-west-bank/?page=all.  (noting that government
salaries are “the backbone of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank” and that “Pales-
tinians have an economy hampered by Israel’s control over the West Bank’s borders as
well as limited movement inside the territory”). See also Leila Farsakh, From Domination
to Destruction: The Palestinian Economy under the Israeli Occupation, in THE POWER OF
INCLUSIVE EXCLUSION: ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
380 (2009).
430. IMF REPORT, supra note 131, at 31.
431. Sam Bahour, Palestine’s Economic Hallucination, 165 THIS WEEK IN PALESTINE (Jan.
2012), http://www.thisweekinpalestine.com/details.php?id=3596&ed=202&edid=202.
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their implementation, and the effects of ongoing violence.432
Questions of inequality, growth, development, and economic progress
are inseparable from those of conflict, although theories differ on their pre-
cise linkages.433  Israelis, Palestinians, and the international community
have been discussing and arguing over the economic aspects of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict since 1967.  These discussions take particular forms,
eliding some issues while obscuring others.  For example, contemporary
international reporting often uses technocratic language to focus on how
Israeli actions damage the Palestinian economy; yet international organiza-
tions rarely address the benefits of the Oslo regime (or of occupation) on
the Israeli economy.434  Similarly, focusing aid and assistance in Gaza on
humanitarian relief can at times remove consideration of the structural rea-
sons the relief is required.435  Rather than provoking sharp contestation—
whether over economic ideology or the utility (or possibility) of develop-
ment under occupation— the economy has become the last preserve of
those advocating cooperation and negotiation.  In the process, economic
approaches on the ground and at headquarters have become less political,
more technocratic, and more accommodating of the status quo.  Back-
ground assumptions— whether based on an embrace of neoliberalism or on
an inability to imagine an end to occupation— limit policy prescriptions; as
Fayyad’s plans demonstrated, they may also limit the use of the economic
realm as a tool of opposition.
432. Id. (“Palestine’s economic hallucination has the power to maintain an image of a
reality that is growing at more than 9 percent a year.  It used to take us 20 minutes to
travel from Ramallah to Bethlehem.  Now, we are forced to circumvent Jerusalem, around
cement walls and through multiple Israeli checkpoints.  Today it takes us over 60 min-
utes, at best.  For GDP growth, this is great news.  During those extra 40 or more min-
utes we burn more gasoline, require more lighting on the longer roads, eat more
sandwiches on the way, spend more time driving, hit more potholes, which causes more
work for the road engineers in the morning, etc., etc.  All of this extra spending is great
for a higher GDP but catastrophic for our livelihood and state-building exercise”).
433. For representative texts offering conflicting positions on the relationship
between economics and war (particularly civil war), see, e.g., Jack A. Goldstone et. al., A
Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 190 (2010); Paul
Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars, 56 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
563 (2004); Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 46 J.
CONFLICT RES. 13 (2002).  For contextualization of the Palestinian situation within the
larger international development discourse, see SAHAR TAGHDISI-RAD, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF AID IN PALESTINE: RELIEF FROM CONFLICT OR DEVELOPMENT DELAYED? (2011).
434. HEVER, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 140. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
supra note 426 (excluding analysis on the impact of the occupation of Israel’s economy); R
Assaf Oron, What’s Behind Israel’s Biggest Economic Boom?  The Occupation, +972 MAGA-
ZINE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://972mag.com/whats-behind-israels-biggest-economic-boom-
the-occupation/81038 (arguing that the occupation has benefited Israel’s economy).
435. Widely quoted in international and national media, one adviser to Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert stated that “The idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to
make them die of hunger.”  In this sense, humanitarian need in Gaza was created in part
due to deliberate actions by Israel to incentivize Gazans to reject their Hamas-led govern-
ment. Conal Urquhart, Gaza on Brink of Explosion, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2008), http:/
/www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/16/israel.
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C. Transition
The Oslo Accords, which were supposed to be a temporary arrange-
ment premised on the notion of interim self-government, have endured
remarkably.  Indeed, one of their most significant legacies has been to
structure the situation as one of transience and progress, a characterization
which suggests a linear, consequentialist narrative, authorizes interna-
tional assistance and expertise, and permits exploitation of power imbal-
ances through temporal and process-based flexibility.  The contrast
between the rhetoric of transience and practices of apparent permanence
mirrors the contradiction between the assumption of temporariness built
into the legal institution of belligerent occupation and the reality of the
continuing Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories.
1. Process and Progress
The Oslo Accords foresaw a five-year transitional period, with the aim
of building Palestinian self-governance and negotiating a settlement to
what were defined as “permanent status” issues— defining borders, estab-
lishing security arrangements, finding a solution for Jerusalem, addressing
the question of Palestinian refugees, and resolving the fate of Israeli settle-
ments in the Occupied Territories.436  It was designed as an incremental,
gradual process, in which progress on the ground would build confidence
for the parties to negotiate final status issues.437  Palestinian statehood was
never mentioned in any Oslo document, and the parties differed with
regard to their expectations of the endgame.438  Early agreements men-
tioned the parties’ aspiration to “peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity
and security,” but the Declaration of Principles inaugurated a process-
based transition that redefined the conflict in terms of a list of discrete
issues (rather than, for example, an end to occupation) and created a spe-
cific timeline, but left the final objective unclear.  As the process deterio-
rated, however, and final status negotiations failed, both international
players and Palestinian leaders began to focus instead on Palestinian state-
hood as an immediate, if not final, goal.439
Making this transition all the more complicated was that it was layered
over a preexisting regime marked as temporary: occupation.  Under inter-
436. See DOP, supra note 6, art. V.
437. See id. art. I.
438. For varied accounts of the expectations for Palestinian statehood in the early
years of Oslo, see SHLOMO BEN-AMI, SCARS OF WAR, WOUNDS OF PEACE: THE ISRAELI-ARAB
TRAGEDY 220 (2006); AHMED QURIE, FROM OSLO TO JERUSALEM: THE PALESTINIAN STORY OF
THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS 286 (2006); DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE 104, 123 (2004); URI SAVIR, THE PROCESS: 1,100
DAYS THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE EAST 46, 94– 99 (1998).
439. In December 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton offered his “parameters” for reso-
lution; these included a sovereign, contiguous, viable Palestinian state.  Bill Clinton, Pro-
posal on Israeli-Palestinian Peace at the White House (Dec. 23, 2000), available at http://
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Peace%20Puzzle/10_Clinton%20Parameters.pdf.
However, the U.S. officially signed onto the two-state solution only with the 2003
“Roadmap” for peace released by the U.S. and endorsed by the Quartet. See Roadmap,
supra note 6.
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national law, occupation is by definition a temporary institution, desig-
nated as a “transitional period following invasion and preceding the
agreement on the cessation of the hostilities.”440  The territory is to be held
with minimal modifications until its return to the occupied population.441
The Israeli occupation has tested the temporal— as well as other— limits of
occupation; both its longevity and the 2005 disengagement from Gaza have
sparked scholarly debates over the legality and definition of occupation.442
The Israeli High Court endorses the notion that Israeli rule over the West
Bank and Gaza is temporary; its stance constitutes recognition of both the
temporal limitations of occupation and the demographic consequences
involved in incorporating the territories into Israel, which would mean sac-
rificing a Jewish majority.443  Yet the prolonged nature of Israeli control
and the continuity of settlement activity seem to contradict the Court’s
440. Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judg-
ment, ¶ 214 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 31, 2033).
441. See supra notes39– 44 and accompanying text; Avinoam Sharon, Why is Israel’s R
Presence in the Territories Still Called “Occupation”?, 23 JEWISH POL. STUD. REV. 40, 43
(2011).
442. See, e.g., id. at 40– 41, 46– 48 (arguing that problematic and politically-oriented
legal reasoning has led to a situation where, despite withdrawal of troops from areas
where the Authority or Hamas exercise effective control, “under the definitions currently
advanced for ‘occupation,’ Israel lacks the power to end its occupation [since the current
trend seems to say that] having once attained the status of occupier, that status contin-
ues until such time as the occupied territory attains international recognition of sover-
eignty”); DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 277 (stating unequivocally that despite some
minority scholarship support for the position that Israel no longer occupies Gaza, “the
present writer cannot possibly accept it” considering the ongoing occupation of the
West Bank, Israel’s continuing effective control, and consistent military recursions);
Shane Darcy & John Reynolds, An Enduring Occupation: The Status of the Gaza Strip
from the Perspective of International Humanitarian Law, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
211, 241 (2010) (arguing that Gaza remains legally occupied even after Israeli disen-
gagement); SARI BASHI & KENNETH MANN, GISHA: LEGAL CENTER FOR FREEDOM OF MOVE-
MENT, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF GAZA 19 (2007) (arguing that Gaza
remains legally occupied even after Israeli disengagement); Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal
Gross, & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: The Framing of the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, 23 BERK’LY J. INT’L L. 551, 554– 56 (2005) (arguing that the legality of occupation
should be measured according to sovereignty, management of public life, and temporari-
ness and that, according to this metric, the Israeli occupation is illegal).
443. Israeli case law affirms the ostensibly temporary nature of the occupation. See,
e.g., HCJ 390/79 Duweikat v. Government of Israel [1979] (Isr.) (unofficial translation)
(finding civilian settlement Elon Moreh, built on seized private Palestinian land, illegal
under Israeli and customary international law, partially because “a military administra-
tion cannot create facts on the ground for its military needs which are predestined to
exist even after the end of military rule in that area, when the fate of the territory follow-
ing termination of military rule is unknown”), available at http://www.hamoked.org/
files/2010/1670_eng.pdf.  Kretzmer discusses the contrast between the 1979 Beit El
case, in which settlements were upheld, and the Elon Moreh case in which they were
struck down based on their apparent permanence.  He suggests that the presence of
Gush Emunim settlers as parties to the action brought the ideological argument for per-
manent settlement of the West Bank to the fore of the case in Elon Moreh, whereas the
Beit El case rested entirely on the statements of the government and military authorities
with regard to military necessity. KRETZMER, supra note 26, at 87– 89.  Kretzmer also
discusses the High Court’s emphasis on the temporary nature of occupation under
Hague Regulation Art. 43, noting that in previous cases Justice Kahan “stressed that the
main feature of a regime of belligerent occupation is its temporary nature, even when the
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position.  The vocabulary of temporary governance serves to prolong a sit-
uation that permits exploiting territory while limiting the effects of incor-
porating the Arab population.
The same is arguably true of the Oslo Accords, which presented
another period of apparently temporary change that offered asymmetrical
entitlements to the stronger party despite formal protections or rights
accorded to the weaker.  As with occupation, the professed neutrality of a
regime meant to be temporary— and thus preventing major changes to terri-
tory or population— may obscure the politics of particular tactics deployed
within and by the regime.  Extending a period of temporary change poten-
tially permits either side in a struggle to adapt the status quo to their
advantage.444  However, the stronger party retains a greater capacity for
exploiting the instability of indecision.445  For instance, Israeli negotiators
pressed for— and by and large won— the continuation of a customs union in
the 1995 Paris Protocol as opposed to the free trade agreement advocated
by Palestinian negotiators on the grounds that the latter would “prejudg[e]
the outcome of future status negotiations between the two sides.”446  They
presented the continuation of a customs union, by contrast, as a kind of
neutral perpetuation of the status-quo, but this provision— which largely
reflected Israeli preferences, with some revisions on trade arrangements—
fundamentally affected the subsequent relationship between Israel and the
Palestinian territories.
In other ways, however, the Oslo regime did not precisely parrot the
contradiction of temporary rule inherent in a 50-year occupation.  Instead,
it inserted a specific progress narrative into the situation: if the Authority
fulfilled its promise as an institutional guarantor of development and
security, and the PLO negotiated a political resolution in good faith, they
could expect the end of occupation.  Both parties would eventually benefit
from ‘peace,’ although the term itself remained ill-defined.  Over time,
international and Palestinian rhetoric increasingly translated the goal of
the progress narrative into an assumption of statehood.
The progress narrative depends on two seemingly contradictory fac-
tors: the assumption of a particular endpoint that is not only elusive but
also under-specified; and a series of conditions primarily aimed at the
weaker party to demonstrate progress toward the unspecified objective.
The former depends on the basic willingness of the parties to compromise,
although by 2013, many thought the parameters of that compromise were
occupation lasts for an extended period.” Id. at 66 (discussing HCJ 351/80 Jerusalem
District Electric Company v. Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, 35(2) P.D. 673).
444. For example, some Israeli commentators and politicians argue that Oslo has per-
mitted Palestinians to build up a state and army on the ground that will eventually
attempt to destroy Israel. See, e.g., Efraim Karsh, Arafat’s Grand Strategy, 11 MIDDLE
EAST Q. 3 (2004).
445. Continued settlement building by Israel— frequently during periods of negotia-
tions— offers the most obvious example. See, e.g., Neve Gordon & Yinon Cohen, Western
Interests, Israeli Unilateralism and the Two-State Solution, 41 J. PALESTINE STUD. 6, 10– 12
(2012).
446. Gross, Mending Walls, supra note 15, at 1599.
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already more or less known: two states based on the 1967 lines with land
swaps, a shared Jerusalem, limited refugee return, and a demilitarized Pal-
estine.447  This claim endows Oslo’s progress narrative with an imagined
endpoint, but in practice that endpoint has been more mythical than
real.448  The five-year timeline for the interim self-governing authority to
reach its final form elapsed, but its temporary nature remained.  The
Authority itself became the representative of both the transience of the pro-
cess (in that nobody imagined the Authority as the permanent government
of Palestine) and its entrenchment as a quasi-permanent proto-government
(few can imagine the dismantling of its institutions).  The establishment of
the Authority not only helped produce a sense of parity with Israel and a
focus on economic development but a commitment to a transition that it
both embodied and undermined.  With the end goal of the process ostensi-
bly obvious (two states living in peace) yet persistently unclear, the process
seemed to warrant major sacrifices while simultaneously appearing
meaningless.449
The second factor of the progress narrative remained relatively consis-
tent: the asymmetrical imposition of conditions.  As a result of the existing
power imbalance, the Palestinians had to meet a series of changing condi-
tions to demonstrate that their interim progress merited continuing toward
the end of the process.  These conditions ranged from international
requirements based on changing international norms (for example, the
requirement for internationally monitored elections to the Authority450) to
shared international and Israeli requirements (for example, the demand to
recognize Israel’s “right to exist,”451 to revise the PLO Charter,452 or
447. In a 2004 CNN interview, President Clinton commented, “The one good thing is,
we all know now.  We know more or less what a final deal is.”  Interview by Christiane
Amanpour with Bill Clinton, former U.S. President, (July 10, 2004), available at www.
cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/09/amanpour.clinton.transcript/.
448. See, e.g., Nathan Thrall, What Future for Israel? N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 15, 2013),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/what-future-israel/?pagina-
tion=false (“Like Netanyahu and Lapid, most Israeli Jews say they would accept a two-
state solution, but the terms on which they are willing to do so are hardly realistic”).
449. Two states were, as described above, discussed in the Roadmap.  The 2007
Annapolis Conference, which was intended in part to implement the Roadmap, also
mentioned two states explicitly.  George W. Bush, Joint Understanding Read by Presi-
dent Bush at Annapolis Conference (Nov. 27, 2007) (available at http://unispal.un.org/
UNISAuthorityL.NSF/0/586E84217636CF87852573A00065F149).  For further back-
ground on the Annapolis Conference, see INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE ISRAELI-PAL-
ESTINIAN CONFLICT: ANNAPOLIS AND AFTER (2007).
450. See Roadmap, supra note 6 (“Palestinians [should] undertake comprehensive
political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitu-
tion, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures.  The first Pales-
tinian Legislative Council elections on January 20, 1996, were internationally
monitored. See CARTER CENTER & NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, THE JANUARY
20, 1996 PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS (1997).
451. This was, famously, part of the Letters of Mutual Recognition, and constituted
one of the bases by which Israel agreed to recognize the PLO as the representative of the
Palestinian people. See Letter from Arafat, supra note 315 (“The PLO recognizes the right
of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security”).  The PLO originally announced its
recognition of the state of Israel in 1988, a declaration largely dismissed by both Israel
and the U.S.  Steve Lohr, Arafat Says P.L.O. Accepted Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1988, at
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replace the Palestinian leadership453), and Israeli calls (such as recognizing
Israel as the “nation state of the Jewish people” and ensuring its security as
a precondition for negotiations).  Conditions were set for Israel over time—
chiefly the cessation of settlement building or the dismantling of settle-
ment “outposts”454— but the inequality of incentives between the parties
undermined the formal equality of the requirements.  Thus, although tech-
nically a negotiated agreement would result in statehood for Palestine and
security for Israel, the latter could be at least partially achieved by unilat-
eral means,455 while the former remained hostage to the process.456  In
addition, while conditions were set for both parties, requirements for Israel
were enforced less consistently.457  As a result of the changing, escalating,
and often unfulfillable conditions, the transition— which regularly
demanded the fulfillment of new conditions, almost always by the Palestini-
ans— became increasingly and ironically enduring.
A1.  The 2002 Roadmap required in Phase I that the Palestinian leadership issue an
“unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s right to exist in peace and security.”
Roadmap, supra note 6.
452. The revision of the Palestinian National Charter, which originally called for
armed struggle and rejected Jewish nationality, was a longtime position of Israel.  In
1998, Israel’s Representative to the U.N. addressed a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General
insisting on the revision on the basis that “[n]o nation can agree to make itself more
vulnerable . . . when its negotiating partner remains ambiguous about whether it still
intends to wage a war of destruction.”  Letter from Dore Gold, Permanent Representative
of Israel, to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, (July 27, 1998)
(available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISAuthorityL.NSF/0/42F8BE5C16B35D420525
66550065C32A).  The Palestine Central Council voted for the revision in December
1998.  Paul Adams, Revising the PLO’s Charter, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 1998), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/232806.stm.
453. “I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised
by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and
liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will
actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able
to reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrange-
ments for independence. And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institu-
tions and new security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of America
will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its
sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle
East.” Press conference, George Bush, June  24, 2002.
454. The first phase of the roadmap required immediate dismantling of settlement
outposts built since March 2001, as well as a freeze on all settlement activity, including
natural growth. See Roadmap, supra note 6.
455. The construction of the Separation Barrier, the reduction of Palestinian labor,
the disengagement from Gaza, and the closure system are all considered elements of
Israel’s strategy to make itself less vulnerable to Palestinian resistance.  None required
Palestinian consent or cooperation and in fact were largely implemented over Palestinian
protest.
456. The Roadmap states that “an independent Palestinian state with provisional bor-
ders” may be achieved only “when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting deci-
sively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance
and liberty.” Roadmap, supra note 6, at 6. R
457. The most striking example is that of settlement-building, which has continued
throughout the process, including after the conditions set by the Roadmap.  Most
recently, Israel announced the expansion of East Jerusalem settlements shortly after the
resumption of peace talks.  Isabel Kershner, New Israeli Housing Bids Raise Tensions
Before Peace Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2013, at A4.
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Palestinians are not alone in facing obstacles to, or conditions for,
statehood and sovereignty.458  Yet their case differs from many other
instances because statehood (and self-determination through statehood)
appears to depend not only on internationally imposed conditions but on
asymmetrical obligations to an existing state which, having already
achieved recognition, is bound by far fewer conditions.
International reports have produced and reinforced the progress nar-
rative by encouraging particular processes (focused on negotiations, coor-
dination with Israel, the quelling of violence, and strengthening Authority
institutions), reiterating particular goals (peace or, later, Palestinian state-
hood), and omitting issues that might contradict the possibility of pro-
gress.  The 2012 UNSCO report to the AHLC offers a representative
statement:
Progress that benefits Palestinians throughout the occupied Palestinian terri-
tory creates conditions in which a final status agreement can— once con-
cluded— take root.  Without concerted efforts by the parties and the
international community to sustain the Authority, the valuable gains and the
Palestinian Authority itself could be at risk.459
The statement embodies many aspects of transitional rhetoric. First, the
notion that the increasing capacity of the Authority to govern within its
limited jurisdiction— as defined by standards of good governance and ser-
vice delivery set by the U.N., the World Bank, and the IMF— represents
“progress.”  Second, the statement supports the idea that progress within
the realm of statebuilding will help establish a final peace agreement.
Third, the report asserts that the international community needs to sup-
port the Authority in order to maintain the progress the international com-
munity has defined (good governance) in order to reach a goal it has
determined (two states).  As a result, the established causal chain has a
clear trajectory: international aid money must continue in order to fund the
Authority, which provides the only hope for peace.  These unquestioned
assumptions are found throughout international documents and discus-
sions.460  Questions such as whether aid money might create dependency,
whether statebuilding within occupation will contribute to its end, or how
progress has been defined (and by whom) remain largely unasked.
2. Permanent Transition
The permanent transition constructed by the Oslo regime rearranged
and entrenched, rather than reformed, the power relations that existed on
the eve of the Declaration of Principles.  These power relations have
458. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 56– 59 (2005). But see Developing the Palestinian Economy: An Interview with
George Abed, 34 J. PALESTINE STUD. 41, 49 (1994) (noting that “[o]ther nations seeking
self-determination are not normally subjected to this series of trials of ascending diffi-
culty in order to achieve their basic freedom”).
459. UNSCO, PALESTINIAN STATE-BUILDING, supra note 108, para. 13.
460. See, e.g., James R. Hooper III & Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Politi-
cal Dimension, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 355, 355– 372 (2003).
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remained remarkably consistent since the pre-Oslo era.  Despite the vocab-
ularies of progress, the creation of the Authority, and the enormous
amounts of international advice, consultation and management that sup-
ported it, the relative positions of Israel and the Palestinians have remained
unchanged.
Ironically, while the rhetoric of transition is ubiquitous, some of the
standard elements and tools of transitional processes have been largely
absent from the Oslo machinery.  Tropes of peace, conflict resolution,
statehood, rule of law, and good governance— all elements of post-Cold
War rhetoric around sovereignty and self-rule— recur repeatedly in interna-
tional reports and in the negotiations themselves.  Yet certain issues have
remained off the table, particularly human rights and transitional jus-
tice.461  These practices, which could potentially disrupt existing power
relations, were marginalized seemingly because they could have disrupted
negotiations, slowing ‘progress’ as defined by the process.462  International
practices and Israeli actions have instead promoted aspects of transition
that preserve the relative power balance on the ground, arguing that an
interim accord requires preservation of the status quo.
The Palestinian ‘transition’ since 1993 has invited an international
intervention of a very particular kind.  As Severine Autesserre has argued
in the context of the Congo:
[L]abeling the Congo a ‘postconflict’ situation instead of a ‘war’ situation
made a specific set of policies and procedures (such as the organization of
461. The failure to reference international law in general, and human rights law in
particular, in the Oslo Accords has been the topic of many debates.  The only reference
to human rights in the early Oslo Accords is in the 1994 Agreement, which states that
the parties “shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement
with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and
the rule of law.”  Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, supra
note 97, art. XIV.  Transitional justice was considered even less relevant.  However, in the
aftermath of Oslo, a number of scholars have suggested ways to incorporate transitional
justice measures into the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. See, e.g., Ron
Dudai, A Model for Dealing with the Past in the Israeli– Palestinian Context, 1 INT’L J. TRAN-
SITIONAL JUST. 249 (2007); Zinaida Miller, A Hybrid Commission of Inquiry for Israel/
Palestine, HARV. J. HUM. RTS. (2007); Ron Dudai & Hillel Cohen, Triangle of Betrayal:
Collaborators and Transitional Justice in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 6 J. HUM. RTS., 37
(2007); Ariel Meyerstein, Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Israel/Palestine: Assessing
the Applicability of the Truth Commission Paradigm, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 281
(2007); Ariel Matthew Weiner, Defeating Hatred with Truth: An Argument in Support of a
Truth Commission as Part of the Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 38 CONN. L.
REV. 123 (2005); Yoav Peled & Nadim Rouhana, The Palestinian Refugees and the Right of
Return: Theoretical Perspectives: Transitional Justice and the Right of Return of the Palestin-
ian Refugees, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 317 (2004); Aeyal Gross, The Constitution, Reconcilia-
tion, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 47
(2004).
462. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FIVE YEARS AFTER THE OSLO AGREEMENT: HUMAN
RIGHTS SACRIFICED FOR “SECURITY” 1 (1998) (noting that the international community has
accepted “peace” and security without regard for human rights). See also The United
States, Israel and the Palestinian Authority: Human Rights Neglected in Theory and Practice
by all Involved in “Peacemaking”, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 23, 1998), http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE02/009/1998/en/21d837ba-e754-11dd-b8d3-
c95de5982fed/mde020091998en.html.
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elections) seem natural and appropriate while another set of strategies (such
as work on local conflicts) seemed inappropriate and illegitimate.463
In the Israeli-Palestinian context, the vocabulary of transition encouraged
and legitimated policies directed at transforming the West Bank, and for a
time Gaza, into a democratic market economy while marginalizing resis-
tance to occupation.  Because the end was ostensibly in sight from the
beginning, both Israel and Oslo’s international sponsors interpreted
unsanctioned forms of resistance— including violence and what is labeled
as unilateralism— to Israeli occupation as resistance to the peace process
itself, and therefore as a rebellion against international auspices and assis-
tance.  The use of aid as a political mechanism to punish behavior such as
the election of Hamas and the pursuit of U.N. membership, or to reward
the appointment of a prime minister committed to good governance
became part and parcel of transition.464  Even after the repetitive lapse of
deadlines, the failure of negotiations, and the Authority’s longstanding
shortcomings, both the rhetoric and practices of transition have persisted.
A transitional regime, by its nature, resists criticism.  The fact that it is
both ostensibly temporary and has a purportedly defined objective means
that it appears to seek its own termination; its imminent end suggests that
critique is misplaced and should be postponed until it achieves its objective
and the new, permanent regime is put in place.  More fundamentally, the
label of transition helps limit resistance to the dominant understandings of
how governance should proceed.  Transitional regimes presume linear pro-
gress from a chaotic past to a stable future.  Because the transitional pro-
gress narrative assumes a specified endpoint— transition will end with a
negotiated pact, peace, and internationally midwifed statehood— it tends to
obscure the multiple forms of governance operating in the territories today.
The assumed teleology of the process combines with the presumed tran-
sience of the status quo to suggest that current actions may be understood
as events along a linear continuum measured according to their contribu-
tion to the inevitable endpoint.  As a result, both the potential of today’s
practices to obstruct tomorrow’s objective, as well as the definition of pro-
gress itself, remain largely unquestioned.
Conclusion
The persistence of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and the
continuation of Israeli occupation tends to obscure a series of remarkable
transformations in governance of the Palestinian territories since the 1993
Oslo Accords.  Occupation remains, but defending or denouncing the cur-
rent dispensation in those terms alone misses the ways that power and
authority function today.  After 1993, the Palestinian territories became a
subject of multilateral governance, managed and organized not only by
Israel but also by intergovernmental and non-governmental players from
around the world.  The relationship between Israelis and Palestinians has
463. AUTESSERRE, supra note 159, at 29.
464. See supra notes 237– 55 and accompanying text.
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been reimagined.  No longer simply occupier and occupied, Israel and the
Palestinian Authority have been transformed into putative equals engaged
in perpetual negotiation.  The institutions and objectives of conflict, occu-
pation, and resolution have been reformulated.  Governance of the territo-
ries is now comprised of a series of multilateral and technical projects
focused on statebuilding and economic development.  Those projects are
touted alternately as interim steps and as the ultimate goal.  What was once
a contest over ending occupation has become an ostensibly temporary
transition aiming for an elusive “final settlement”.
These changes came about in no small part because of the unexpect-
edly enduring presence of international actors.  The Accords reassigned
responsibility for the Palestinian population to the newly created Palestin-
ian Authority while leaving control over territory largely in the hands of the
Israeli government.  With the nascent Authority severely lacking capacity,
the arrangement was tenable only because of international support in the
form of money and expertise.  Originally understood as performing a stop-
gap role, international actors became instead— even if sometimes reluc-
tantly or ambivalently— integral pieces in the governance puzzle.  Over the
course of the following two decades, international actors and organizations
provided aid and development assistance necessary to preserve Palestinian
institutions that otherwise would have collapsed, facilitated peacebuilding,
development, and post-conflict reconstruction, and supported negotiations
between the parties.  International actors, however, brought more than
money or institutional blueprints: their ideas about how to make peace and
reconstruct territories after conflict reshaped the form and conceptualiza-
tion of governance and peace in the Occupied Territories.
The Palestinian case offers insights into two relationships common to
post-conflict and transitional territories: between ideas and institutions
and between local and international actors.  Analyzing only the ideational
realm— for example, with regard to peacemaking or post-conflict recon-
struction— diminishes the ways in which institutional implementation
changed those ideas on the ground.  By contrast, focusing only on institu-
tional practices obscures how particular concepts shaped a consensus
about what sorts of intervention were possible and desirable.  International
actors made institutional choices about how to intervene in the Israeli-Pal-
estinian conflict based on ideas common after the Cold War.  They advo-
cated bilateral negotiations and elections, supported shared governance,
and favored specific methods of economic development.  Once formed, the
institutions created ideational effects.  For example, the parties were
treated as if equal and the political stakes of occupation were discussed in
economic terms.  These ideas in turn affected institutional change in an
iterative cycle.  More broadly, the international presence as a whole relied
on the idea that resolution and recovery were international problems
requiring external intervention.
Similarly, international and local forces together produce and
reproduce governance.  International intervention did not obviate local
involvement any more than ideas alone dictated institutional arrange-
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ments.  In fact, as the international role became entrenched after 1993,
divisions between the “local” or “national” and the “international” blurred.
International conceptions of state-building were implemented by the Pales-
tinian leadership.  An occupation comprised of a set of legal and political
institutions specific to the West Bank and Gaza (and shaped by interna-
tional law) was transformed into a series of economic questions by interna-
tional as well as by Israeli and Palestinian actions.  Palestinians did not
passively receive international ideas any more than Israelis simply trans-
ferred occupation wholesale to the international community.  At the same
time, international actors and institutions were transformed by their
encounters on the ground.
Changing governance also altered the terms of contestation.  Parties
resisting the regime have increasingly used the vocabulary and practices of
the system they oppose.  As a result, resistance sometimes reinforces the
regime.  The ideas, vocabulary and institutions that structure Palestinian
governance today— equivalence between the parties, economic develop-
ment as peace, transient stages leading to resolution— have altered the polit-
ical logic of both sides.  Castigating the failure of Oslo in 2014, Israeli
Economy Minister Naftali Bennett proposed the annexation of Area C in
the West Bank, arguing that his initiative— which he suggested pairing with
“autonomy on steroids” in other areas465— as a way to “move forward after
20 years of trying one track”.466 Bennett’s proposal— effectively a repudia-
tion of the Oslo Accords— was ironically predicated upon them: he pro-
posed annexation of a zone specifically created by the Accords.  On the
Palestinian side, calls for Palestinian statehood through U.N. membership
similarly built upon the Accords by using the conception of equivalence
with Israel.
The statehood debate revealed as well how debates over ‘international-
izing’ the conflict mask the entrenchment of the regime.  When Palestinian
President Abbas sought U.N. membership or submitted requests for Pales-
tine to join international conventions,467 Israeli government officials
decried the move toward “internationalization”, one that Palestinians
defended in the same terms.  Their shared vocabulary and mode of argu-
ment— whether the Palestinian move was, as Israel claims, a unilateralist
rejection of Oslo or, as President Abbas suggested, a genuine attempt to
give negotiations a better chance to succeed— obscured the ways in which
the conflict was already international.  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can-
not be “made international” by an application to the United Nations or the
recognition of Palestinian statehood.  Rather, the use of statehood as a
resistance strategy exemplified the ongoing influence of international law
465. Tovah Lazaroff, Bennett: ‘We’ll Annex Area C and Offer the Palestinians Autonomy
on Steroids,’ THE JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 29, 2014.
466. Herb Keinon, In Wake of Talks’ Collapse, Bennett to Present PM with Proposal to
Annex Area C, THE JERUSALEM POST, May 15, 2014.
467. Jodi Rudoren, Michael E.  Gordon, and Mark Landler, Abbas Takes Defiant Step,
and Mideast Talks Falter, N.Y.  Times, Apr, 14, 2014.  The PLO agreed prior to this round
of talks to delay any bids for further recognition for the state of Palestine until the April
29 deadline for the conclusion of negotiations.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-2\CIN203.txt unknown Seq: 85  9-OCT-14 13:33
2014 Perils of Parity 415
and policy on the conflict itself.  The Oslo regime is by definition an inter-
national one, constructed and supported in part by external actors who
came to Jerusalem and Ramallah with agendas, preoccupations, and intel-
lectual commitments of their own.
Even attempts to “unmake” Oslo— a reaction to the seemingly endless
transition— themselves reveal the durability of the regime.  In 2014, a frus-
trated Palestinian President Abbas, reflecting a Palestinian sense that the
Authority’s primary purpose has been to relieve Israel of its responsibilities
as an occupying power, threatened to dismantle it, telling Israel, “You don’t
have to send tanks or use force. . . Just send a junior officer, a second
lieutenant, and we’ll give him the keys.”468 Yet it is not clear how the cur-
rent arrangement could be undone and even less so that the pre– 1993 sta-
tus quo could be restored.  Advocating the end of the Palestinian Authority
or the elimination of international aid appear today both implausible (the
machinery of governance and aid is so entrenched as to be largely impervi-
ous to challenge) and functionally problematic (even if the tactics could be
achieved, it is unclear that their goals would be achieved).  As a U.S. official
involved in the talks suggested, “new game rules and facts on the ground
were created that are deeply entrenched.”469
Perhaps most fundamentally for Palestinians, Oslo has penetrated one
of the most common registers for contesting activities in the West Bank and
Gaza: law and legality.  The new language of policy, partnership, develop-
ment and transition has a paucity of vocabulary for contesting occupation
or its components as legal or illegal.  The creation of an open-ended “transi-
tion” under Oslo converted the comprehensive regime of occupation into a
series of discrete topics to be managed and negotiated rather than adjudi-
cated. Issues once argued as law became more frequently discussed as
questions of policy.  Attention shifted to the shape of a future arrangement
rather than the resolution of past claims or an evaluation of present reality.
Today’s reality is captured neither solely by the label of occupation nor
by the ostensible equivalence, economic problem-solving, and transitional
processes of the Oslo era.  Israelis and Palestinian are not equal, their
problems are not technical and amenable to technocratic solutions, and
their supposed transition has, at best, stalled indefinitely.  Although the
Oslo Accords brought Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza certain
gains— chiefly in administering aspects of their own lives— the regime has
undermined its own ostensible objective of resolving the conflict.  Moreo-
ver, in the name of a transition to peace and development, the system has
concealed inequality behind parity, masked political stakes with economic
technocracy, and hidden permanence under transition.  Until the particu-
larity of the regime is understood and confronted, escape from it will
remain elusive.
468. Patrick Martin, Setting Borders First Priority for Abbas, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr.
21, 2014.
469. Nahum Barnea, Inside the Talk’s Failure: US Officials Open Up, YNET NEWS, May
2, 2014.
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